

The Baltic International Yearbook of  
Cognition, Logic and Communication

August 2009  
pages 1-29

Volume 4: *200 Years of Analytical Philosophy*  
DOI: 10.4148/biyclc.v4i0.137

DAVID SULLIVAN  
Metropolitan State College of Denver, USA

## RUSSELL'S TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT REVISITED

**ABSTRACT:** This paper seeks to delineate some of the significant modes of philosophical resistance to, and subversion of, British Idealism already operational in Russell's earliest work. One key tactic employed in *An Essay On the Foundations of Geometry* (1897) is to reorient the findings of the 'modern logic' of Bradley and Bosanquet by employing some 'transcendental' or neo-Kantian strategies. Russell thereby arrives at a number of conclusions with a metaphysical or epistemological import at wide variance with the approach of the British Idealists. Yet, despite this divergence, Russell does retain a basic commitment to at least one of their fundamental logical dogmas: the unity of analysis and synthesis. Should this reading prove fruitful, philosophical analysis in Britain, from its earliest strivings and first manifestations, can be seen as deriving significant sustenance from both Idealist and neo-Kantian sources.

### 1. PART ONE: RUSSELL'S CONTEXTS

Early in his career, Russell turned away from mathematics and towards philosophy because, among other important things, philosophy dealt with concepts that mathematicians took no notice of – viz. epistemic *necessity*. This re-orientation is already quite apparent in his first, still very mathematical, book, *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry* – hereafter, the *Essay*. Therein Russell argues for the existence of certain *a priori* conditions that are determining factors in our *experience*.

Toward this end, he is led to introduce the concept of a 'form of externality,' to exhibit its essential properties, to establish that it is indeed 'necessary to experience,' and, finally, to attempt to free this concept from all appearance of contradiction.

Important catalysts for such a project include a number of insights from nineteenth-century developments in geometry, chiefly concerning the reduction (or elimination) of the metrical properties typically associated with Euclidean geometry to the qualitative, or descriptive, properties of projective geometry. And although this aspect of Russell's work deserves further exploration, the following discussion focuses mainly on his curious attempt to merge insights garnered from the 'new' or 'modern logic,' promoted by the British Idealists, with certain transcendental approaches associated, in the main, with prominent neo-Kantian thinkers.<sup>1</sup>

It seems to be common currency that the most philosophically relevant context for the *Essay* is that found in the work of Bradley and Bosanquet. As a consequence, it is widely assumed that once Russell definitively rejected Idealism, under the promptings of Moore, there was nothing of value to be salvaged from this earliest effort. This paper will investigate the possibility for an alternative narrative, where important advances towards the coming program of philosophical analysis are already present and actively deployed in the *Essay*.<sup>2</sup>

Many have portrayed Russell's *Essay* simply as an attempt, albeit a failed one, to contribute to the existing literature of the (then) ascendant tradition of British Idealism (or they have simply taken this for granted entirely). But if *that* were Russell's intent, it is difficult, upon reflection, to see just how this peculiar volume was meant to appeal to the academic Idealists. After all, it is quite easy to imagine that even the leading lights of Idealism would have found it, mostly, to be incomprehensible. Neither mathematics nor the sciences generally held much interest for Bradley, for example. (Nor does Russell give any indication that he is seeking to extend their program into as yet unapproached areas.)

After all, Bradley's main enterprise was, on one side, deeply negative and sceptical: he wanted, first and foremost, to reveal how philosophy – and in the end, *all* human thought – not only fails to do justice to the rich and variable world given directly in experience, but indeed distorts

it in mostly unforgivable ways. Because our theorizing typically contains fatal contradictions, paradoxes that emerge inexorably whenever we try to follow any of these particular lines of thought to their ultimate conclusions, Bradley followed Lotze in elevating emotion and volition alongside cognition as equally valid sources of human knowing: consequently, it is of great significance to Bradley that we *feel* the world to be *one*, as our entire experience is composed of one unified continuum or whole. Yet little of this peculiar orientation is manifest in Russell's obviously constructive and epistemological project in the *Essay*.

Now it is true that despite his unwillingness to parcel out, in a naïve fashion, the universe into the received categories of human thought, Bradley did attempt a positive account, one that revealed, among other things, that many of our common opinions (and the philosophical theories elaborated thereon) are founded in nothing but illusions. In particular, space and time are unmasked as *unreal* – along with the necessary acknowledgment that all appearance of spatio-temporary discontinuity, that of its supposed parts, must go by the wayside as well.

Space, Bradley believed, was unintelligible without reliance upon spatial relations, that is, the relations holding between material objects that compose our experience of space. But the cognitive employment of such relations is only a necessity of *our thinking*, for 'thought is relational and discursive, and, if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide' (Bradley 1930, 150). But if relations themselves are ultimately unreal (only thought-things), then so are space, time, causality and every discernable aspect of our own capacity for thinking insofar as it involves an act of relating. All phenomena are relational but such relations are unsupported in the true nature of reality, correctly understood. Thus, even if geometry is the science of space, it is of no ultimate import, being nothing more than a complex construct that, however useful, is elaborated on the basis of an unsupportable foundation.

Russell does not appear to have been party to this line of thinking, whatever his purported state of mind at the time, for relations, it appears, are *here* (as elsewhere) an essential part of his theorizing. The very notion of a form of externality is, after all, a super-ordinating concept of such relations – akin to, but importantly different from, a Riemannian *manifold*. It is 'a general conception . . . containing space as a particular species':

The form of externality, like Riemann's manifolds, is a general class-conception, including time as well as Euclidean and non-Euclidean space . . . [and] it fulfils, if it has more than one dimension, all the functions which, in our actual world, are fulfilled by space (Russell 1897, 178).

As *necessary* to our experience, this form is *a priori* but not, therefore, subjective. Russell qualifies this last point as follows:

Of course, necessity for experience can only arise from the nature of the mind which experiences; but it does not follow that the necessary conditions could be fulfilled unless the objective world had certain properties . . . our conclusion, when a piece of knowledge has been declared *à priori*, can only be: Owing to the constitution of the *mind*, experience will be impossible unless the *world* accepts certain adjectives (Russell 1897, 179).

The very language of 'adjectives' calls to mind the priority of place accorded the new logic. Bradley used this special locution for *both* terms in the traditional structure of judgement, 'S is P'. This is because in asserting that S, the ostensible subject, is P, the ostensible predicate, we are not thereby to be construed as picking out some distinct portion of reality, represented by S, to which we may ascribe some peculiar property, represented by P. Rather, all judgements have, in the end, the same (ultimate) logical *form*: 'Reality is such that S is P' (Bradley 1914, 333). As he was wont to characterize this same position a few years earlier, Bradley insists that we acknowledge all judgements as involving ' . . . the attribution of an ideal content to reality, and so this reality is the [true] subject of which this content is predicated. Thus in 'A precedes B', this whole relation . . . is the predicate, and in saying this . . . , we treat it as an adjective of the real world' (Bradley 1922, 28).<sup>3</sup>

Now if such reliance by Russell upon the terminology (and the results) of modern logic is not mere window-dressing, it will be possible to vindicate Russell's own (contemporaneous) assessment that a full appreciation of his work would be predicated upon the reader's familiarity with 'modern logic.' He quite clearly warned one potential reader that ' . . . some knowledge of Kant and a modern logic (Lotze's, Bradley's, Sigwart's or Bosanquet's) would, I think, be necessary for a comprehen-

sion of most of the original parts of my work' (quoted in Griffin 1991, 127). Yet, as is obvious, this same excerpt also emphasized the necessity of supplementing this with 'some knowledge of Kant.' So another aspiration of this paper is to encourage a lively perception of the deeply Kantian nature of Russell's enterprise in the *Essay*.

Because the contribution of neither late-century Kantianism, nor of 'modern logic,' is readily apparent to contemporary readers, it is quite easy to simply read *over* (as well as to read *into*) much of what we find puzzling in Russell's remarks. Yet one other interpretative difficulty has been a lack of wonder and astonishment at much of what Russell has to say in the *Essay*. Consider, by way of example, this curious passage, contained in its penultimate pages:

... with the third period [of the history of metageometrical speculations], the interest in Philosophy diminishes, the opposition to Euclid becomes less marked, and most important of all, measurement is no longer regarded as fundamental, and space is dealt with by descriptive rather than quantitative methods (Russell 1897, 199-200).

Let us pause and consider just what Russell is trying to express in each of these three claims.

The first claim is, elsewhere, glossed by Russell as follows. The first period of metageometry, although critical of Euclid, 'preserved his synthetic method, while it threw over one of his axioms' (ibid., 13). The second period stood opposed to this approach and was 'guided by a philosophical rather than a mathematical spirit ... it treated space algebraically, and the properties it gave to space were expressed in terms, not of intuition, but of algebra' (ibid.). Although these thinkers had not yet grasped the notion of a geometry 'which does not deal with space as a quantity at all' (ibid., 16), this fact does not describe their main error. For that realization, we must first re-inscribe Russell's discussion inside the polemic of which it formed a part precisely because '[p]rojective geometry [itself] was developed in this highly polemical context' (Gandon 2008, 18).

Beyond this opposition between the old (Euclidean) synthetic and the new (Cartesian) analytic emerged anew a 'pure geometry' that carefully preserved the virtues of each of the preceding approaches, while putting their distinctive vices quickly aside. The new 'pure geometry'

was designed 'to compete with the analytic methods' *without* 'losing contact with the geometrical material':

At the beginning of the nineteenth century ... several mathematicians sought to challenge [the superiority of analytic geometry over the ancient] ... According to them, one advantage of the ancient method was that it never lost sight of the geometrical aspect of the subject. The mathematical superiority of the analytic method had thus an epistemological cost: the geometrical topic-specific features of the various problems, covered by a numerical veil ... were completely lost. The new task was then to develop a new pure geometry that would be able to compete with the analytic methods (ibid.).

This new 'pure geometry,' one that was rigorous without leaving the ground of intuition entirely behind, is identified as projective geometry. And it is the fact that 'Russell saw himself as part of this movement' that motivated, at least in part, 'his refusal to endorse the Riemannian analytic approach' (ibid., 19).<sup>4</sup>

This brings us to the last claim, namely the circumstance where measurement is no longer fundamental and space itself is conceived of in a non-quantitative fashion. But this was the very same approach that was quickly assimilated by some neo-Kantians. Cassirer, although not necessarily representative, was eager to provide a neo-Kantian gloss to projective (or, 'the new synthetic') geometry. For although, at first glance, the new approach, because it entails 'a stubborn struggle against the supremacy of analytic methods' appears to 'signify a reaction' (Cassirer 1923a, 76), Russell was correct in proclaiming that the projective approach is 'the universal '*a priori*' science of space, which is to be placed alongside arithmetic in deductive rigor and purity' (ibid., 88).

The semblance of a theoretical 'reversion' rested in the appeal to *intuition*. But this idea is now understood as one that has been fundamentally 'deepened and transformed' (ibid., 77). It is now assimilated to a quasi-conceptual status, following the Grassmannian imperative 'to raise the science of space to the rank of a universal science of form' (ibid., 97). To become a 'pure science of form' entails that 'in its proof does not go beyond thought itself into another sphere' (ibid.). Hence, among other things, we arrive at a pure but conceptualised intuition

(by means of a Kleinian group-theoretic characterization of geometry):

... 'intuition' is never concerned with the particular figure with its accidental content, but is ... directed to the mediation of the dependency of geometrical forms upon each other ... The construction of the spatial forms from original fundamental relations remains as an inviolable postulate, but this postulate must now be satisfied by purely geometrical means and without the introduction of the concepts of measure and number (ibid., 78-79).

Consequently, the science of geometry is both rationalized and generalized:

... projective geometry has with justice been said to be the universal 'a priori' science of space ... [where] [s]pace is here deduced merely in its most general form as the 'possibility of coexistence' in general, while no decision is made concerning its special axiomatic structure, in particular concerning the axiom of parallels (ibid., 88).

This curious approach thus combines an orientation for rigor and for pure thought with a continuing demand for the recognition of *the topic-specific character* of geometry. That which is specific to geometry – and which cannot be argued away – remains whatever is indicated by the use of the term *intuition*.<sup>5</sup>

Returning to the philosophical context, the primary *perspective* that Russell appropriates from the neo-Kantians is so widely accepted in our world of thought that it simply goes without saying. Consequently, it also easily goes unnoticed in the *Essay*, despite the fact that Russell takes time to underscore it again and again. This is the relative priority of (actual) scientific discovery over (mere) philosophical speculation. Russell takes great pains to emphasize that substantial progress has been achieved in the sciences (in the course of the nineteenth century) and that this is due, in no small part, to the (gradual) withdrawal of philosophical interference in the sciences.

A favourite whipping boy in the *Essay* is highlighted in Russell's treatment of Lotze, particularly with respect to the latter's rejection of metageometry. Lotze's argument – no matter how much philosophical

acumen it contains – simply misses the point, more often than not, being founded on 'several misunderstandings due to insufficient mathematical knowledge of the subject' (Russell 1897, 98). And since Lotze's practice asserts the traditional primacy of philosophy over the sciences, Russell instead 'rejoice[s] that Mathematics has not been imposed upon by Philosophy,' the first proper prerequisite for 'all who seek for a philosophy of space' (ibid., 108). Note that this attitude is not very Hegelian and hardly accords with some of the characterizations provided by others.<sup>6</sup>

Russell's adoption of the science of mathematics as a *Faktum*, a brute given for which it is the job of philosophy not to dispute but rather to account for, is akin to the familiar approach of the so-called Marburg school of Kant-interpretation. This approach could have come to Russell's attention in two main ways: first, by his familiarity with the massive Kant volumes of the British Idealist Edward Caird or, second, by his reliance upon Hans Vaihinger's famous commentary on the *Critique of Pure Reason*.<sup>7</sup> The Marburg approach emphasized that while Kant himself had attempted to coordinate his philosophy with the Newtonian science of his day, when science subsequently changed, philosophy must follow suit. The proper job of philosophy hence has important similarities with what came to be called 'rational reconstruction,' or the project of delineating the logical structure of the context of justification, as opposed to and as unconcerned with the psychological genesis of knowledge, the context of discovery.

Consequently, for the neo-Kantians, although Kant had indeed 'intended to be the philosophical systematiser of the Newtonian natural science,' his methodological breakthroughs are *not* 'entangled in the fate of the Newtonian physics.' As modern physics (subsequently) has advanced, the time has now come for us 'on the basis of Kant's presuppositions ... to advance beyond Kant.' Kant's epistemological approach must, when confronted with the progress of the 'exact sciences,' 'face the problems which are presented to it by the latter, with complete methodic independence. It stands to physics in precisely the relation, in which, according to the Kantian account, the 'understanding' stands to experience and nature' (Cassirer 1923b, 355).

Given this penchant for pure epistemological effort, subsequent to scientific discovery, it is no surprise that the Introduction to the *Essay* is filled with vigorous anti-psychologism in its Kant-interpretation (an-

other hallmark of Marburg neo-Kantianism) combined with an enterprise that invokes two (and only two) possible strategies for epistemic justification: the analytic or regressive method (Kant's approach in the *Prolegomena*) and the synthetic or progressive method (that employed in the *Critique*). However, Russell's characterization of these methods is unique and tied to his understanding of the contributions of the 'new logic' as espoused by, among others, the British Idealists.

After separating the *a priori* from any taint of the subjective, or the merely psychological, Russell then seeks to drive a wedge between it and apodeicticity. This is because although the *a priori* is apodeictic, the latter provides only an insufficient criterion for the former. Instead the *a priori* is best identified as the 'logical' and, in sharp contradistinction to this, 'all necessity rests on fact.' The *a priori* is rooted *not* in any fact *but* is established by logical regression from the 'fact' of our science to its 'fundamental postulate,' *that ultimate* upon which all reasoning in our science depends.

In the Introduction to the *Essay*, Russell first adverts to Bradley's discussion, one that is designed to de-construct the traditional conception of judgement as involving a relation between two ideas. Many modern logicians sought to establish the utter arbitrariness of all the distinctions traditionally made amongst judgements. Hence, Bradley adapts a well-known argument of Herbart's to the effect that seemingly categorical judgements may be more effectively glossed as hypothetical in form.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, on the Herbartian reading, 'The wrath of the Homeric gods is fearful' is best understood when transformed into 'If something is a Homeric god, then its wrath is fearful.'<sup>9</sup>

This approach allows, among other things, for a characterization of the subject under discussion, without simultaneously incurring any commitment to that particular subject's *actual* existence. And here one important observation, already noted by Wollheim almost fifty years ago, bears repeating:

The first step in the argument from 'S is P' to 'If anything is S, it is P' is clearly what would be regarded by contemporary philosophers as an instance of analysis: an original statement whose manner of expression is found misleading is removed in favour of another statement equivalent to it in meaning but expressed in a manner that is, in the relevant

respects at least, unobjectionable (Wollheim 1969, 64-65).

Next, Russell insists, as he will, again and again, that 'Every judgment – so modern logic contends – is both synthetic and analytic; it combines parts into a whole, and analyses a whole into parts' (Russell 1897, 38). This seemingly simple admission has many non-obvious consequences, as we shall see.

First, we need to note that at least one commentator, contemporaneous with Russell, took this doctrine to entail the consequence that no judgements are, at base, describable as identities but all are, rather, 'of the relational type' (Kemp Smith 1992, 38). This means that such judgements connect by means of 'a *relation*,' 'contents that as contents may be extremely diverse' (ibid.). Consequently, as 'the justification of a judgment is always to be looked for beyond its own boundaries in some implied context of coherent experience,' 'Kant is the real founder of the *Coherence* theory of truth' (ibid., 36). This is, again, because '[j]udgment is in all cases the expression of a relation which implies an organized system of supporting propositions' and, further, 'for the articulation of this system *a priori* factors are indispensably necessary' (ibid., 40). The familiar oppositions between analytic and synthetic, between *a priori* and empirical, between principle and fact, drop away as in each set of supposed oppositions, the two factors contribute equally to their mutual establishment.

As we may not appeal to induction or self-evidence as an epistemological criterion, we must acknowledge that 'Kant's so-called transcendental method' is intended to convey only the realization that 'all proof conforms . . . to the hypothetical method of the natural sciences':

Though the method employed in the *Critique* is entitled by Kant the 'transcendental method,' it is really identical in general character with the hypothetical method of the natural sciences. It proceeds by enquiring what conditions must be postulated in order that the admittedly given may be explained and accounted for. Starting from the given, it also submits its conclusions to confirmation by the given. Considered as a method, there is nothing metaphysical or high-flying about it save the name (ibid., xxxvii-xxxviii).

That Russell seems interested in retrofitting this Kantian apparatus

on to the machinery of modern logic has received scant discussion. He quotes Bradley to the effect that “‘arsenic poisons’ remains true, even if it is poisoning no one’ (Russell 1897, 4). Hence, this is best rendered in a hypothetical or conditional form as follows: ‘If arsenic is ingested, then it will poison the person ingesting it.’ This expresses a necessary truth because in all such judgements, we ought to acknowledge that such a judgement ‘asserts, prima facie, only the ground on which rests the necessary connection of premisses and conclusion’ (ibid., 135). But thereby we have only identified mere factual necessity, for ‘the ground of necessity is . . . a mere fact, a merely categorical judgment’ (ibid., 4). Our necessary judgements should be expressed in hypothetical form. There they are revealed to contain compressed inferences, whereby the antecedent of the hypothesis indicates the ground of the connection, which in this case is a fact (stated assertorically, as a categorical judgement).

As a consequence, in Russell’s mind, a further question emerges: what is the epistemic basis of this factual necessity?<sup>10</sup> Upon what (precisely) is it grounded? Hence he explains that ‘[t]o supplement this criterion, we must supply the hypothesis or ground, on which alone the necessity holds’ (ibid.). And, although ‘this ground will vary from one science to another,’ ‘there are [basically] two grounds on which necessity may be sought in any science’ (ibid.). And these two grounds, it appears, are none other than those discoverable by an application of Kant’s two distinct methods, those applied ‘in the Prolegomena . . . and in the Pure Reason’ (ibid., 4-5).

Accordingly, the two grounds are described by Russell as follows: the one resulting from the analytic method of the *Prolegomena* is the (aforementioned) ‘fundamental postulate,’ while the one based in the synthetic method of the *Critique* is ‘that element, in the subject-matter, which makes possible the branch of experience dealt with by the science in question’ (ibid., 5). Both are ‘grounds of necessity’ that cannot contradict each other: for no matter how much their methods (or their starting-points) differ, ‘the results cannot differ’ (ibid.). That the two must have the same results, although arrived at in entirely different ways, is something found in Kant. But Russell is keen to emphasize this for reasons that will be discussed later. Of course, as should be obvious, one method cannot be privileged over the other, for both are part of the

necessary circle of coherence.

## 2. PART TWO: RUSSELL’S ARGUMENTS

Russell takes Bradley to have established that all necessary categorical judgements should be glossed as hypothetical in form and that this form, as a result, describes some necessary connection between antecedent and consequent. In this way it asserts something, at least provisionally, about the nature of reality, *without* asserting that the antecedent of the conditional is, in fact, the case. It is the *connection* ‘of which [the] necessity is predicated,’ and yet this very ‘necessity always points beyond itself to a ground of necessity, and asserts this ground rather than the actual connection’ (Russell 1897, 4). This ‘ground’ is ‘a mere fact,’ one that may be described as either our science’s ‘fundamental postulate’ – ‘the postulate on which alone its reasonings are possible’ – or its ‘essential nature’ – or, ‘experience of the subject-matter of the science’ – depending upon whether we proceed analytically or synthetically (cf. Russell 1897, 5).

Unfortunately, Bradley is, at first glance, exceedingly obscure about the exact nature of this ‘fact’ or ‘ground.’ But he is quite candid that ‘what hypothetical judgments assert, is simply the quality which is the ground of the consequence’ (Bradley 1922, 88):

The fact that is affirmed as an adjective of the real, and on which depends the truth or falsehood, does not explicitly appear in the judgment . . . What is affirmed is the mere ground of the connection . . . a latent quality of its disposition . . . ‘if you had not destroyed our barometer, it would now forewarn us.’ In this judgment we assert the existence in reality of such circumstances, and such a general law of nature, as would, if we suppose some conditions present, produce a certain result (ibid., 87).<sup>11</sup>

What this suggests is that because ‘[t]he fact that is affirmed . . . does not . . . appear,’ all conditional statements are, taken on their own, effectively to be construed as counterfactual, barring the factual affirmation of their antecedent in some further inference. What happens is that we do assert of reality some connection, one that necessarily results from our miniature ‘thought experiment.’

Applying these lessons learned, it is now apparent that the seemingly categorical judgement, such as ‘All trespassers will be prosecuted,’ is true even if no one is trespassing (and ought to be accorded the logical form  $(\forall x)(Tx \supset Px)$ ). But what ‘backs up’ this claim is an *unstated* connecting link between the two concepts, a ‘something’ that does not appear in the judgement at all: this can be nothing but *the fact of positive law* about which we might elaborate by saying that this is something comprised of both civil and criminal prohibitions that delimit and protect, among other things, property rights and whose violation will demand and receive remediation in, for instance, courts of law. None of this appears anywhere near what is stated in the surface form of the actual judgement but it is, nevertheless, the ‘ground’ or ‘quality’ or ‘fact’ that underwrites the claim asserted in the judgement.

Russell then takes this *fact* to be somehow equivalent to a Kantian *Faktum* and, hence, discoverable by the transcendental method of either analysis or synthesis. And although this ground of necessity is thus *transcendentalized*, this notion of ground also retains and refracts holist impulses common to British Idealism.<sup>12</sup> It also supplements what could appear to be a glaring *lacuna* in Bradley’s account: for although he highlights the fact’s necessity, he ‘does not specify the unconditional fact that . . . conditional propositions assert’ (Allard 2005, 89). If this is so, then Russell’s solution is intended to step into this looming breach by providing some positive characterization of the hitherto unspecified ground.

It is now possible, almost, to turn our attention to Russell’s employment of the transcendental method of proof. But before so doing, there remains one other issue having to do with the relationship between knowledge and experience in Bradley and Russell (and the connection for both with ‘diversity’). This is important, as the notion of experience in Russell, insofar as it follows Bradley, is very un-Kantian (and *vice versa*). For Kant (at least at A1), experience is, as the ‘first product,’ the ‘raw material of sensible impressions’ (Kant 1965, 41). For Bradley, although experience maintains this primacy, it is something that is never received in anything like a piece-meal fashion but is instead always given as ‘a whole’ (cf. Bradley 1930, 128ff).

For Bradley, experience is primal, immediate, unanalysable, omnipresent and enduring. It is a given *plenum* of feeling but not a mere

*Vorstellungsverlauf* and, although *first*, not merely *one* stage among many in the evolution of consciousness. Nor is it simply mine and mine alone, for it ‘alone is real.’ These twists and turns have been admirably summarized, in all their peculiar complexity, by, *mirabile dictu*, Eliot:

There is immediate experience, contrasted with ideal construction; which is prior, and in some sense, certainly, prior in time, to the ideal construction. But we go on to find that no actual experience could be merely immediate, for if it were, we should certainly know nothing about it; and also that the line between the experienced, or the given, and the constructed can nowhere be clearly drawn. Then we discover that the difference in no instance holds good outside of a relative and fluctuating point of view. Experience alone is real, but everything can be experienced. And although immediate experience is the foundation and the goal of our knowing, yet no experience is only immediate. There can be no absolute point of view from which real and ideal can be finally separated and labelled. All of our terms turn out to be unreal abstractions; but we can defend them, and give them a kind of reality and validity (the only validity which they can possess or can need) by showing that they express the theory of knowledge that is implicit in all our practical activity (Eliot 1964, 18).

These same constraints apply to all of our ordinary epistemological arsenal: for instance, talk of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are only suggested by our epistemic project and, in reality, ‘[i]n feeling the subject and the object are one’ (ibid., 21):

It is hard to disabuse ourselves of the prejudice that feeling is something subjective and private, and that it affects only what feels, not what is felt. The reason for this is not far to seek. Feeling itself is properly speaking neither subjective nor objective, but its development into an articulate whole of terms and relations seems to affect the conscious subject, but not the objects of which the subject is conscious . . . The only reality which feelings can have, it is thought, is in consciousness; we do not think of the external world as

dependent upon feeling, unless we go so far as to say that it is dependent upon being felt – unless, that is, we think of it as an adjective of some transcendental self (ibid.).

Feeling (or immediate experience) persists as the ‘glue’ that binds our notions and sensations together while remaining merely ‘an aspect, and an inconsistent aspect in knowing’ (ibid.).<sup>13</sup>

It might appear that we have gone very far a field indeed, deep into Bradleyan territory. But this detour was necessary for it reveals the suspiciousness of Russell’s explicit claim that ‘I use ‘experience’ as Bradley does.’ He simply cannot be party to Bradley’s view that experience is nothing but *unanalysable feeling* and, hence, is something that can only be indicated but never defined. For if this were the case, then the investigation into identifiable transcendental constraints on what things could become an object of experience for us would be superfluous. Russell must, as a consequence, consistently recognize and defend a Kantian dimension to the notion of experience.<sup>14</sup>

What then, in Bradley’s account, could have appealed to Russell? The answer that first suggests itself is rooted in the fact that Bradley’s notion both maximizes the sphere of the experienceable while maintaining a degree of ineliminable primacy. Consequently, experience *qua* immediate feeling features prominently in what most commentators have taken to be Russell’s main transcendental argument, that contained in Part IV of the *Essay*. There Russell is taken to have tried to establish that ‘... a form of externality is necessary for the possibility of experience, because the givens of experience are complexes’ (Grayling 1996, 259).

By following the text, one might opt for the following rendition:

1. ‘all knowledge is necessarily derived from the *This* of sense-perception’;
2. ‘such [an] extension [of our knowledge] is only possible if the *This* has that fragmentary yet complex character’; and
- Therefore, 3. ‘some form of externality, given with the *This*, is essential to all knowledge, and is thus logically *à priori*’ (Russell 1897, 183).<sup>15</sup>

The first premise is taken by Russell to be equivalent to the claim that all knowledge must involve recognition of diversity in relation. This argument is analytic because we start not with our ordinary experience but

with established knowledge and argue backwards from that to what, although it cannot be apprehended directly in experience, must nevertheless structure and make possible our knowledge as founded on that experience. And, thereby, we establish that knowledge to be *a priori*.

This argument Russell takes to be the ‘converse’ of that provided by the British Idealists. Russell describes both Bradley and Bosanquet as committed to the following line of thought:

1. In our experience, all phenomena are in space and time.
2. Space and time are, in their very nature, continuous.
- Therefore, 3. No mere particular exists (but, rather, only a diversity that must be grasped as a universal).

We start, in the latter argument, from experience and use that as the basis for deducing the existence of some necessary ‘element,’ operative in the experience that makes up our knowledge: in the first case, the axioms of projective geometry; in the second, the (concrete) universal. Consequently, in such arguments the validity of our knowledge (or some cognitive ability) does not serve as that premise.

Yet Russell also refers explicitly to a much earlier argument, found in Part III, as ‘a transcendental argument.’ This ‘first’ argument is intended to establish that ‘any form of externality must fulfil certain conditions.’ These conditions are as follows: the form must (i) be (essentially) relative, (ii) it must be homogeneous, (iii) it must be (infinitely) divisible, and (iv) it must possess a finite number of dimensions. Our form of externality must also admit of being conceived without the matter required to fill it – there must be form prior to and separate from matter. The argument is presented (under the rubric of hypothesis in §127) as follows:

1. There is an experience of externality.
2. ‘If there be [such] experienced externality, ... then there must be a form of externality with such and such properties’ (Russell 1897, 135).

Therefore, 3. ‘[I]f there be such a form, it must possess the properties embodied in the axioms of projective Geometry’ (ibid., 136).

But this argument, if correct, while it does say something about the essential properties of a necessary condition of our experience, says *nothing (directly) about the necessary conditions of our possible experience*. So in what sense is this argument *transcendental*? Remarkably, Russell never indicates just what he takes a transcendental argument to be, so the reader can only assume that it has something to do with the two grounds, the two modes of argument, the two Kantian *Lösungsmethode* just mentioned.<sup>16</sup>

If this is the case, however, then our first argument can only be taken to be an example of the *synthetic* method of transcendental argument. This is because here we do *not* argue from the ‘fact’ of our science – or our actual knowledge – back to the logical postulate that underwrites all our reasoning in that science, but rather from an aspect of our ordinary experience forward to some possibly unacknowledged but cognitive element, codifiable in our science, that underwrites our abilities with regard to that experience. Rather, this last description applies only to the technique utilized in the main argument.

Furthermore, the first argument takes place within the context of a number of other different stipulations stemming from at least two distinct sources. First, the ‘form of externality’ is, as we have seen, a concept (a ‘conception’), one that ‘includes both [Euclidean and non-Euclidean spaces], and neglects the attributes in which they differ’ (Russell 1897, 134). Second, our undertaking, under the guidance of some Grassmanian ideal, is portrayed as that of attempting ‘to construct a branch of pure mathematics, a science, that is, in which our object should be wholly a creature of the intellect, which should yet deal . . . with extension - extension as conceived, however, not as empirically perceived in sensation or intuition’ (ibid.). And, finally, the critical recognition that ‘. . . what is merely intuitional can change, without upsetting the laws of thought, without making knowledge formally impossible: but what is purely intellectual cannot change, unless the laws of thought should change, and all our knowledge simultaneously collapse’ (ibid., 135). All of these are neo-Kantian (and not primarily Idealist) in origin, especially the latter that posits the unity of *logos* with *ratio*.<sup>17</sup>

To these Russell appends a final requirement, one that stipulates that,

. . . there must be, in perception, at least one ‘principle of

differentiation’, an element, that is, by which the things presented are distinguished as various. This element, taken in isolation, and abstracted from the content which it differentiates, we may call a form of externality (ibid., 136).

The last desideratum Russell takes to have been derived from the new logic of British Idealism. But has it not been established that, for the British Idealists, the fundamental form of judgement takes the Absolute as its subject, appearing always in the form ‘Reality is such that S is P’? Why does Russell insist on highlighting the form of externality alongside what is, after all, the first appearance of what he calls diversity in relation, the claim that the content of our perception must involve mutually diverse things?

In a footnote, Russell takes pains to point out that by a ‘principle of differentiation’ he expressly does *not* mean a ‘principle of individuation’ of the sort (justly) criticized by Bradley (ibid., 136n). In the *Principles of Logic*, Bradley complains that we ought not to speak of ‘space and time’ as:

. . . ‘principles of individuation,’ in the sense that a temporal or spatial exclusion will confer uniqueness upon any content. It is an illusion to suppose that, by speaking of ‘events,’ we get down to real and solid particulars . . . It is true that, in the idea of a series of time or complex of space, uniqueness is in one sense involved; for the parts exclude one another reciprocally. But they do not exclude, unless the series is taken as one continuous whole . . . Apart from this unity, a point on its recurrence could not be distinguished from the point as first given (Bradley 1922, 63-64).

In other words, every attempt at individuation (uniqueness) or differentiation (difference) will be utterly dependent upon the system against which such acts of individuation take place. This argument thus appeals to the holist impulse that is encountered always and everywhere in the writings of such thinkers.

This passage follows a section in which Bradley has tried to establish (once again) that ‘[t]he real is inaccessible by way of ideas’ (ibid.). If we think we can attain concrete particularity via the use of demonstratives, to carve out some particular part of reality, in the very attempt

‘to become concrete and special, you only succeed in becoming more abstract and wholly indefinite. ‘This’ ‘now’ and ‘mine’ are all universals’ (ibid.). This suggests that we have strayed into the territory of ‘identity in difference,’ something that is another strict analogue of their logical doctrine that every judgement is both analytic and synthetic.

The British Idealists insisted, as we have seen, that ‘[e]very judgment is both analytic and synthetic’ (Bosanquet 1888, I, 97); and, further, that ‘[t]he content of every judgment is always a significant idea, that is to say, a recognised identity in differences’ (ibid., I, 96). Furthermore, ‘[a]n identity in relation to its differences may always be regarded as a whole in which there are parts’ (ibid.). Bosanquet seeks to explain this idea as follows:

I said at the beginning of this section that every judgment is both analytic and synthetic. This assertion demands no explanation, if we remember our account of judgment as always involving identity in difference. But I will attempt to illustrate its meaning more fully.

If I say ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon,’ I start with an individual Caesar, whose continued identity extended through a certain space of time and revealed itself in a variety of acts, and I exhibit his identity in one of the acts and moments - its differences - through which it persisted. What I mean by the affirmation is that he, the Caesar who had before conquered Gaul, and who was afterwards murdered on the Ides of March, displayed his character and enacted a part of his history by crossing the Rubicon. This is a clear case of exhibiting an identity in difference (ibid., I, 99).

Although the clarity of the case may be disputed, this discussion does relate directly to an earlier remark that ‘the moral character of a man is a whole in which his several acts of volition are the variously dependent parts’ (ibid., I, 97). (Moral character is thus not a mere sum of our individual actions but a totality in which some acts are more significant (functionally) than others: morality is not a simple game of addition and subtraction in columns labelled good and bad.) As a result, the relationship of the parts in the whole is not thinkable as ‘a sum of units’ but is rather ‘a synthesis of differences’ (ibid.).

Consequently, in making statements about Caesar, one ‘construct[s] or make[s] synthesis of the individual whole in question, by exhibiting it as a whole that pervades, and absorbs in itself, each or all of its differences’ (ibid., I, 99). But, simultaneously, one also thereby ‘analyse[s] the individual whole that is called Caesar by specifying one of the differences that may be considered as a part within it’ (ibid.). In making the statement ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon,’ one is not saying that it was the babe in the cradle who crossed the Rubicon (a difference) although by ‘Caesar’ one does indeed mean to encompass all of the moments of the life that comprised it (an identity).

This provides a possible rationale for Russell’s substitution of and preference for the phrase ‘diversity in relation’ over ‘identity in difference.’ Considered ‘synthetically,’ we have an identity in difference, or the need to construct a synthesis as exhibited by the relation of the parts in the whole. Considered ‘analytically,’ we have diversity in relation, or the need to analyze the whole by specifying at least one of its differences as a part. And as we have seen, diversity in relation plays an essential role in the main transcendental argument.<sup>18</sup>

There is much, much more that could be said about Russell’s arguments. But one salient observation is the possibility that both the first and the main transcendental argument were what Moore had most clearly in his sights in his critical review of the *Essay*. One might well imagine that Moore’s main complaints would be directed against the false views of the nature of judgement promoted by the British Idealists, especially as endorsed by Russell. But Moore’s criticisms, while touching on the points of intersection between British Idealism and neo-Kantianism, are almost completely directed at the Kantian side of the equation.<sup>19</sup> Although not presented by Moore in this fashion, his two main objections can be portrayed as directed against the two forms that a transcendental argument may take. And, I will suggest, there is a response to at least the first objection, which, although not a knockdown argument, can provide a possible solution from a neo-Kantian perspective.<sup>20</sup>

Moore’s first objection might be deemed the regress objection and, as such, seems to be directed primarily at the analytic form of the argument. Here Moore points out that, according to Russell’s own lights, our account of necessity demands a ground of necessity. He thus ob-

jects that the ground of necessity must ‘either be simply categorical, or else it must be necessary and require a further ground’ (Moore 1899b, 399). This objection is valuable because it highlights the fact that, in Russell’s hands, the analytic method is now being construed as one that stresses the formal relations of logical (or presuppositional) dependence amongst propositions. Consequently, Moore’s assumption appears utterly commonsensical: he thinks that the analytic method is interminable because it can never find a foundation in any necessary proposition.

However, Moore fails to consider the possibility that the ground of our necessity may ultimately rest in something non-propositional in nature. This may, after all, be what Russell was trying to indicate when he said that the necessity might arise ‘from the nature of the mind’ (Russell 1897, 179). This formulation seems to suggest that the structure of our cognitive apparatus is a determining factor and that there is no subsequent reason to try and gloss that apparatus in a propositional fashion.

Indeed, for the British Idealists, the ultimate ground is always something non-propositional, what they called the ‘system.’ ‘Facts’ merely stand by themselves and, as such, are neither grounds nor consequences. A ground, on the other hand, ‘implies a consequent other than, though fundamentally one with, itself’ (Bosanquet 1888, I, 253). And this ground too is, in some sense, a fact, albeit what we could call a structural (or structuring) fact. This Bosanquet illustrates by considering an exploded map or a puzzle, an example that highlights that each piece is utterly dependent upon and so exhibits ‘relativity within a system’ (ibid., I, 254). A given piece by itself, abstracted from the whole, means or determines nothing. Rather

... it is only within it [the system] and by reason of it that each piece has a prescribed place in virtue of its own shape combined with the shapes of all the other pieces. All the pieces being given, of course, the arrangement is given too; but if nothing is given, of course all is in the air, and one arrangement and set of shapes is as likely as another (ibid., I, 255).

The arrangement of pieces is not itself a piece, but something is a piece only in virtue of some (pre-given) arrangement. Our ground

supplies a necessity although it itself is no necessity but only fact. And this is the view that Russell seems to have adapted here rather than the common neo-Kantian reference to an *Erkenntnisquelle* and, thereby, he effectively merges the two approaches together.

Russell’s earliest work is thus not a philosophical dead-end, one that he subsequently rejected wholesale. It is of course conceivable that this is how things seemed to him.<sup>21</sup> But this paper has tried to suggest that Russell’s contexts are perhaps more complex than generally recognized and that, as well, Russell’s arguments are much more Kantian (or neo-Kantian) and much less Hegelian than previously acknowledged. In both cases, the discussion has been oriented at suppositions that seem, to this author, to be quite prevalent.<sup>22</sup>

What is clearly retained is the idea that there is a fundamental constraint on the parameters of all philosophical investigations: namely, the need to root all such investigations in the positive results of the actual sciences and to invoke ‘analysis’ (or the regressive method) in the discovery of our sciences’ ‘first principles.’ And this brings us, finally, to the question of analysis.

### 3. AFTERWORD: RUSSELL AND ANALYSIS

Since the development of interest in the topic of the history of analytic philosophy, there have been a number of attempts to stipulate the criterial marks of philosophical analysis. Unfortunately, many of these accounts – irrespective of their erstwhile adequacy – have produced results that are, at first glance, counter-intuitive. First and foremost amongst these must be included those that have proposed the elimination of prominent names from the established ranks of canonical analysts.

Here should be counted Monk’s remarkable *reductio* of the Dummettian strictures, one that shows, upon such restrictive criteria, that Russell himself cannot be counted an analytic philosopher (cf. Monk 1997). This paradox exposes the fact that Dummett believes the analytic impulse may be labeled ‘the extrusion of thoughts from the mind’ and that this is a move that immediately cashes itself out as the philosophy of language. But Dummett fails to consider that, even by his own criterion, the analysis of language cannot be viewed as an end in itself.

Rather, it is only, perhaps, the main mechanism by which thoughts can be handled and investigated, in a non-psychologistic fashion.

Now Russell later opposed the philosophy of language taken on its own and for its own sake. But this did not mean that he did not care about the philosophy of language or that he did not believe it worthwhile to subject language to rigorous philosophical or logical analysis. Indeed, 'logical analysis' was one name he adopted for his philosophy. But what is logical or philosophical analysis? And what program, if any, did Russell seek to advance for the remainder of his very long life?

Here it will pay to defer to those scholars of Russell who have taken his entire career into careful consideration. One such expositor has suggested the following formulation:

Throughout his career Russell adhered to a characteristic view of the nature of philosophical analysis according to which it has two parts. Firstly, philosophical analysis proceeds backwards from a body of knowledge to its premisses, and, secondly, it proceeds forwards from the premisses to a reconstruction of the original body of knowledge. Russell often called the first stage of philosophical analysis simply 'analysis', in contrast to the second stage which he called 'synthesis' (or, sometimes, 'construction'). While the first stage was seen as being the most philosophical, both stages were nonetheless essential to philosophical analysis (Hager 2003, 310).<sup>23</sup>

And if our method of analysis involves a science arranged in the form of a deductive system, then it may very well be that such a process 'leads to premises that are decreasingly self-evident.' (And again, in all events, this process is almost never 'final' and so: 'Analysis is unlikely to be final.')

Now if this is true, and if my peculiar reading can be defended, then we may now codify one of the main theses that this paper has sought to advance, as follows:

Russell's reliance upon 'philosophical analysis' *in at least two important senses* did not develop only in his works of the twentieth century but was already present in the *Essay*, where it is clearly identified with the 'regressive method'

championed by the neo-Kantians and, to a lesser extent, with the correlative 'progressive method', when also combined with the decompositional analysis of propositional content, as encountered in the main figures of modern logic.

Of course, Russell came to see that the logic of the British Idealists was the wrong logic and that is why, on its own, this book is not essentially a contribution to the analytic tradition. But the importance and centrality of logic to the philosophical enterprise did not suffer a similar change.

The analysis of propositions (and their content) is familiar in the history of logic from Herbart and Bolzano forward. But this type of analysis by itself does not yet compose the basis for a philosophical movement: rather, analysis as a philosophical strategy can only emerge when those decompositional techniques of earlier logicians are combined with the analytic method of logical regression from the basic results of the positive sciences, as advocated by the neo-Kantians. The final necessary step is, in turn, when these twin techniques are further supplemented by the correctly conceived logical calculus of Frege and Peano – or, transformational analysis. (Modern logic is also 'decompositional,' although it cannot provide the correct logical gloss because of the weakness in its 'transformational' toolbox.)<sup>24</sup>

For this reason, philosophical analysis is not attained by either the British Idealists or the continental neo-Kantians – despite their status as 'outliers' to analysis proper – but emerges only when the first approach is extended by means of the second. Pre-analytic philosophy in the nineteenth century offers numerous signs of one or more of these impulses. But analytic philosophy proper only emerges when all three come together in a single project. And for this reason – whatever their other important differences – Frege and Russell are indeed the founders of that movement of thought that came to be known as analytic philosophy.<sup>25</sup>

Perhaps, for some of us at least, too much time has been spent in Russell's long shadow. Many, myself included, still remember a time when Russell's 'theory of descriptions' was commonly touted as the exemplary case of how to solve a philosophical problem (for once and for all) – using the twin techniques of analysis and construction (synthesis) – a case whose lesson was neatly anatomized by Wittgenstein: 'It is Russell's service to have shown that the apparent [*scheinbare*] logical form

of a proposition does not have to be its real [*wirkliche*] one' (Wittgenstein 1922, 4.0031). This 'given' is now no longer the case and perhaps even in those exceptional places where it is still spoken of, its time has long since passed.

In all events, whatever the ultimate fate of the philosophical paradigm that gave such pride of place to Russell, this much is now clear: there has been far too much dependence on facile interpretations of Russell's own self-characterizations, especially those many recollections made several decades removed from the topics and events under discussion. The best we can now attempt is to try to re-read the *Essay* with new eyes and, as well, a healthy dose of suspicion that either we (or Russell) have quite got things right. Then we may discover that, despite the received views to the contrary, we ought to see both the *Essay* and analytic philosophy itself (at least in some of its first strivings) as peculiarly Kantian 'not just in inspiration but in aim and, to a significant degree, content' (Grayling 1996, 245).<sup>26</sup>

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Some opening observations. First, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive if we were to accept Kemp Smith's characterization: 'modern logic, as developed by Lotze, Sigwart, Bradley, and Bosanquet, is, in large part, the recasting of general logic in terms of the results reached by Kant's transcendental enquiries' (Kemp Smith 1992, 181). Irrespective, modern logic can be briefly characterized by its commitment to three basic tenets: (1) a *contentual* view of logic, or the belief that formal investigations are neither devoid of cognitive content nor should these principles avoid application in cognitive activities. This entails, among other things, a rejection of the claim of merely 'formal' logic and a new methodological orientation for logical investigations; (2) a *holistic* approach that favours, first, the priority of the judgement over the concept and, second, of the system over the individual inference; and (3) a new notion of *logical form* rooted in the abandonment of the traditional models of the judgement and of inference, namely the subject-predicate form and syllogistic argument. I have detailed some aspects of the rise of the new logic in Sullivan 2008, especially pp. 612-628. Although their analyses of logical form, and the conclusions drawn from them, differ, these three beliefs unite both Frege and the logicians of the British Idealist movement, Bradley and Bosanquet. Finally, for our present purposes, we may relieve ourselves of the task of expounding what Bradley and Bosanquet actually said, turning instead to the more modest task of illuminating just what Russell took them to have said. This is a helpful restriction of purpose given Bradley's proclivity for taking away with one hand what he has just given with the other.

<sup>2</sup> One obvious and central weakness of my reading is that I must treat the concluding passages as an unfortunate afterthought, motivated in no small part by the so-called

Tiergarten program for an encyclopaedic dialectic of sciences.

<sup>3</sup> This is one of the bases for Bradleyan anti-psychologism: in making a judgement we are not referring to the contents of our own mind but to reality as actually given in experience. This surely is echoed in Russell's later insistence that 'Mont Blanc' *the object* is what is at stake in my use of the term in propositions.

<sup>4</sup> The two seminal techniques of this approach lay in 'the principle of duality' and in 'quadrilateral construction.' And the two most important figures in pure geometry were thus respectively Poncelet and von Staudt. As Russell later portrayed it, '[t]he true founder of non-quantitative Geometry is von Staudt' (Russell 1903, 421), possibly because of von Staudt's attempted elimination of the concept of 'distance' in the cross-ratio.

<sup>5</sup> It is tempting to amalgamate all formal developments in geometry in the nineteenth century as part of one, continuous movement away from intuition and towards greater abstraction. But it may be that the singular import of projective geometry, in the *English* context, was considered rather 'as a way of rehabilitating spatial intuition in geometry' (Griffin 1991, 136). Of course here Russell followed on the heels of Cayley's innovations that 'showed how to define Euclidean quantities in terms of cross-ratios of points of a line together with a fixed curve (called the absolute) whose Euclidean distance away would turn out to be infinite' (Kilmister 1984, 19).

<sup>6</sup> For instance, 'At this time, Russell considered philosophy to be superior to mathematics as a means of understanding the nature of mathematics, because the contradictions that mathematicians swept under the carpet, philosophers held up to the light' (Monk 1996, 111).

<sup>7</sup> Both Caird 1889 and Vaihinger 1976 give lengthy lists of intellectual debts composed, in the main, of prominent neo-Kantians of that day.

<sup>8</sup> However this 'conclusion' is only provisional, representing one stance adopted in the multiple stages of Bradley's complex dialectic.

<sup>9</sup> For more on Herbart's theory of judgement, see Sullivan 1991.

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of the 'further question,' and its centrality to neo-Kantian ambitions in philosophy, see Sullivan 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Joseph proffers the following rendition of the Bradleyan position:

*If Hannibal had marched on Rome after Cannae, he would have taken it. This judgement makes an assertion; in doing to it declares something to hold good of the real, for it declares its own content to be true ... what then does the hypothetical judgement affirm to be actual in the real? A character, says Mr. F. H. Bradley [Logic, Bk. I. c. ii. § 50: cf. § 52.], which is the ground of the connexion hypothetically asserted in the judgement. Rome was in such a state that it could not have resisted Hannibal after Cannae (Joseph 1906, 166).*

Yet neither 'a latent quality' nor 'a character' seem to go far in illuminating just what is involved in 'the ground of the connection.'

<sup>12</sup> There need be no tension here if Russell were of the same mind as Kemp Smith: '... all that is most vital in ... [Kant's] teaching ... would seem to be in line with the positions which have since been more explicitly developed by such writers as Lotze, Sigwart, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Jones and Dewey' (Kemp Smith 1992, 36).

<sup>13</sup> My anachronistic reliance on Eliot should not suggest that there has not been significant work on the topic since. For instance, see Bradley 1984 and 1996.

<sup>14</sup> And it will turn out that the same dangers are present if we try and take Russell's

appeal to ‘transcendental arguments’ as strictly Kantian in nature.

<sup>15</sup> For all of the arguments presented in the text, none are to be construed as syllogisms.

<sup>16</sup> Grayling advances the view of transcendental arguments as legal deductions, or as those with ‘a certain distinct aim, which is to establish conceptual title to a principle or claim which, accepted as true, licenses our activity in some region’ (Grayling 1996, 255). This seems plausible but Russell unfortunately never takes the time to say anything like this at all.

<sup>17</sup> Compare Cassirer: ‘Only those ultimate logical invariants can be called a priori . . . A cognition is called a priori not in any sense as if it were prior to experience, but because and in so far as it is contained as a necessary premise in every valid judgment concerning facts’ (Cassirer 1923a, 269).

<sup>18</sup> See, for instance, the rendition provided by Grayling 1996, 221.

<sup>19</sup> And yet even ‘The Nature of Judgment’ paper of the same year contains these curious sorts of ruminations and manoeuvres:

It will be apparent how much this theory [of judgement] has in common with Kant’s theory of perception. It differs chiefly in substituting for sensations, as the data of knowledge, concepts; and in refusing to regard the relations in which they stand as, in some obscure sense, the work of the mind. It rejects the attempt to explain the ‘possibility of knowledge,’ accepting the cognitive relation as an ultimate datum or presupposition . . . [it] recognises no other kind of explanation than that by way of logical connexion with other concepts . . . But it is important to note that it retains the doctrine of Transcendentalism. For Kant’s transcendentalism rests on the distinction between empirical and a priori propositions. This is a distinction which offers a striking correspondence to that between the categorical and hypothetical judgments’ (Moore 1899a, 183-184)

<sup>20</sup> The second objection might be called the psychologism objection and Grayling discusses it (Grayling 1996, 254ff). It seems to me that it is more applicable to the synthetic form of the argument and points to the psychologistic Achilles’ heel of all such transcendental arguments of this variety.

<sup>21</sup> My colleague Brian Hutchinson has reminded me of the possibility of an ever-present divergence between what a philosopher *believes* that he is doing and what, in actuality, he *is* in fact doing.

<sup>22</sup> However, no one person has been singled out for scrutiny and, of course, anyone is free to say that they themselves never suffered from any such delusions, making most of the prior discussion perhaps otiose.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. also Griffin 1991, 81

<sup>24</sup> Here I follow Beaney’s terminology, cf. Beaney 2007.

<sup>25</sup> This is why I cannot agree with the assertion that ‘it was Bradley who put the analysis in ‘analytic philosophy’ while remaining happy to admit that surely the movement would have been ‘different in many ways if there had been no Bradley to beget Russell’ (Dwyer 1996, 347).

<sup>26</sup> *Acknowledgements*. There are a number of different debts to be acknowledged here. First, my department endured the earliest and often half-baked versions and managed to feign interest while posing relevant questions. To all I am beholden, but especially to Brian Hutchinson and Ian Smith. Second, Alan Richardson and Tom Ryckman offered encouragement and advice on early drafts. Third, Susan Martinelli-Fernandez also reviewed

any number of different drafts and presented important criticisms while also offering suggestions for much needed clarifications. Fourth, I benefited greatly from the opportunity to present a selection of this work at the conference collected in these proceedings. I would like to acknowledge my co-symposiast, Mathieu Marion, and the questioning of the fiercely sceptical audience, especially Samuel Lebens. Finally, the editors of this volume assisted in untangling some garbled prose, as well. No one mentioned should be impugned with the acceptance of my view and, as always, any errors or misstatements must be laid to rest firmly at my own door.

## References

- Allard, J. 2005. *The Logical Foundations of Bradley’s Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and Truth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Beaney, M. 2007. ‘Analysis’. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2007 Edition). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/analysis/>.
- Bosanquet, B. 1888. *Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bradley, F. H. 1914. *Essays in Truth and Reality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 1922. *The Principles of Logic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 1930. *Appearance and Reality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bradley, J. 1984. ‘F. H. Bradley’s Metaphysics of Feeling and its Place in the History of Philosophy’. In Manser & Stock (eds.) ‘The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley’, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- . 1996. ‘The Transcendental Turn in Bradley’s Metaphysics of Feeling’. In Mander (ed.) ‘Perspectives on the Logic and Metaphysics of F. H. Bradley’, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Caird, E. 1889. *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*. Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons.
- Cassirer, E. 1923a. *Substance and Function*. Chicago: Open Court.
- . 1923b. *Einstein’s Theory of Relativity*. Chicago: Open Court.
- Dwyer, P. 1996. ‘Bradley, Russell and Analysis’. In Bradley (ed.) ‘Philosophy after F. H. Bradley’, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Eliot, T. S. 1964. *Knowledge and Experience: in the philosophy of F. H. Bradley*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Company.
- Gandon, S. 2008. ‘Towards a Topic-Specific Logicism? Russell’s Theory of Geometry in the *Principles of Mathematics*’. *Philosophia Mathematica* 16: 1–39.
- Grayling, A. C. 1996. ‘Russell’s Transcendental Argument in *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*’. In Monk & Palmer (eds.) ‘Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy’, Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
- Griffin, N. 1991. *Russell’s Idealist Apprenticeship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hager, P. 1994. *Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell’s Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- . 2003. ‘Russell’s Method of Analysis’. In Griffin (ed.) ‘The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell’, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hylton, P. 1990. *Russell, Idealism, and The Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Joseph, H. W. B. 1906. *An Introduction to Logic*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Kant, I. 1965. *Critique of Pure Reason*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kemp Smith, N. 1992. *A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Kilmister, C. W. 1984. *Russell*. Brighton: The Harvester Press.
- Monk, R. 1996. *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude, 1872-1921*. New York: The Free Press.
- . 1997. 'Was Russell an Analytical Philosopher?' In Glock (ed.) 'The Rise of Analytic Philosophy', Oxford: Blackwell.
- Moore, G. E. 1899a. 'The Nature of Judgment'. *Mind* n.s. 8: 176–193.
- . 1899b. 'Review' (of Russell). *Mind* n.s. 8: 397–405.
- Russell, B. 1897. *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1903. *Principles of Mathematics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sullivan, D. 1991. 'Frege on Existential Propositions'. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 41: 127–149.
- . 2002. 'The Further Question: Frege, Husserl and the neo-Kantian Paradigm'. *Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse* 5: 77–95.
- . 2008. 'The Idealists'. In Gabbay & Woods (eds.) 'The Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 4 – British Logic in the Nineteenth Century', Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Vaihinger, H. 1976. *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*. New York, NY: Garland.
- Wittgenstein, L. 1922. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Wollheim, R. 1969. *F. H. Bradley*. Baltimore, MD: Penguin.