Abstract

Notwithstanding their technical virtuosity and growing presence in mainstream thinking, game theoretic logics have attracted a sceptical question: "Granted that logic can be done game theoretically, but what would justify the idea that this is the preferred way to do it?'' A recent suggestion is that at least part of the desired support might be found in the Greek dialectical writings. If so, perhaps we could say that those works possess a kind of foundational significance. The relation of being foundational for is interesting in its own right. In this paper, I explore its ancient applicability to relevant, paraconsistent and nonmonotonic logics, before returning to the question of its ancestral tie, or want of one, to the modern logics of games.

How to Cite:

Woods, J., (2013) “Ancestor Worship in The Logic of Games. How foundational were Aristotle's contributions?”, Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1(2013). doi: https://doi.org/10.4148/1944-3676.1076