Abstract
Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her proposed mechanism. We base our arguments in part on several of our own experiments, reported herein.
Keywords: perceptual color experience, cognitive penetration, color perception
How to Cite:
Gross, S., Chaisilprungraung, T., Kaplan, E., Menendez, J. & Flombaum, J., (2014) “Problems for the Purported Cognitive Penetration of Perceptual Color Experience and Macpherson’s Proposed Mechanism”, Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1(2014). doi: https://doi.org/10.4148/1944-3676.1085
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