Abstract
Russell is commonly accused of failing to solve Bradley’s problem of unity. In this paper I argue that the problem doesn’t really pose a distinctively philosophical question; that Russell’s account of unity exposes the problem as unworthy of an answer. I accept that this isn’t a solution, but it does constitute a substantive non-solution! Furthermore, some scholars have read in Russell’s writings a confession of guilt to the effect that he was defeated by the problem of unity: this, I argue, is a misreading of the texts in question.
Keywords: philosophy, History of Analytical Philosophy
How to Cite:
Lebens, S., (2008) “A Substantive Non-Solution To The Problem Of Unity”, Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1(2008). doi: https://doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v4i0.141
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