


ISSN No.
0146-9283

**Spring
1992**

educational considerations

published at kansas state university college of education



educational considerations

Vol. XIX, Number 2, Spring 1992

BOARD OF EDITORS

- Chad Litz**
Kansas State University
- G. Daniel Harden**
Washburn University
- David C. Thompson**
Kansas State University
- Gerald D. Bailey**
Kansas State University

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

- George Crawford**
University of Kansas
- Donald J. D'Elia**
State University of New York-New Paltz
- Patrick B. Forsyth**
University Council for Educational Administration
- David S. Honeyman**
University of Florida
- John Koepke**
Kansas Association of School Boards
- Betty MacPhail-Wilcox**
North Carolina State University
- Betty Malen**
University of Washington
- Martha M. McCarthy**
Indiana University
- Larry Picus**
University of Southern California
- William E. Sparkman**
Texas Tech University
- Donald I. Tharpe**
Association of School Business Officials International
- Julie K. Underwood**
University of Wisconsin-Madison

BOOK EDITOR

- Jerry L. Gray**
Washburn University

Table of Contents—Spring 1992

Forword	2
Daniel Harden	
Thoughts on Education and Culture: An Interview	3
Russell and Annette Kirk	
Intellect, Intelligence and Chewing Gum	10
Frederick C. Neff	
What Good is Liberal Education?	15
Alan J. Hicks	
Educational Discourse in the Postmodern World	20
Leon McKenzie	
The Wheel of Traditional Education	26
Arthur Versluis	
Dr. Benjamin Rush (1746-1813) and the Judaeo-Christian Origins of American Education	29
Donald J. D'Elia	
A New Vision of Education: On the Nature of Poetic Knowledge and Form	33
Thomas Foster	
The Way Back to Educational Foundations	38
James T. Hillestad	
Knowing Why: The Integration of Theory and Practice	41
David E. Engle	
Distinguishing Conflict and Competition: A Model for Understanding Some Teaching Interactions in Athletics	45
Richard J. Nastasi	
Effective School Districts: Some Key Components	49
Charles F. Webber and Kathy G. Skau	
Book Reviews:	
John Goodlad's <i>Teachers for Our Nations Schools</i>	52
Reviewed by David W. VanCleave	
Barry Farber's <i>Crisis in Education: Stress and Burnout in the American Teacher</i>	54
Reviewed by Donovan Cook	

PUBLICATION INFORMATION

Educational Considerations is published at the College of Education, Kansas State University. *Educational Considerations* and Kansas State University do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in articles, reviews, and other contributions appearing in this publication. In keeping with the professional educational concept that responsible free expression can promote learning and encourage awareness of truth, contributors are invited to submit conclusions and opinions concerned with varying points of view in and about education.

Educational Considerations is published two times yearly. Editorial offices are located at the College of Education, Bluemont Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5301. Correspondence regarding manuscripts must be accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope. No remuneration is offered for ac-

cepted articles or other materials submitted.

Material submitted to *Educational Considerations* may vary in length from a paragraph to 4,000 words. All material, including quoted information and footnotes, is to be typed double-spaced. Footnotes should be listed at the end of the manuscripts. Headings should not be underlined. ONCE AN ARTICLE IS ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION, THE AUTHOR MAY BE REQUESTED TO SUBMIT THE FINAL VERSION ON DISK OR VIA MODEM. Disk requirements are 720k 3.5" drive in WordPerfect 5.0 (or compatible) format. The author's complete name, address and telephone number should be typed on a separate sheet and attached to the original copy of the manuscript. Three copies of each manuscript are to be submitted. Photographs, drawings, cartoons, and other illustrations are welcome. Authors should be prepared to provide copies of permis-

sion to quote copyrighted material. Queries concerning proposed articles or reviews are welcome. The editors reserve the right to make grammatical corrections and minor changes in article texts to improve clarity. Address questions regarding specific styles to the Editor.

Subscription to *Educational Considerations* is \$6.00 per year, with single copies \$2.00 each. Correspondence about subscriptions should be addressed to the Business Manager, c/o The Editor, *Educational Considerations*, College of Education, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5301. Checks for subscriptions should be made out to *Educational Considerations*.

Printed in the United States of America.

Foreword

This issue of *Educational Considerations* is, for the most part, different than most. It deals with some of the broad foundational issues that effective school administrators must think about but often do not find the time to consider. The reasons are clear. After 17 years in the principal's chair I can understand how the report that the superintendent thinks is so vital seems always to take priority over the calm reflection needed to sort out honest purposes and goals. A quick, snappy newsletter is easier to fit between irate parents than Plato's "Seventh Letter".

One of the challenges of the course I teach in philosophy of education is to convince the teacher, who is perhaps only taking the class for purposes of recertification to begin with, that what Plato and Aristotle and Dewey said pertains very directly to what they are doing, or are supposed to be doing, in classrooms across Northeastern Kansas. I am usually successful, not because I am a great teacher but because of the power of the texts and the excitement generated by their ideas.

Many of those who have contributed to this issue I have known for a long time. Others are new friends. I was about 16 years old when I first picked up a copy of Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind*, first published in 1953. It was hard going for me and I can't swear that I read every word of every page, but I read most of it. It bore out Richard Weaver's book title, *Ideas Have Consequences*. The traditions and approaches to life and the civil-social order of which Russell Kirk spoke those many years ago are still central to my thinking. My wife and I were honored to be guests at Piety Hill in Mecosta, Michigan, last July. We interviewed Russell and Annette Kirk for this issue after dinner. For over thirty years I have had intermittent contact with the Wizard of Mecosta, and his kindness and helpfulness has never flagged.

But there are a lot of different views represented in this issue. I have reflected on them and concluded that there is something to irritate and agitate almost everyone, and something that will comfort almost everyone. That, it would seem, is not a bad recipe for a journal such as this. For many administrators it will be good tonic. Perhaps something to take to the seventh basketball game on Friday!

Daniel Harden

We must constantly remind ourselves that the true ends of education are wisdom and virtue. Self control and personal restraint are virtues that need to be nurtured in our modern culture.

THOUGHTS ON EDUCATION AND CULTURE: AN INTERVIEW WITH RUSSELL AND ANNETTE KIRK

Part I—The Purposes of Education

GDH: Dr. Kirk, over the last forty years you have been, as well as a critic of popular education, a widely listened to exponent of what should be done to improve schooling. In this last decade of the twentieth century, what would you recommend that must be done to bring about authentic educational reform?

RK: The first necessity is to restore the original purposes of education, which as Plato said, are wisdom and virtue. We have forgotten all about those and instead we list

Russell Kirk is the author of thirty books and hundreds of articles and monographs on history, literature, and political thought. He is the editor of *The University Bookman*. Kirk has also received the Ann Radcliffe Award of the Count Dracula Society and the World Fantasy Award for best short fiction. He was the first American to receive a doctor of letters degree from St. Andrews University in Scotland. He lives with his wife Annette in his ancestral house, Piety Hill, in the village of Mecosta, Michigan. Annette was appointed to the National Commission on Education by President Reagan in 1981.

G. Daniel Harden is associate professor of administration and foundations at Washburn University of Topeka and associate editor of *Educational Considerations*. Mary Harden is a teacher of behaviorally disordered children for the Topeka Public Schools.

fifty or a hundred minor objectives and forget the principal ends, or aims.

The question immediately arises as to through which disciplines one approaches these. The primary discipline of education is literature, humane letters, books which have suffered badly in our time from the ravages of television. Since great literature is ethical, it is through humane letters that the building of character is carried on in schools. This has been forgotten in the typical textbook or reader nowadays. Virtue too is closely related to the literary discipline.

The second most important discipline, I think, for the teaching of wisdom and virtue is history, which is now frequently neglected. Through history we acquire an understanding of the continuity of human existence. We learn from the errors as well as the triumphs of the past. We come to feel that we are a part of a great continuity. Both of these disciplines are badly neglected in our time for a variety of causes. In part from the assumption that everything old is archaic and that we should be concerned, apparently, with things of the hour. That way lies the destruction of the intellectual disciplines and indeed of character. We aim only for measurable results and are surprised that somehow the mind and the imagination are not satisfied.

To put things very briefly, the primary means of reform is to return to certain long established disciplines, but many people are unwilling or unable to make that effort.

GDH: In 1970 you wrote that what was needed was sort of a cultural restoration sustained by affirmative courage. You said this in relation to what T.S. Eliot referred to as "... the permanent things."

RK: Human nature is a constant. So much in modern life seems momentary and ephemeral. We need to be reminded again and again that there is an enduring human nature, about which you learn, in part, through formal instruction. Eliot means by "... the permanent things," such things as family, orderly government, politics, great architecture, great music, great literature; these are the things about which schooling ought to be concerned. Often, I think, the lack of imaginative development in schools leads us to neglect the permanent things. The modern mind tends to become mechanistic and materialistic and assumes that the end of life is simply sensual pleasure. When that conviction becomes wide enough spread the society and the family begins to disintegrate.

Now there are permanent truths. Not all things are relative to the moment. It was assumed until our own time that the primary function of education was to impart these truths. Nowadays we find many who say with Pontius Pilot, "What is truth?" and will not stay for an answer. This is the denial of the permanent things in any walk of life.

GDH: Would you suggest that the "permanent things" of which you speak, and of which Eliot wrote, can be taught in our modern public schools, considering the pluralism of today's society?

RK: There are difficulties there but not insuperable difficulties. It was taken for granted in the early years of our republic that such a thing was possible. I think it was assumed by Horace Mann, who had more than anyone else to do with the widespread founding of public schools, that such a thing could be done: imparting veneration, respect for the past, and well established moral principles. There are various ways of doing it. For instance, there came to Grand Rapids some years ago, a teacher, a Japanese who had taught in the West Indies. After the Second World War he made his way to this country and became an American, earned his teacher's certificate and became a teacher in the social sciences. His pupils came from the slum district of Grand Rapids and from broken homes, neighborhoods of vi-

olence. These boys and girls were seeking some general principles, apparently, by which to live. They would ask him, "Teacher, is it all right to beat up another boy if the gang is on your side?" or "Is it all right to take what you want from the dime store?" He saw the need for imparting ethical principles through the social science program, the content of which had consisted of vague abstractions and of visits to the municipal sewage works and perhaps to City Hall. He thoroughly reorganized that program, under the influence, I think, of C.S. Lewis' book *The Abolition of Man* and the Tao. He commenced his series of studies of moral and ethical principles by examining moral and ethical principles as described by great and good men and women of the past - prophets, sages, saints and ethical teachers of many civilizations. For example they took up the commandment, "Honor thy father and thy mother and live long on the land," and then he would give parallel teachings from Mohammed and so on, establishing here a universal recognition of a moral truth. He would ask, "Well, boys and girls, what do you think of this? Does it seem right that all these great and wise men and women agreed on these principles? How are we going to apply this to our lives?" Of course he became very popular teaching principles that way. However the school board was threatened with a suit of law by a woman in the community, not by an avowed atheist however, not a Madalyn Murray O'Hair, but by a woman who belonged to a particular Christian denomination and who feared that what the teacher was teaching would interfere in some way with the creed of her sect. The school board, I am glad to say, in this case did not yield, but continued the teacher in this program and the woman did not sue. And, I expect that if it had been brought to court in that case the school board and teacher would have won.

This is not doctrinal instruction in any sense but rather the teaching of a kind of universal moral law. In many other ways it is possible, or at least more possible that in was ten years ago, to devise programs in public schools of ethical instruction that will arouse the moral imagination without being attached to particular doctrinal bodies of belief. And in general the courts are more likely to permit references to *The Permanent Things* and indeed to religion.

I have been a witness, allegedly expert, in various church/state trials, and in general the tendency of courts has been to recognize the first clause of the First Amendment as a protection for religion, not against religion.

GDH: Mrs. Kirk, from the perspective of the National Commission on Education, on which you served as it developed its much heralded *Nation at Risk* report in 1983, how much support would you see *The Permanent Things* having from the national educational establishment?

AK: Well first of all, to get educators to agree that wisdom and virtue are the final ends of education is quite an accomplishment in itself. That includes both parochial schools and public schools. Obviously it is a little easier in the parochial schools. I just mention that because when I did bring that up at the United States Catholic Conference Committee on Education an old bishop said, "Yes, I remember the days when we used to speak of education in those terms." Instead today in parochial schools, particularly in Catholic schools, they are more likely to speak of education as having the end of social justice as opposed to any kind of a Christian transformation of character or even in wisdom and virtue. There is more of an emphasis on social goals than on specifically Christian goals.

But, as far as public schools are concerned, within the last ten years this subject has become much more popular. It became quite polarized until about three or four years ago. Even in our little villages here in Michigan the ACLU was tak-

ing people to court every year over some Bible reading or some left-over prayer in the school or some teacher who was teaching creationism. That seems to have faded somewhat just recently. And I think that the reason for that is a general feeling that things are falling apart at the seams; that something is needed as a cohesive force in society and that ultimately it has to be some conviction about something, a moral conviction. Paul Vitz recently did a study that pointed to a lack of any moral teaching, especially Christian moral teaching, in textbooks. His study showed that the role of Christianity in our national history was completely ignored in these textbooks. He showed this very conclusively. It was a very strong study. It was commissioned by the Department of Education, and it really make its mark. It was picked up by the popular press, the magazines, and many people became alarmed when they realized how little their children were absorbing in the public schools in terms of just an objective study of what Christianity had done to help this country develop its laws and literature and culture. Now it is a little easier to make your case in the public school because people realize that with lawlessness out of control it is very important to teach right and wrong. Relativism has run its course. People now realize that we have to do something about character education.

And we have to teach teachers how to teach character and ethical principles. In that regard, there is a new Center at Boston University for the Advancement of Ethics and Character. Kevin Ryan is the director of that Center and they are specifically trying to teach teachers how to implement throughout the curriculum literature in order to teach good character to students in elementary and high school. It is an effort to do this through the teaching of literature.

There are, as you know, many areas of thought in this field. Two of the more prominent ones being Values Clarification and Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development. They both have been shown to be not very effective in terms of outcomes relating to character formation in students. In both cases they are rather complex and emphasize the dialectic rather than the active response. The result is that they are both becoming rather passe and character education is coming back into vogue. Kohlberg's "old bag of virtues" is reappearing on the scene in the public schools.

GDH: To what extent would you connect the decline of wisdom and virtue as the primary purposes of education to instrumentalism of John Dewey?

RK: Dewey was what he called a "religious humanist," which is what today we call a "secular humanist." The term secular humanist originated apparently with Christopher Dawson, the British historian. Irving Babbitt, the great American critic preferred the term *humanitarian* for the same kind of mind and character. That is *humanitarian* meaning that there is no transcendent divine power and that all virtues are of man's own making. At any rate, Dewey was strongly opposed to any traditional, established religion or any body of dogma. There was no transcendent power in the universe. Those views he looked upon as unscientific and he endeavored to promulgate *humanitarian* thinking in his works and teaching and enjoyed a large success. His success was, in part, because he addressed a topic which no one had seriously examined in America before. Thus, the Teacher's College at Columbia became, in those days, the agency for disseminating throughout the country doctrines of secular humanism. Other teacher's colleges and schools of education, impressed by this, almost as in a fit of absence from the mind, surrendered the old respect for tradition and authority and the belief in the realm of being that is not merely immediate and sensual. These gave way before the doctrines of secular humanism which are still dominant

in nearly all teacher's colleges and which many educationists are trying to instill in the rising generation of teachers. And for that reason, of course, Dewey's influence was large.

That, of course, was not the only cause of our present attitude. In general, of course, since the middle of the nineteenth century there has been a tendency for the natural sciences to assume the role formerly occupied by the philosopher and sage. Mechanism and materialism have become dominant in the popular culture and the schools have gone along with this drift rather than oppose it. And as the state assumed a larger and larger role in public education religious instruction became difficult because of conflicts of creeds and dogmas as well as the conscious desire of the secular humanists to push any kind of religion or veneration out of the curriculum. You find this in many quarters, even Chester Finn, who has been involved in educational argument for the past twenty years, regrets that there are still persons who think that religion ought to be included in education. Though he is a strong critic of much of the present educational establishment he is still a secular humanist and wants to promote those views through the federal government's policies as it assumes a larger and larger role.

The chief place where religious instruction has been preserved at elementary and secondary levels has been the independent schools of a Christian or Jewish character which educate a very small proportion, however, of the general population. The fact that there has been such a striking growth in these independent schools over the past fifteen years or so indicates that there is a felt need for such instruction. It has helped prepare the way for such things as tax credits or tax vouchers, which encourage parents to send their children to schools of their own choosing, most of which would be religious schools.

GDH: Your emphasis on the importance of teaching wisdom and virtue in relation to certain transcendent understandings, goes back to a statement that you made twenty years ago to the effect that our present cultural crisis is traceable to "... the pragmatism of James, the naturalism of Dewey, and the sentimentality of the socialists, all [of which] are the result of the presumptions of people who have forgotten the truth of dualism." Would you care to comment on that in terms of the public school and its curriculum?

RK: First of all the term dualism implies that there is a realm of being other than the material realm which we see around ourselves. There is in the universe life and awareness which is beyond ordinary human experience. With that transcendent power we try, in our feeble way, to "get in touch." Dualism also implies that there are powers of good and powers of evil and that we must be always on our guard against the evil that lurks in all human nature. All of us must learn to restrain ourselves or we fall apart. This what is called the Doctrine of Original sin. "In Adam's Fall, We Sinned All." Thus all human beings suffer from the Seven Deadly Sins: lust, violence, gluttony, avarice, and the rest. Much of the function of education is to learn to restrain oneself and to be aware that there is a power that ordains that restraint.

Now, the doctrines of William James concerning pragmatism interpreted these doctrines in a twisted sense. They assume that research, practical experience, that which works—that is the only guide for mankind. Certain actions seem to have good results and by this experience we should guide ourselves. That in itself, of course, leads education away from tradition and authority toward a short-range judgement of the means to success. Then, add to this, the militant secular humanism, or *humanitarianism*, of the Deweyan school which teaches that present life is the be all and

the end all and advocates an egalitarianism which is socialist in its political character, and which proposes that we should as far as possible abolish individual distinctions and create an educational system which serves the community or, more exactly, the state. This fundamentally transforms the end of education; it is no longer the improvement of the intellect of the individual human being, the person, but rather the aim becomes service to society in some vague sense. That results in the ignoring of the old body of schooling which took it for granted that one studies humane literature to learn how to conduct oneself in life and history enough to understand the great continuity in life, of our very being. Dewey is said to have argued that no one should read any book written before 1900. The past is worthless. Those who adhere to the Deweyan school will lead the march forward into the glorious future of egalitarianism. These doctrines have always had a popular appeal. They appeal perhaps to the old American feeling sardonically expressed by Mark Twain when he said "One man is as good as another, or, maybe a little better." That, when applied to schools translates into a reluctance to encourage achievement, indeed a willingness to encourage contentment with mediocrity. Thus, these abstract doctrines have been popularized and done widespread mischief.

GDH: You have emphasized the need to educate for restraint and self-control. How would you evaluate the efforts of schools to introduce programs that directly address the contemporary problems of drug and alcohol abuse and irresponsible sexual activity?

RK: Such contemporary problems are the result of a world without norms. Exhortation of the young is not usually very effective. Giving a classroom lecture against promiscuity accomplishes little except to interest children in the possibility of promiscuity. To lecture against drink and tell how much harm it does is an ineffectual restraint on the appetites.

Moral teaching has to be done, ordinarily, by parable, allegory, and fable in the higher sense of those words. That is, we read fiction or great works of philosophy as a means to develop wisdom. And the beauty of the language and the aptness of the illustrations has a strong affect. Imaginative literature of that kind has been dropped altogether from the curriculum of many schools. And thus, if the imagination is denied, still the imagination is there and perhaps the teenager will seek the imagination brought by the narcotic trance, which isn't really the imagination but is what T.S. Eliot called the "diabolical imagination" as contrasted to the moral imagination.

When I was a boy I read all of the Arthurian tales and my gang and I equipped ourselves with cardboard armor, helmets, and swords and battled each other mightily, not doing any permanent harm. We had at least an idea of the chivalric ideals of the table round. It is different nowadays, there is no reading of the Arthurian legends in most schools. There is, however, the vicious effect of television, of bad movies, and so the modern street gang works for the destruction of all ideals except for the triumph of the ego.

We learn from great literature and from historical studies and philosophy the necessary need for the restraint of passions, while the tendency in many schools is to realize the *self*: "find yourself and fulfill your personality." This is nonsense. As if there is any "fulfillment of the self" separated somehow from religion, duty, and tradition. With no instruction the ego becomes ravenous, destroying; one's life becomes one of aggrandizement and power over others. A system of education which assumes that there is no such thing as Original Sin, that all desires are innocent, and what is needed is simply the attainment of those desires, leads

first to personal anarchy and then to the public anarchy of which we see so many terrible examples around us.

GDH: You would not then, view the books of Judy Blume as being the imaginative or cultural equivalent of the Arthurian legend.

AK: Judy Blume is really quite insidious. Her works are very popular, and they are very funny in perhaps the same way as "Saturday Night Live." It is very funny, but once you have started to look at it and think about it you see what it does to our culture and to our children's imaginations. Everything in the end is cynical. Television today is often in that mold: children are very bright and adults are very stupid. It is funny, and it does get a laugh; in fact I find myself feeling guilty sometimes laughing at it. Some children today are trying to be like the Simpsons, and those children whom they see on television and in the movies who are arrogant, cynical, sensual and violent. It is true that television has influenced our entire generation. But not only television—the videos and the movies. And I can see this with our own girls, and I have talked to them about it at length. Putting so much of this violence into their heads makes them insensitive. It desensitizes children to see people being hit as a matter of course. They sit there eating popcorn and watch people being hurt and suffering from terrible violence: it's almost like they were desensitized to real violence. It is frightening because their imaginations are being warped.

MH: One of the problems that we are looking at is teachers. So many teachers today, even those who might like to teach character through the classics and other good literature, have themselves not had any exposure to it. There is no easily available curriculum for this. How would you suggest that a teacher would start in developing the moral imagination?

RK: There are several books of this sort, some quite good. Again, other attempts are highly unsatisfactory. A large volume of literature recommended for children was published about three years ago by a writer for *The New York Times*. It is interesting what was omitted. Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* and *The Looking Glass* were not included. They were apparently fantasy of the sort that was not relevant. They wanted late twentieth century literature of the Judy Blume type, and that was the sort that predominated. There was a fear of anything that might hit upon a realm of being that is not material. They wanted realistic stories about slums and rock and roll singers and so on.

MH: Years ago you wrote about the use of legends and fairy tales with very young children. As the children grow older they can be provided with more advanced legends to consider.

AK: Yes, and it must be clearly understood that the imaginative void will be filled with something and if that is not the moral imagination it will be the diabolic or perverted imagination.

RK: Curiously enough, the education of the young through folktale and fantasy has survived better in the Soviet Union than anywhere else in the world, largely because of the influence of the great Herneage Tchaikovski, who is greatly beloved by all Russians because they have read his fairy tales from an early age. He lived to a great age and became the richest man in Russia, and though he refused to join the Communist Party he was never interfered with. His influence was too great: it would have been like trying to imprison Santa Claus. They went on using his fairy tales throughout his life and beyond. In other words, there are some forms of materialism that are much stronger in America than in Russia.

While in America most bookshops have decayed into the typical franchise chain book shop where there is almost nothing worth reading, children's bookshops and children's book departments in bookshops are in vigorous and healthy condition. There are a lot of good books there, both old and new; there are good new children's books coming all the time. Obviously there is a public for them. Parents, although they cease to read themselves, preferring to sit and watch television, still think it virtuous for children to read and continue to buy books for them. So, in that sense, the private reading is compensating in some degree for the loss of such literature in the school, although obviously it cannot wholly compensate for it.

At the beginning of this century the one fairy tale, a very long one, which was found in virtually every school reader was Ruskin's *King of the Golden River*. It dealt with charitable duty and moral development. This was taught in practically every school. It is now nowhere mentioned nor is any tale of that sort told. And, while a great fantasist of our time is Ray Bradbury, and while his tales are included in school anthologies, they include only those which are primarily horrible and seem to show no meaning in the universe. His tales without this character are carefully omitted. Still, we live in a time when children's fiction still has a large influence. The books most widely read by children nowadays are C.S. Lewis' *The Narnia Chronicles*. The books most widely read by boys a little older than that are Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings*. And by girls the books, *Young Unicorns* and *A Wrinkle in Time* by Madeleine L'Engle are very popular. And the author most popular with high school students is Ray Bradbury. All of these help the healthy moral imaginations. So we needn't despair! The taste for good literature is still there among the children who are actually reading.

Part II—A Nation at Risk

GDH: Mrs. Kirk, you served on the National Commission on Education which produced *The Nation at Risk* report in 1983. Could you give us some insight as to how the report was developed, how it was received, and what effect it has had.

AK: *The Nation at Risk* was essentially a catalyst for work that had already been done in research areas and it served as a point at which people started to agree that something was wrong. People had been talking about this, but they were polarized into liberal and conservative camps. This was the first time that all these people of good will, be they conservative or liberal, came together to agree that something was wrong. They would part again on what to do about it, and on how it got that way. Many people criticized the Report because they thought that we did not blame anybody. We did not say who was at fault, we didn't even speak about the utilitarians or Dewey or that sort of thing. In fact what we said was that the trend, which is currently a declining trend in education, stems more from "weakness of purpose, confusion of vision, underuse of talent, and lack of leadership." That was the conclusion of the Report. As to how education got this way we did not go into detail.

Now, I was concerned, especially with the weakness of purpose because I did not think that we had an idea of what education was all about. So my constant cry during the year and a half that we met was to continually ask the commissioners: "What are we about? What are we trying to do? Where should we be going?" I was much more concerned with the philosophical aspect of this than any of the other members who were much more concerned with what we were going to do on a very practical level; how we were going to pay for it; what the unions would say about imposing a

core curriculum and of those more practical aspects of the report. These questions obviously had to be addressed but I felt that unless we could agree on a vision for education we really wouldn't be accomplishing very much. It was amazing that we came together to even agree that there should be these recommendations. And we should remember that they were recommendations and not decrees by the federal government.

Then each state took the report and decided what it was from the report they wanted to implement. Some states decided that they wanted to implement all of it, some in part, some had stronger unions and didn't implement very much. It was a struggle in all states, but every state in the union did reply which, I think, means that it made its mark. Now, why did they reply to this report when they often already knew that these things were wrong, and didn't do anything about it? I think that the reason was because we put it together in a statement that was jargon free. It was readable, it had some dramatic flair to it, and it said very specifically what could be done. We gave them a plan. The report told people where we were, it told them that this is the problem at the moment. I think that it was a very clear and concise report.

Now a few of us on the Commission were particularly eager to have the report be jargon free. At one point the staff, which was really pretty decent, came up with a 100-page initial draft of the report. In it were such things as "we must rationalize the generic curriculum." That was the kind of jargon that they were used to. So, when I picked up on that phrase, and asked them what they meant, they used more gobbledegook trying to explain. Everyone laughed and it became apparent that we needed to take out phrases like that. Soon it became evident that the staff, because of having dealt so long in this kind of educational jargon, couldn't communicate with ordinary people. The Commission itself then took up the actual writing of the report. Each of us wrote different sections. It was then put together by David Gardner, our very able chairman, who took one member of the staff with him one weekend to Utah where they wove together all of the parts of the report that each of us had tried to contribute. Now, I am not sure that every single member wrote something, but every member had some aspect of the report to which they wanted to contribute.

I helped, along with Minnesota Governor Albert Quie and Yvonne Larson, to write the section of the report that dealt with parents. David Gardner polished it beautifully. That was the last section which was "A Word to Parents and Students." It was the part of the report that was read at the White House the day that President Reagan presented it to the press. We had been talking for some months about "excellence" in education, and we defined that in the Report. I became very nervous about the fact that nowhere had we noted that in order to achieve excellence in education it was necessary that students not cheat. I kept bringing up the idea that excellence in education also included a developed notion of honesty. And so this line was included in the final version: "Finally, help your children understand that excellence in education cannot be achieved without intellectual and moral integrity coupled with hard work and commitment."

And then I was able to get the word "virtue" in the report by saying "Children will look to their parents and teachers as models of such virtues." I also wanted to establish the fact here that there is still an expectation, even in this decadent time, that parents will be, to some extent, good models for their children. At the same time, the concept of the teacher being a model sort of faded in the 1960s, when teachers no longer wanted to be models; they wanted to be

just like everyone else and they became simply facilitators. That word became very popular in the 1960s and 1970s. They did not want the model "trip" put on them, where they had to be models of virtue. At that time there were quite a few teachers who were involved in drug use and other kinds of illegitimate activities. They would walk into the classroom, put their feet up on the desk and want to be considered a "common Joe." They wanted to "relate" to their students and be considered friends. They did not want to be up on a pedestal. Therefore their concept of the teacher as a model of virtue was completely lost. Inserting this into the report was actually quite radical. It was much debated in some of the journals after we issued the Report. Some of the teachers resented the idea that they were supposed to be teaching their children any kind of virtue. They said, "We have enough to do, we don't want to teach them virtue too!" Of course the concept that we had was that teachers, by the very nature of their own character should be virtuous individuals so that the modeling would just be that. It didn't mean that they had to be didactic about it. Teachers teach by what they are rather than just by what they say.

The other reason that I was particularly anxious to help out and push this part of the report about parents being the first teachers of their children, and that they have a right and responsibility to participate in their children's education was that I would have liked to see something about tuition tax-credits or vouchers in the final report. That was an impossibility because there was not enough support among the members. No member was willing to dissent from the Report on that particular issue. They all had their own ideas and agendas, and no one was strong enough on that point to dissent. I would have been the one ordinarily who would have dissented, being perhaps the most conservative member of the Commission, but I realized that it was a policy that was not, at that time, going to be passed by Congress. The time was not yet, in fact only now is the time, with Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander, who is going to be pushing for vouchers and tax-credits. But I was anxious to include in the report the premise that the parent has the responsibility for the education of the child as opposed to the state. I felt it was important to get that philosophical premise included so that later on, when Congress would consider the question of how parents would choose the education of their children, they would look back at that premise included in the Report and realize that the recognition of parental responsibility had already been made.

The reaction was wonderful, much more overwhelming than we had anticipated. We later analyzed that and realized the reason was that there was a moment in time when people were ready to receive this Report. They knew that something was wrong, they didn't know how to articulate it. We articulated it in this jargon-free document. It was only 36 pages; we know that today Americans have a very short attention span. We decided that it would be short, pithy, even punchy. In a sense it was, because it said in the very beginning that "... if an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war." That was a very forceful statement and was the kind of thing that the media pick up. Because there were so many quotable statements in the document the media picked it up and news of it was everywhere. Charles Karalt's "Sunday Morning" came here to Mecosta and spent two days interviewing me. They followed us around, they went into the public school because I was considered the parent representative. I was the only one on the Commission with children at all levels of schooling. At that time I had one in kindergarten, one in grade school, one in junior high school

and one in high school. The report was discussed on a lot of programs like that one. It had an effect on every legislature. So, I think that the long-term effect has been very good. It started a deeper dialogue about education.

Part III—The Present Social Crisis

What can be done, and we have seen this since 1983, is only superficial until you get the parents involved in the school, and that can only really happen when parents have the power of the purse. So, until we actually have a voucher system in this country we can only repair some of the previous damage and do some superficial reform. Until that very concrete thing happens, where parents actually have to pay attention and make decisions as to what schools their children are going to, you can't have thorough reform. The one government program that everyone seems to agree did work to some extent, was Head Start. That was the only government program that required parents to actively participate. It was a program dealing with small children where, obviously there had to be, because of the age of the children involved, parental participation. The parents couldn't just drop them off, they had to be involved. The parents were in the classroom, and they had certain things that they had to do with the children at home. And that is the program that everyone seems to agree, across the board, has made some impact. I do not see why, if you are going to have a public school system, you cannot require that parents participate in the education of their children by at least making them come and pick up the report cards once a year. I would go further and say that you should have them come to school at the beginning of the year to explain the program and show them how they should help their children with their homework and such, but at least you should get them to come at the end of the school year.

In special education each of the children must have an Individual Education Plan and a progress report. Even then it is sometimes difficult to get parents to come. I don't see how, if you don't have at least one adult other than the teacher interested in a child you can hope to make any progress.

MH: One of the problems that we see in special education is that many of the difficulties that the children have are the direct result of the neglect, lack of interest, and actually malign behavior of the parents to begin with. It is another aspect of the decline in the civilized values of wisdom and virtue of which we spoke earlier.

AK: That is right, and I don't know how society is going to deal with this. It is unfair to those children whose parents do come and participate, so, when they talk about equality in education, I don't see how that can ever be a reality. There are different levels of ability as well as differences in care and in the influences to which the child has been exposed.

GDH: In terms of public policy, how would a person who holds to your traditionalist and conservative philosophy develop an educational policy that would answer the problems that arise out of parental failure?

AK: This is probably why all of the character education programs are springing up. People realize that you must have some kind of ethical training, and if you don't you are putting at risk students whose parents do give it to them. In education you need a positive environment, a moral ethos, and if you do not have it, if it is not created by the kind of wholesome character that the students have or by the sense of stable community that they have in relation to each other, you really can't make much progress. That is one intangible aspect of education that is a necessity.

GDH: Are not these uninvolved and unconcerned par-

ents part of what you have referred to, Dr. Kirk, as the unattached urban proletariat, whose only contribution to society is their progeny? What do we do with that progeny that will help make it at least productive enough to maintain itself?

AK: With each generation, as the proletarian conditions continue, the problem becomes more acute because such convictions and morals as the first generation on welfare begin with diminish with the passage of time. No one really has shown a way out except to work with such people on the spot and save them against their will. Here and there you find in these circumstances that something can be done. So far as there being any healthy influences at work among the modern American urban proletariat they are the churches. We can see what Catholic grade schools can do in places like New York and Detroit and Chicago. One journalist from The New York Times wrote about visiting a Catholic grade school in the South Bronx. All the children were black. Around the school there was complete burned-out devastation, but the school stood there intact. The journalists who entered were greeted by a hostess. A very small black girl came up, introduced herself politely, kissed them all, and lead them around the school which seemed in perfect order. It was still functioning amidst this almost complete anarchy and ruin. In that sense the only kind of education that is going to work is that done in the spirit of reverence and religious principle. Because of that, religious schools have an advantage in the work of redemption that the public schools do not enjoy in the present circumstances.

AK: But that is an example of what can be done if you have the cooperation of the parents. It is also a reason why the public schools have become dumping grounds, where some parents leave their children from 7:00 in the morning to 7:00 at night because they can't take care of them. Some parents can, but choose not to. Others just aren't home and that's why the school becomes the focal point for all of their after-school activities as well. In some instances you are lucky if the school is the focal point and not the gang on the corner. One of our Commission members was a black principal of an inner city school who said that he had a list of 27 things that he had to do every year that had nothing to do with education: take the census, be sure that all of the kids had their shots, federal forms and so on. The reading and writing and academic work was way down on the list of things that he had to attend to; so the schools are taking on many non-educational functions and society is agreeing to this by default in many cases. There seems to be no other agency to take care of these problems. Many of these people won't even go to the churches, so the schools are the only institutions that can be counted on to conduct health surveys and other things to help society. How you can have equitable education when you have such diverse populations being served, I don't know.

MH: One of the problems is that we are dealing with a society where the traditionally shared values are no longer accepted by large groups of people. We have families where even the work ethic is derided, it is laughed at, and there is no reason that they see why they should work; where the idea of honesty is not taught, where they teach their children to lie and take their children out to steal.

AK: If all parents had vouchers they would have to make some choices, otherwise the child would not go to school at all. Ultimately there has to be one adult somewhere who is in charge of the child. The problem is that the schools, or the teachers, have had to pick this up. What we are really talking about is this class that Russell calls the "detached urban proletariat." They stand in opposition to almost all of

the values of the society. You can't even count on them to cooperate to get their children to school.

GDH: Dr. Kirk, you have written extensively in recent months about this proletariat. I know that you believe that the recent intensification of our cultural crisis is at least partly the result of this group. Would you discuss your thoughts on this subject?

RK: Let us define our terms. The words "proletariat" and "proletarian" come down to us from Roman times. In the Roman signification of the term, a proletarian is a man who gives nothing to the commonwealth but his progeny. Such a being pays no taxes, subsists at public expense, fulfills no civic duties, performs no work worth mentioning, and knows not the meaning of piety. As a mass, the collective proletarians, the proletariat, are formidable; they demand entitlements—principally, in antique times, bread and circuses and in our own day much larger entitlements, which are granted to them lest they turn collectively violent. To the state, I repeat, the proletarian contributes only his offspring—who in their turn, ordinarily, become proletarians. Idle, ignorant, and often criminal, the proletariat can ruin a great city—and a nation. What Arnold Toynbee calls "the internal proletariat" so dragged down the Roman civilization; the barbarian invaders, the "external proletariat," burst through the fragile shell of a culture already bled to death.

GDH: What, in fact, can a society do about this proletariat that resists being brought into a more productive mode?

RK: There is no historical precedent for a remedy, unless it is what happened to the Roman proletariat. It withered only when the Republic withered. When the corn ships ceased to come from Egypt there was great malnutrition in Rome. The population of Rome, which had been two million, decreased to five thousand. It was the running sore of

the Empire. In city after city there was destruction. And so it is that unless we find some means of amelioration we face a similar prospect of social catastrophe. Detroit is already a disaster area; so I understand, is Newark. They get steadily worse. Increased violence, poverty, decay. In Detroit there is only one neighborhood which is still tolerable. They presently have a vast stewing, steaming slum in which everyone is in danger, and which consumes public funds which are drawn from outside the city. No one has yet found a very practical remedy.

AK: In Michigan we have a new governor who is trying to tighten up all of the governmental operations. He has decreed, through the legislature of course, that the men and women on general assistance will have their grants cut. These are able bodied men and women who are collecting funds and who do not have families. This has caused an uproar in the state, but it has been sanctioned by the legislature and by the people in general. Some are claiming that terrible things will happen to these people, that they will be out on the street and starving; so far it hasn't happened. It will be an interesting experiment to see what does happen when people are denied support when they aren't working even though they are able to work.

RK: No effort at all is required to become a proletarian: one needs merely to submit to the dehumanizing and deculturizing currents of the hour, and worship the idols of the crowd. Much effort is required to conserve the legacy of order, freedom, and justice, of learning and art and imagination that ought to be ours. Some malign spirits, in the name of equality, would have us all be proletarians together: the doctrine of equal misery. The conservative impulse, au contraire, is to rescue as many men and women as possible from that submerged lot in life, without object and without cheer, which is the proletarian condition.

Let the great world spin forever
Down the ringing grooves of change.
—Alfred, Lord Tennyson

On Intellect, Intelligence and Chewing Gum—A Contemporary Appraisal

Frederick C. Neff

That ours is a rapidly changing world is scarcely a matter of serious debate. Social and political unrest among the Russian republics has called for a drastic restructuring of the regional and geographical boundaries of the Soviet Union and its satellite nations. Stunningly victorious in the battle to free Kuwait from its domination and control by Iraq, we are now confronted with the problem of how to assist the Kurds in establishing a homeland. The impasse between the Palestinians and the Israelis likewise calls for urgent resolution. Biafrans are starving in West Africa, while thousands of natives are being brutalized and massacred in Johannesburg in the Republic of South Africa. In light of the near-catastrophic flux in the world today, what obligation does education have in ameliorating such turmoil, i.e., in bringing about stability in an apparently chaotic world? Is a more intensive study of history all that is needed, or should such study be viewed as a prelude to change? Is knowledge itself power, or do the uses to which knowledge is put determine its power and its significance?

The very nature of education is imbued with change when it is conceived as a forward-looking enterprise designed to chart the course of our future aspirations rather than as simply a recounting of our past—important as that may be. Certainly there is truth in the adage that those who refuse to study history are compelled to repeat it. But it is likewise true that such study—divorced from a kindled imagination and considered visions of a better future—does little more than perpetuate the status quo. An overweening concern with the past is perhaps best represented by certain followers of the classical or Great Books movement, while the contemporary or future-oriented outlook is more likely indicated by the adherents of Pragmatism. A

Frederick C. Neff is professor emeritus at the College of Education at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan

closer examination of this schism would seem to be in order.

The classical point of view is perhaps best represented by such writers, among others, as Mortimer J. Adler; William F. Buckley, Jr.; Harry S. Broudy and the late Robert M. Hutchins. Pragmatism is most clearly delineated in the writings of John Dewey (who preferred the term Instrumentalism), Boyd H. Bode, John L. Childs, George S. Counts, William H. Kilpatrick (founder of Progressive Education), Ernest E. Bayles and several others. In *The Learning Society*, Mr. Hutchins had argued that education must begin preparing for a time when "... we shall find ourselves largely without work as we have understood work in the past." He believed that "... for the educational system the transition from schools, colleges and universities away from jobs and toward intellectual power." That many of the kinds of jobs that have heretofore been an integral part of our working society are no longer in demand is scarcely debatable. Whether mechanization means an increasing elimination of all kinds of work, however, is at least open to serious question.

If, in the classical view, the matter of learning hinges upon the learning of newer and more productive kinds of work, wherein inventiveness, creativity and imagination would play increasingly greater roles and a greater proliferation of job opportunities would result, considerable merit might be attached to such a position. There is reason to believe that such learning would release the worker from enslavement to his job and free him to become an innovator of myriad ways of better accomplishing his task. It would enable him to remove himself from the stigma of assembly lines and conveyor belts and become a genuine participant in the improvement of his product. He would be able to view himself, as it were, not a layer of brick upon brick, but as the builder of a cathedral. But this is probably not what the classicist has in mind at all. It is doubtful, in fact, whether he views learning as geared to any tangible end, least of all to anything so lowly as work. What he appears to be urging upon us is not that learning be redirected toward implementing the newer kinds of jobs that technology may require, but that learning be conceived as a substitute for work, with no apparent relationship between the two—and this is quite a different matter.

Learning thus becomes an airy abstraction to be indulged in for its own sake, unencumbered with any practical purpose. What may be overlooked in the advocacy of a transition from working to learning is a basic fallacy in the argument, viz., that learning and working are not mutually reinforcing but that they are disparate terms. It would seem that the learner is not a doer and that the doer is not a learner, which suggests a subtle reinstatement of the old dichotomy between knowledge and action, between contemplation and involvement and perhaps even between morality and conduct. That intellection is somehow different from and superior to the work of the hands is an insidious notion that has plagued us for centuries. It has characterized every aristocratic or caste society from the Greeks to the present, but it remains withal a notion that is alien to democracy. Every contributor to society has been in some sense or another a worker. The architect works to achieve a master plan; the draftsman works at his drawing board to implement its design; and the skilled laborer works to bring the plan into being. Skilled surgeons, violinists, writers, artists and sculptors all work in various ways with their hands. It will scarcely do to say that the skills with which they ply their work were not learned or that they do not continue to learn better ways of performing as they practice their crafts.

II

To hold, on the other hand, that learning is not for the purpose of doing, working, or performing in regard to some skill or creative act would be to deprive learning of its purposive function or end-in-view. Learning is not a matter of vague celebration. To learn is always to *learn how to do something*. Whether a learning society is a worthy society is ultimately to be measured, not by the mere fact that it is learning, but by what it is learning, by the purposes for which it learns and by the criteria it uses in assessing such purposes.

This brings us to the age-old question of aims, which in turn hinges upon whether they shall be viewed as universal and transcendental, as classicists maintain, or as contingent upon present and probably future states of human affairs, as suggested by John Dewey. It seems paradoxical, at least, that classicists should so long have claimed a kind of transcendence in regard to educational aims and now urge that they reflect the current and forthcoming technological revolution in the social order. Lest it be presumed that the classicist had suddenly become a relativist and that his educational values were culturally oriented, I venture to suggest that what he is really saying is that the kind of intellectual training of which he has long been an ardent advocate as at long last giving promise of coming into its own, not as a luxury but as a necessity. I suspect that he is further saying that despite—not because of—the job dislocations and eliminations that a highly technological society may bring about, education should primarily be concerned with a cultivation of those universal ends that are oblivious to the changing physical environment and that are impervious to time, place and human conditions.

It is only realistic to recognize that science and technology are becoming increasingly integral parts of our daily lives, and it would be a woefully short-sighted view of education that failed to reconstruct itself accordingly. But is the classicist's brand of reconstruction what we need? It is not difficult to detect in the classical proposal the familiar thesis, borrowed largely from Plato and Aristotle, that true education pertains to a cultivation of the intellect, that labor is necessarily menial and degrading, and that this is because, philosophically speaking, the mind and the body exist in disparate realms, with priority assigned to the mind.

III

One cannot but question whether it is not this very bifurcation of mind and body, of the cultural and the practical, of the academic-minded and the hand-minded, of the humanistic and the scientific that has resulted in what C.P. Snow has called our "two cultures" and which has but served to widen the breach between the artist and the artisan, between the poet and the scientist, between the philosopher and the activist and between the intellectual and the average man. The shearing away of values from the experiences we engage in, on the one hand, and the isolation of what we do from its connection with our moral aspirations, on the other, have led to a kind of schizophrenia in regard to a proper relationship between thinking and doing, as well as between ordinary thinking and doing and intellectual thinking and doing.

At a conference at Princeton University the British M. P. Brian Waldon once referred to "... the increasing divergence between what intellectuals do and think and what ordinary people are doing and thinking." His observation was also that there had been a complete collapse of liberal values at their source and that the framework in which the ordinary man now thinks has virtually no relationship to liberalism, or indeed, to any values at all. The classicist quite

properly reminds us that in an increasingly computerized and technological society many of the vocations that were earlier in demand are going by the boards, and that future generations are going to be faced with fewer and fewer of the traditional kinds of job openings. He urges that the curricula of our educational institutions, in order not to prepare students for outmoded or non-existent vocations, ought to take into account these changing conditions.

But the rather handy conclusion that soon most people will be learning and few will be working is too simplistic an assessment of the issue. In the first place, although a great many of the vocations for which we have prepared and may still be preparing young people may no longer be in demand, this is not to say that we shall ever become a completely mechanized society. Nor is it to say that the bulk of the professions—law, medicine, education, the ministry, economics, politics, etc.—are likely to become obsolete. Moreover, the creative work that is required in music, drama, painting, sculpture, poetry, etc. is not likely to be displaced by technology. Productive work will no doubt always be in demand wherever creative art and scientific inventiveness are concerned, and the work of the imaginative mind will become increasingly prized as such slide-rule skills as calculation and simple logic are taken over by machines.

In the second place, there is a strong and highly prized relationship between the dignity of labor and social values. From the simple carpentry of Jesus to the architectural designs of Lewis Mumford, from the geometry of Euclid to the mathematical physics of Einstein, from the epic poetry of Homer to the cryptic imagery of T. S. Eliot, from the majesty of Beethoven to the cacophony of Shostakovich, man has valued and respected the worker—be he inventor, discoverer, physician, poet, mathematician, musician, actor or manual laborer. Although he may occasionally have envied them, man has habitually failed to respect those who do nothing, or who are merely aristocratic, or who are too lazy to work, or who do not have to work, or who do no more than cultivate their own intellects and contribute nothing to the well being of others.

IV

Lewis Terman, in his *Genetic Studies of Genius*, once assumed the equivalence of genius and a high intelligence quotient. In his later years he acknowledged that these are not the same, that persons who merely "sit" with high I Q's are not perforce geniuses, and that the term genius had best be reserved for those who have demonstrated *productive* intelligence. It may be significant to note that the term intellect, which those in the Aristotelian tradition make paramount, is largely avoided by Dewey and other experimentalists, who prefer the term intelligence. Both terms derive from the Latin root *intellegere*, meaning "to know." Intellect, however, stems from the perfect passive participle *intellectus*, meaning "having been known"; whereas intelligence is derived from the present active participle *intelligens*, meaning "knowing." Despite the apparent similarities of these two terms, the difference between them is more than merely etymological. It suggests the conception of intelligence as ongoing, in the present, hence active. Intellect, on the other hand, is understood as something completed or perfect, hence passive. This also supplies us with a clue as to why intellect is commonly conceived as an entity, a reified or hypostatized capital stock of knowledge; whereas intelligence is viewed as a function, an active participation or transaction in regard to the environmental field in which the activity we term knowledge-getting occurs. It may likewise provide us with an understanding as to why intellect is so often thought of as a kind of soul-substance, removed from

experience; whereas intelligence is seen as joined in interaction with experience.

Some analytic philosophers—among them Gilbert Ryle and R.S. Peters—have argued to the effect that intelligence is not an inner entity which manifests itself outwardly, nor simply, as Dewey has argued, that it is continuous with its expression, but that it is to be identified precisely with its product. This amounts to saying that Beethoven's genius, for example, resides *in* his compositions, or Picasso's *in* his works of art, or Hemingway's *in* his written works, for here lies the only basis for calling such men geniuses. Although virtually every society has esteemed its productive members, the free society has seen fit neither to subsidize nor to patronize them, but to dignify their efforts by granting them independence and increasingly higher degrees of autonomy. Accordingly, one cannot but wonder whether the proposed shift in emphasis from working to learning would actually constitute no more than a realistic attempt to adjust to technological change, or whether, if seriously and thoroughly undertaken, it would threaten the very foundations of our social values and our social order.

In the third place, aside from the social recognition and rewards that accrue to work, what is to become of the human need for self-respect that is engendered by a sense of accomplishment from a job well done? The boredom of the idle—be they rich or poor, learned or unlearned—is a poor substitute for the zest that derives from undertaking, working at and successfully completing difficult and worthwhile tasks. We're urged to reorient education away from jobs and toward intellectual power. But what is the significance of intellectual power except as it is utilized in working out more humane ways of living in association with others? Moreover, if our educational system is to retain a semblance of its democratic structure and outlook, can it afford to overlook the fact that not every learner is capable of profiting from an exclusively intellectual kind of education?

V

There are many kinds of intelligences—mechanical, manipulative, clerical, as well as creative and abstract—which represent the diverse capacities, needs and interests of the free, multi-group society. To single out but one kind of capacity—to attempt to limit all learning to a strictly intellectual variety—would be to ignore the rich and varied scope of talents and aptitudes that American youth represent. It would be an ironic twist to discover that the technology we have spawned—a technology that purportedly enables us to realize virtually every end we set up—is capable of usurping those very ends and of bending our historic goals to its will.

Like a Frankenstein's monster, the technology which in many cases man may be justly proud of having wrought, may now be threatening to take away from man his pride of accomplishment. What is apparently forgotten in this strange phenomenon is that the original purpose of technology—the easing of undue hardships and the betterment of human living—is in danger of being ignored, and the servant threatens to become the master. The specter of a technological usurpation of man's ability to decide his own best interests and destiny is not without its parallel at the governmental level. Washington Senator Stan Chamberlain, for example, once referred to Federal bureaucracy as a "governaut, which is something with the personality of a grinch and the momentum of the Seventh Fleet, only bigger—a self-generating monster which devours its creator, bursts out of the laboratory and sinks the United States."

In times past, religious revolts, industrial revolutions

and technological shifts have been seen as portents of a better life. To be sure, there was often unmitigated suffering involved in the task of realigning one's faith, in temporary job relocations and in adopting ways of production that were claimed to represent greater degrees of efficiency. But in all such historical phases there was a tacit assumption that, once the painful period of transition was endured, equilibrium would again be restored, and a new era of religious, economic and social stability would be ushered in. Efficiency was the magic word, and whatever disruptions were necessitated in its name were presumed to be ultimately beneficial. In the name of efficiency our natural resources have in many instances been drained. In his devastation of forests and destruction of wildlife, predatory man has often thoughtlessly disturbed the balance of nature. To facilitate the efficient flow of traffic, the beauty of a landscape yields to the construction of a superhighway. If it be efficient and profitable to industry, the resultant contamination of our air, lakes, rivers and streams, although perhaps unfortunate, will apparently just have to be endured.

Even the gracious-sounding names of telephone exchanges such as EVERgreen, LAWndale, PARKway, CRESTview, WALnut and FOREst have given way to mere numbers—all in the name of efficiency. In order to live efficiently, modern man has increasingly reduced himself to a nameless and faceless blob. Today it is quite possible—indeed almost routine—for him to have a house number on a numbered street in a community that is located primarily by its ZIP code number; to have attended a numbered school; to have—in addition to a telephone number—a social security number, an insurance policy number, a license plate number and a drivers license number; and to be buried in a graveyard plot that is identified by a number. Our cities, industries, jobs, educational systems and, indeed, our entire lives have been geared to efficiency, with the result that efficiency has virtually become a way of life itself.

What we have neglected to consider is that to live efficiently is not necessarily to live effectively. Whereas efficiency has to do only with means, effectiveness has to do with taking into account the probably consequences—both immediate and long range—in the service of which means are employed. Merely to live efficiently is to live at the superficial level of a sometimes questionable economy of time, funds and energy. To live effectively is to live at the higher level of perceived relationships, as well as to keep under continual surveillance the desirability—both individual and social—of whatever we undertake to accomplish. While corporate enterprise, Madison Avenue advertising and computerized living may represent the Golden Age of the efficiency expert, they do nothing to prod us to tap the deep wellsprings of meaning that life affords.

VI

The average man has come to believe that the meaning of life is a matter of discovery, or that it is a commodity, like aspirin, ready-made and available upon request; he seldom thinks of it as something personally wrestled with and individually wrought. Even religion has often become a big-business commodity-dispenser of ready-made ideas instead of the means for an honest, perhaps disturbing and unorthodox, inquiry into the depths of human relevance.

In science and technology we are daring innovators, whereas in morals we tend to be subject to the dominion of the herd. We have been spectacularly experimental in plumbing the ocean depths, in invading outer space, in conquering disease and in devising all sorts of efficient means of communication and transportation. But in the labor of learning how to live in harmony with our fellow man—in our

families, in our communities and among nations—we have exhibited a sorry lack of aptitude. We have all but exhausted ourselves in the heroics of physical conquest, while our moral frontiers remain uncharted. Perhaps the ever closer proximity of our megalopolitan populations of the future bespeaks a need not so much for intellectual power as for the fostering and development of sharable interests, human sensitivities and mutual understandings.

The transitional nature of our times goes deeper than the rather obvious changes in the physical scene. It is bound sooner or later to raise the problem of choice between competing standards of value. To put it differently, evidence of material progress is basically an indication of an increasingly experimental outlook. Although not widely understood, the import of this view is that progress consists in gaining mastery of situations for the purpose of human betterment. In opposition to this view is the contention that progress results not by acquiring control over physical forces but by conforming to some set of fixed principles, which has variously been defined as cosmic, revealed, transcendental, classical or otherwise absolute and inviolable. From the latter standpoint, those who would invade the cosmic order, if not rank heretics, are at least persons whom we should "keep an eye on," and those who would presume to match their wits against nature had better "watch their step." Or the position is sometimes taken that scientific truths are not really truths at all, since real truth is metaphysical and transcends any propositions that science may formulate. Our present dilemma has to do with the fundamental question of deciding between piecemeal adjustment on the one hand and wholesale reconstruction on the other.

The *Weltanschauung* in which we have been operating stems largely from the Aristotelian notion of a closed universe, mechanistic in nature, which was thought to be an outward manifestation of some sort of predetermined plan or cosmic design, the metaphysics for which was provided by Platonic philosophy and later adopted by Christian theology. It is this dualistic or two-world outlook that has been largely responsible for the present dichotomies in psychology, philosophy, economics, religion, morals and government and which has become so familiar, if unfortunate, a part of our Western culture. It is this twofold conception of reality which has resulted in a not-too-healthy separation of mind from body, heaven from earth, the spiritual from the worldly, the ideal from the real, the metaphysical from the physical and the individual from society. In education it has performed the irreparable error of separating things to be learned—the curriculum, subject matter—from the learner.

Although it would be inaccurate to say that philosophy has stood still since the days of Aristotle, the fact remains that the dualisms of which we have been speaking likewise tended to separate the philosophic from the scientific, with the somewhat predictable result that neither was considered to have much more than an incidental bearing upon the other. The philosopher, absorbed with the metaphysical, has seldom felt compelled to concern himself with scientific discoveries; while the scientist has for the most part been content to stay within his appointed bounds of purely physical research and has been shy about playing philosopher. As a consequence, wherever science has collided head on with philosophic truth, it remained for philosophy to put science in its place. The upshot was that newer scientific findings were usually adjusted or "hitched on" to the established philosophic order of the day, which it was thought necessary to preserve at all costs.

VII

The discoveries of such men as Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and Einstein might have constituted grounds for re-vamping our world outlook. Had the spirit of their habit of mind caught on, we might have been spared the shackles of ancient superstitions, outmoded dogmas and the whole tradition of fixed standards. Instead, the degree of their acceptance was usually limited by the degree to which their ideas did not seriously disturb the old, dualistic scheme of things. The very names attached to "new" philosophic movements—neo-Platonism, neo-realism, neo-classicism, neo-scholasticism—reveal the persistent tendency to give ground grudgingly by making minor concessions within the established order rather than to engage in serious reconstruction of the order itself. Our present culture harbors a hodgepodge of assorted outlooks, incompatible with one another, which give aid and comfort to two basically irreconcilable philosophies. It is neither fish nor fowl. The idea of a closed system obedient to certain immutable laws, where truth is an eternal verity, cannot be reconciled with the conception of an open universe, hospitable to change, in which truth is forever emerging and modifiable with each new addition to knowledge.

It is the philosophic framework from which the rather superficial admonition to stop working and begin learning is made that needs to be seriously examined. Moreover, the job of moving toward an increasingly equitable distribution of the world's resources among the less fortunate people of the earth and the continuing task of learning how to live with diverse cultures suggest a far more significant conception of learning than just learning for learning's sake. It has long disturbed me that many persons have been assigned educational status whose knowledge outstrips their ability to utilize it in moral and humane ways. I have long felt that the hallmark of an educated person is a reflective and compassionate attitude toward human being and human problems. The truly educated man, as distinguished from the man who merely knows, is the man who has learned how to enlist his knowledge in the service of moral ends. We're not especially short on "intellectuals" today—indeed, it may even be said that we are burdened with them—but there is a difference between being merely intellectual and being cultured or civilized. Formal education, from the kindergarten to the graduate school, has emphasized what might be termed the "learning that" aspects of education. We have finally produced a generation that is perhaps over-equipped with knowledge as no previous generation has ever been. As Professor Guy Davenport, of the University of Kentucky, has remarked, "Knowledge, once ordered, has now become an atomic rain of random particles under which the mind dances like a toy balloon in a hailstorm." But our surfeit of knowledge has apparently fallen short of ameliorating the psychology of the human predicament and, despite our burden of information, we continue to fail in our attempts to realize our moral aims.

VIII

Whereas the intellectual may have *learned that* to an astonishing degree, the educated man is distinguished by the fact that he has *learned how* to discipline his behavior in the achievement of reflected-upon ends, i.e., to align his methods with his goals. For what is the purpose of education if not ultimately to render life richer, more livable, more decent and more humane? A study of subjects such as mathematics, astronomy, biology, history, music, literature, drama and painting is truly educative not because it adds to our funded knowledge but to the degree that it contributes to the enrichment, enhances the dignity and ennobles the

purposes of life. By the same token, to be proficient or well-versed in technology, or to be expert in the field of international diplomacy, is not necessarily to be educated. But to have learned how to utilize technology in the service of effective living, or to have mastered the art of aligning diplomacy with the attainment of moral goals is representative of true education. Every science and every art reaches its greatest degree of significance in its social bearings—or, like Dewey's conception of intelligence, the meaning of every human undertaking is ultimately social.

The literal-minded simplicity of the average sociologist or public moralist serves little purpose. Instead of listening endlessly to picayune answers to small questions, perhaps it is time to demand tentative answers to important ones. It is encouraging to note that there are a few voices beginning to be heard in regard to defining the issue. Erich Fromm, for example, holds that "Our problem today is technology vs. humanism in both its religious and non-religious forms." Fromm has proposed the creation of a National Council of the Voice of the American Conscience, which he believes should consist of about fifty eminent, dedicated Americans concerned to make technology subservient to the attainment of human ideals. What we are in danger of losing, Fromm believes, is a recognition of the social primacy of man. Although his proposal might be interpreted by some as fostering a kind of elitism in respect to the questions of who should serve as watchdogs of our common aims, and although grass roots awakening to the inherent pitfalls of a mindless technology might be considered more desirable, Fromm at least reminds us of the need for sober thinking about the problem.

IX

Intellectualism in the classical sense suggests an at-

tempt to escape from reality—it serves as a sort of metaphysical antidote to the crassness of technology. Instead of joining brain power with man power, the classicist appears to see no connection between the two. He is all for technological progress, for this provides us with more and more leisure time in which to cultivate our intellects. But whether cultivation of the intellect has any bearing upon a planned economy, urgent urban needs, a conservation of natural resources, or problems of international accord is nowhere made clear. An intellectualism cut off from the circumstances, plights and predicaments of modern living, while nurtured by leisure, could at the same time preside over a technological desecration of our landscapes, a dehumanization of our social relationships and a gradual usurpation of our power to choose the conditions of our own lives. The prevailing notion that all technology is good technology needs to be drastically altered. In the words of Harvard biologist George Wald: "Our society is trained to accept all new technology as progress, or to look upon it as an aspect of Fate. Should we do everything we can? The usual answer is 'of course.' But the right answer is 'of course not'."

A most serious danger to our social well-being is the threat of an irreparable cleavage between our technological prowess and our so-called intellectual development. If the potential and long-range benefits of technology are to reach beyond the dilemmas it has created; if, once leashed and thoughtfully directed, technology is to become a true harbinger of human progress, then the scientific, the intellectual and the moral forces of human thought had best be united in a joint declaration of our education aims. In our rapidly changing world it might be well to remember, however, that progress is more than just movement—as chewing gum proves.

"Not to know the relative dispositions of things is the state of slaves or children; to have mapped out the universe is the boast, or at least the ambition, of Philosophy."—John Henry Cardinal Newman

What Good is Liberal Education?

Alan J. Hicks

Last fall a special governors' commission issued a report on the declining state of American education. Reports of this kind come around, it seems with the regularity of the seasons; they have become as routine as the school term itself, and we are no longer surprised by their evaluation of students' deficiencies in the basic skills deemed necessary to function in the world. In this particular report, these deficiencies are declared to be especially salient when placed against the background of the current state of science and technology. Measured by this criterion students are seen to be behind not only when they know less than their predecessors, but even when they know as much or more, yet have not advanced at an equal pace with technological progress. And so we are faced with the prospect of always playing catch-up, and never quite getting there, for "there" is always changing—a sure formula for perpetual educational crisis.

Let me here put aside the paradox in the judgement that Americans are deficient in relation to the technology that they themselves are, still, one of the leaders in advancing. What I wish to consider instead is an attitude regarding the basic nature of education, one that I believe is fundamentally flawed, and which dominates the administrative bodies of the educational establishment. This attitude underlies much of the current concern over the state of education, as evidenced by the nature of that concern. As reflected in the aforementioned report, the governors' over-riding concern is with education as skill. This concern is the fruit of a pragmatic attitude toward education and knowledge, within which knowledge is viewed solely as an instrument to be used to some external effect, and education is seen as an investment in human productivity. Learning, thus understood, is nothing if not learning to do something. In other words, by this account we learn only in order to work. But this is in opposition to the educational view of the ancients, in which man is seen to work in order to live, and learning is a *sine qua non* of a truly *human* life. The understanding and contemplation of truth for its own sake was seen by Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas to be the

Alan J. Hicks is a doctoral candidate in philosophy at Kansas University in Lawrence.

highest pursuit of man, because of their vision of the nature of man. The modern subordination of knowledge to purely functional or utilitarian ends, on the other hand, reflects a limited view of knowledge, corresponding to a limited view of man, a view that is hardly a vision. In order to reestablish the claims of a learning higher than that which is merely pragmatic, we must first seek to regain a true and complete vision of man, a vision which will itself serve to illustrate the essential nature and force of this higher learning, in the possession of which man attains his highest perfection.

I.

In the *Phaedo* Socrates relates that as a young man he was frustrated in his attempt to arrive at an understanding of the ultimate principles of things. This frustration resulted from following the science of the day, which invariably led him along the path of a shallow materialism, reducing all things to "such absurdities as air, ether, and water." Failing to satisfy, such explanations were finally left aside and Socrates struck a new course, by means of which things were no longer to be explained according to mere physical components but according to their universal essence or determining form; for there is, says Socrates, "no means whereby anything can come into existence other than by participating in the proper essence of the particular thing whose nature it shares."¹

Today we are in possession of an empirical science far in advance of that with which Socrates had to contend. And yet if we seek to understand an object through the medium of that science alone, we will see it only in its partial and limited elements, however sophisticated the description of those elements may be. If that object be man, we may distinguish his elements according to the various perspectives of the special sciences: chemistry enumerating those elements in one way, biology in another, psychology in yet another, and so on. But regardless of the perspective by which the parts of man are identified, and how accurate is that identification, there must be a single principle in which those parts attain to their unity as a whole; a principle that brings the parts themselves into existence as parts; for nothing is a part except in relation to a whole. That single principle is the substantial (and determining) form, which in man and in all living beings has been called the soul; and the consideration of its nature falls within the special domain of philosophy, the science of ultimate causes.

Aristotle follows his master in seeking to understand man in his substantial form or soul. However, he maintains that the soul can only be understood by means of reflection upon observable activity, for as an intrinsic principle there is no immediate access to its secrets. It therefore remains hidden to the probes of a positivist science, which will only consider the existence of an observable reality. That science, applied to the activities of man, usually results in some form of behaviorism, reducing man's life to a mere collection of observable behaviors, clusters of activities which may be charted and graphed, influenced by means of external stimuli, but never truly understood. But with no single principle underlying the various activities of a man, thereby uniting them as to a common source, there is no justification for even identifying those sundry activities as activities of a single thing. And if through the manipulation of external stimuli we are able to influence the behaviors of man, to what end shall we influence? In other words, if observable behavior is all we have to go by, then we have no criterion for determining why one set of behaviors is preferable to any other. That criterion can only lie in something distinct though connected to the behaviors themselves: the nature of man as determined by the objective essence of the soul,

that dynamic one in which his many parts have their very existence as parts of one living thing. It is only by comprehending the various aspects of man in the unity of a whole that we can attain to the true comprehension of the thing itself—man and his good.

It is to the soul, then, existing as the animating principle of man in all his capacities that we must turn as the source of all human activities, for "it is through the rational soul that man is not only man but also animal and living body and being."² These activities range from the most basic life sustaining functions of nutrition and reproduction to those activities characterizing the animal kingdom—the operations of sense and the appetites that follow the direction of sense. Yet as human beings we also participate in an activity of a unique and spiritual dimension. This is the activity of intellect. Through the use of reason we are able not only to direct those vital functions shared with lower forms of life, thereby imbuing them with a specifically human quality, but also to attain to that immaterial union with the essences of things characteristic of knowledge. By means of the spiritual power of intellect man transcends the limitations placed upon the material dispositions of sense. He is able to comprehend the world. It is this spiritual power of potential relation to all things that sets man off from the beasts of the field, making him a little lower than the angels. While "every other substance has only a particular share in being," says St. Thomas, the intellectual substance "may comprehend the entirety of being through its intellect."³ Thus man can only complete himself, which is to say can only truly be himself, to the extent that he takes in or relates to the whole of reality, becoming one with that whole.

We see then that the world in which man exists is a necessary companion, required not only to sustain his organic nature, but also to realize his highest capacity, the capacity to know. Knowledge must have its object, and this world is our first object. Indeed, we could not even know ourselves without first knowing the world in which we live, for contrary to what is sometimes assumed, there is no direct or immediate knowledge of the self. As it is we know ourselves as rational beings only by first exercising our capacity to know. Yet while man requires the world in order to exercise the capacities rooted in his very nature, man is also part of the world itself. As man is not sufficient for himself, so the world as a whole, of which man is a part, does not suffice to account for itself, but requires the agency of that being which alone suffices for itself—the necessary being of God. In order, therefore, to understand man or the created order as a whole we must understand the relation of all things to God, for outside of that relation there is nothing.

From the fact that all things exist because of God's creative act it follows that the end of all things is determined by Him. But outside of Himself there is no end for which God could act, and therefore we are compelled to conclude that God Himself is not only the first cause but also the end or final cause of all creation. While it is true that the good of man consists in the perfection of his nature, this perfection has as its ultimate, we might even say cosmic, purpose the manifestation of the power and glory of God. All creatures have this manifestation as their ultimate end. But man, as a result of his rational soul created in the very image of God, more fully manifests that power and that glory. It is for this reason that the lower creatures are rightfully said to be subordinate to man, and we are justified in using this world to our own ends.

II.

Now whether one holds the preceding overview or not, it nevertheless serves to illustrate a philosophical perspec-

tive that goes beyond the mere knowledge of particular facts to a general framework within which those facts may be understood. Such a general and connected view of things was considered by the ancients to be the especial mark of a liberal education. Today, however, we labor to effect what we consider to be liberal education by the destination of a wide assortment of information out of a variety of subjects traditionally designated as liberal (e.g., English and history). Yet liberal education consists in much more than mere facts piled upon facts. It consists rather in the formation of a mental power, what John Henry Newman called an enlightened or illuminative reason, which he described as "the power of viewing many things at once as a whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values and determining their mutual dependence. Possessed of this real illumination, he continued, "the mind never views any part of the extended matter of knowledge without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations which spring from this recollection. It makes everything in some sort lead to everything else, it would communicate the image of the whole to every separate portion, until that whole becomes in imagination like a spirit, everywhere pervading and penetrating its component parts, and giving them one definite meaning."⁴

Whoever would aspire to this illuminative view must learn to rise above the mere accumulation of facts to a vista from which these facts may be seen in their proper relation to one another. He must, that is, be able to ascent to the universal principles of things; for it is only within the framework of such principles that we can even begin to have that vision. Unfortunately, as the student more closely approaches the maturity that enables him to grasp the universal principles in their relation to particulars he is increasingly funneled into a concentrated area of particular study. Those who follow through this process to the end, while perhaps quite competent in their special area of expertise, are usually competent only in the particular, and are often left with a superficial understanding of the world as a whole. They are left with a perspective not unlike that of most tourists who wander through the aisles of the great cathedrals of Europe, looking at altars here or there, statues of saints unknown, stained glass windows, or whatever else happens to catch their eye. Perhaps if there is time they will pick up a few more details, but only details, bits of information generally unconnected. Such people may be contrasted to one who enters with the perspective of the artist; who sees manifested in the particulars, universal principles of form and design; who furthermore is able to see the various parts—portals, arches, ceiling, etc.—existing in the unity of the whole, grasping the beauty of symmetry and the due proportion of an architectural type. Yet even this view is inadequate to the thing if it does not include an appreciation of the motives lying outside the structure considered in itself: the aspirations of the builders and the ultimate purpose of an offering made to the glory of God. Unless one understands this ultimate ends though he be a master architect he cannot completely understand what lies before him.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of this general and integral view of things—the view that sees things as a whole, in which the various parts are related, and through which they exist as parts. Only such a view is adequate to the thing as it is, be it a cathedral, a man, or the world at large. Of course we may distinguish the limited aspects of a thing, and give detailed consideration to one or more aspects in isolation from the whole. Such an approach is the method of the sciences and is not without certain advantages. Even so, a particular aspect, when considered apart

from the whole, is but an abstraction and does not present reality as it is. A knowledge of mere aspects, no matter the extent of that knowledge, therefore represents a defect of understanding, a failure to comprehend reality. This failure can be of serious consequence when the object of our concern is man and the educative means to his good, for without the understanding of man in his totality we are unable to know what actions are most appropriate to the achievement of that good.

Because of the complexities of the human predicament—the variety of possible activity and the conditions under which it may be pursued—it is sometimes difficult to know what contributes to our greater good. Aesop tells that once the Hands and the Mouth, disgruntled over the Belly's apparent sloth in the light of their own industry, decided to withhold all food from that quarter. Being deprived of its only source of food the Belly was unable to nourish the rest of the body, which before long began to wither and die. On the point of extinction, the Hands and Mouth were at last forced to resupply the Belly, admitting that the Belly indeed had its work, the accomplishment of which was necessary for the good of all.

We can see this fable's immediate application to an integral being considered as a whole: that for a being possessing multiple capacities there exists a good beyond the mere fulfillment of any one. This overall good does not result from the free reign of the manifold capacities, which would be chaos, but rather in their harmonious exercise in relation to one another. Taking the body by itself, we can see that there are a multitude of particular needs and functions to which we may minister. It is only when all of the various aspects are given their proper due, however, that we attain to the physical harmony that is health. This means that equal emphasis should never be given to every bodily function or need, for not all are of equal importance. True harmony will only exist when the higher functions are treated as such, the lower standing in a subordinate role. Yet man possesses a good beyond mere health. Man is also an animal with sensual and emotional capacities and needs, is also an intellectual being with all that is entailed by reason. It is from this latter capacity of reason that we derive our properly human character which determines our unique good as man, including thereby moral good.

From this perspective we can then maintain that a single capacity or combination of powers may be ordered to some limited good, the pursuance of which in certain cases would nevertheless interfere with our greater good. The concupiscible appetite, for example, is ordered toward sensible goods, yet its immoderate exercise, while perhaps resulting in the attainment of an abundance of sensible goods, would nevertheless interfere with the pursuit of higher goods, and in the long run may even interfere with our ability to obtain and enjoy the sensible goods. We may even be driven by the dictates of an inordinate appetite to the commission of crime in order to satisfy that appetite. In that case the appetite works against the social good, which is also our good, for we need harmonious social relations in order to flourish as human beings. In all cases, then, the appetite considered in itself alone is ordered to some good, but what is good in one regard may be evil in another.

According to this account all capacities of human nature taken by themselves are good. But of all human capacities reason is the highest and therefore gives to man his highest good in its exercise alone, prescinding from any results external to its exercise. In addition, reason is that faculty by which we are able to order our multifarious powers to the harmony or good of the whole, including both the individual considered as a whole, and the whole of soci-

ety of which the individual is a part. In having access to an elevated view we are better able to judge which course of action best contributes to our overall good, for we then judge from a perspective that enables us to see all of our actions, and the limited goods of those actions, in relation to our entire good.

At this point I can very well anticipate an objection being raised to all this talk of universal schemes and ultimate ends. Such talk, it might be said, is fine and well, especially when considering questions of a moral nature. Questions of that sort indeed require for their resolution an understanding of man's total nature and his ultimate good. We should then be grateful for the insights of philosophers and theologians whose job it is to consider the relative value of the many possible human actions in light of the overall good. Yet the philosophical view is not everything. There exist legitimate problems concerning particular aspects of reality the resolution of which has no relation to man's ultimate good. If one is in need of a coronary bypass, for example, what is required is not the philosopher or theologian, but a man who has spent years studying the human body, its malfunctions, and the available remedies, and who has logged time in the operating room. A philosophical outlook may better enable a person to make a correct moral judgement, but it in no wise makes him a better surgeon, and sometimes what is needed is a good surgeon. While there are, then, ultimate questions and concerns, there exist at the same time more immediate concerns of man demanding for their resolution an intellectual formation antithetical to the general view. Through the division of intellectual labor and the concentration on particular problems that such a division allows, great advance has been made in addressing these concerns. This advance has nowhere been more evident than in the physical sciences, which, being free to pursue their respective objects unencumbered by universal or ultimate considerations, have experienced a striking success, the very proof of the merit of such specialized pursuits.

Now I say in reply that I do not deny the rather obvious truths that certain problems require for their resolution a specialized knowledge, and that there have been countless benefits resulting from the pursuit of such specialization, especially during our own times. Just recently, in fact, I spoke with an old acquaintance who told me that his young son would have died at birth if not for an advance in medical technology achieved but a few years before. Incidents like that can well make one glad to live in a time of such progress, when so much can be done to alleviate human suffering and make life on earth more bearable. All the same, the question of the kind of knowledge best suited to the alleviation of particular problems is a question not of education but of training. Education, however, is of a much broader scope than training for a particular task. "Education concerns the whole man," says Josef Pieper. "An educated man is a man with a point of view from which he takes in the whole world. Education concerns the whole man, man *capax universi*, capable of grasping the totality of existing things."⁵

I grant that a general understanding of things by itself does not issue in any immediate practical result, and it is on this score that it is held to be so little worthy of pursuit. Indeed, it has almost become in our time an unquestioned principle that knowledge which issues in no utilitarian advantage is worthless; after all, if it has no use then what can be its worth? But such thinking betrays a confusion over the proper relation of means and ends. As it is, that which is merely useful is not itself good, except insofar as it serves as an instrument or means to something else. Its whole

worth insofar as it is useful lies in the fact that it stands as a bridge to something other than itself which is the real object of our desire. We submit to a painful medical procedure, for example, not because we desire that procedure, but for the sake of the health that is its result. But those things are of true worth which we desire, not because they lead to something else, but for themselves alone. Liberal education can be considered such an object. For apart from any advantages which may accrue to its possession, and indeed there are many, apart from this, I say, it can be and always has been desired for itself alone. This is what qualifies it as an end and therefore a good in itself.

On the other hand, we must question even the long-term utility of practical knowledge when, as is so often the case, it is possessed and therefor applied in isolation from a general view. For without the ability to grasp the larger scheme of things, how can we ever know whether an advance in a particular area is truly to the benefit of man or the world at large? It seems as if almost every advance in power resulting from man's specialized and highly technical knowledge results in some long-term harm to mankind. Perhaps, you say, that is too strong. But who can reasonably deny the many grave and unique problems of modern man that have followed from some spectacular achievement of the scientific or technological specialist? We are, for example, continually experiencing ecological disasters, one after another, as a direct result of some technical advance or scientific discovery. We have learned to split the atom and now live under constant threat of world annihilation. We travel at inhuman speeds, and accumulate and transmit information at rates that boggle the mind; all of which contributes to the increasing burden of stress and anxiety that so oppresses the spirit of modern man. Our increasing powers have resulted in decreasing security and an ever-burgeoning care. With all these problems and so many more, the question may be legitimately asked whether the great advance of our modern "age of the specialist" is really an advance at all.

Earlier I pointed out the truth that the good of an individual cannot be found in the free reign of his multiple powers, but only in the harmonious interplay of those powers in proper relation to one another. The absence of this harmony I described as chaos. In society at large there exists an analogous confusion of purpose resulting from the free reign of the specialists, who pursue their various objects unencumbered by considerations relating to the good of man or the world as a whole. It is their narrow focus of vision that had made them almost incapable of such considerations.

The moral chaos of the specialized society is accurately described by Wendell Berry in *The Unsettling of America*. "Because by definition they lack any sense of mutuality or wholeness, our specializations subsist on conflict with one another. The rule is never to cooperate, but rather to follow one's interest as far as possible. Checks and balances are all applied externally, by opposition, never by self-restraint. Labor, management, the military, the government, etc., never forbear until their excesses arouse enough opposition to force them to do so. The good of the whole of creation, the world and all its creatures together, is never a consideration because it is never thought of; our culture now simply lacks the means for thinking of it."⁶

Modern education must bear its share of responsibility for this loss of the means to take the larger view. While we perhaps offer a wider variety of subjects than in times past, they are almost always presented from an isolated, that is to say, a specialized, perspective. Students advance through grades, but rather than rising to universal considerations,

are merely presented with more information of an increasingly technical and particular nature. Witness the practice of confining teachers to their specialties. The assumption is that one is incompetent outside his specialty, and perhaps that is true. Thus science and math teachers know little of language arts, English teachers know little of science and math, and they all know next to nothing of music or history. I once taught at a private academy where the bold suggestion was made that the faculty be required to teach all subjects, as is done in the lower grades. This was met with unsurprising incredulity, for who in his right mind could expect a teacher to know all subjects? But then, we expect the students to know all subjects—or do we? Though educators would protest, I sometimes think we don't care whether students remember most of what has been taught, (and who could reasonably expect them to remember all the details served up in schools of the age of information?) Our concern is, rather, to present a variety of material in order that the student can decide what specialty he may eventually wish to pursue, with teaching as one specialty among the rest, pursued within the school of education. Whatever general knowledge is gained is considered valuable only insofar as it contributes to the ability to pursue that specialty and to function as a citizen, which means to be able to vote and pay taxes. Yet we have become so dependent on a system of specialization that we can't even perform the latter functions without the help of an expert. So we have tax experts to help us pay our taxes, and political analysts to tell us how to vote. Really, the only thing left for us to do now, outside of our particular job, is to entertain ourselves, and even here we rely on an industry of entertainment experts, typified by the professional athlete whom we watch on television while sitting back on overstuffed chairs, "puffing our guts on insipid American beer and potato chips, gaping like Nero at his gladiators." Our system of specialization has become a parody of itself.

Now it should not be thought that I am decrying the need for specialization, meaning by that term the application of one's ability to some primary work. Man has to work, and a certain degree of specialization is necessary to do any work that is not of the most rudimentary kind. We are all familiar with the expression "jack of all trades; master of none." What I am maintaining is that in order to know how to use one's work well, so that it contributes to the overall good of the person and society, we must be able to stand above our work and be its master, or we will stand below and it will master us. But then, man does not live in order to work, man works in order to live. The cult of work, what we in American sometimes call the work ethic, measures man only in terms of his work. Ironically, that is the same view of man contained within the Marxist philosophy, a philosophy that sees the worth of the citizen only in terms of his utility to the state. The perennial philosophy, on the other hand, does not measure man solely in terms of work. It recognizes that man must work in order to live, and to live as a man is to live according to our nature, not like the beasts of the field groveling on all fours, seeking only to fill their bellies; but according to our nature as man, *anthropos*, the up-turning animal, the animal that stands erect so that he may look up to the stars and beyond: to the cause of all things, the first and last principle, the center of all things. Only then do we live as human beings.

Would that it were our purpose to bring our students to life as human beings, to lift them up to that vista where they may at least catch a glimpse of the integral nature of being in all its diversity. I say a glimpse, for even a lifetime is not enough time to gain this illuminative vision of things. Man can never master the world which has as its source an infi-

nite God. But as Newman affirms, to possess even a portion of this illuminative view is the highest state to which nature can aspire, in the way of intellect.

References

¹Socrates, "Phaedo," *The Trial and Death of Socrates*, Dent and Sons Publ., 1969, pp. 147 and 151.

²St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Spiritu Creat.*, a.3; cit. ex Anton Pegis, *At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man*, Macmillan Co, 1963, p. 22.

³St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, 3,112; Image Books, 1956, p. 117.

⁴John Henry Cardinal Newman, *The Idea of a University*, Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1982, p. 103.

⁵Josef Pieper, *Leisure the Basis of Culture*, Mentor Books, 1963, p. 36.

⁶Wendell Berry, *The Unsettling of America*, Sierra Club Books, 1986, p. 22.

⁷John Senior, *The Restoration of Christian Culture*, Ignatius Press, 1983, p. 28.

The important issues raised by the postmodernists deserve to be critically considered and dealt with honestly.

Educational Discourse in the Postmodern World

Leon McKenzie

Postmodernism as an idea was crystallized, according to Steven Connor, with the publication of a book by Jean-Francois Lyotard in 1979. Lyotard was concerned with the legitimation of scientific discourse and emphasized the principle of performativity, that is, science has less to do with the discovery of verifiable facts and more to do with "increasing the performance and operational output of the system of scientific knowledge"¹ Lyotard observed the diminishing influence of the modern paradigm or, in terms of Thomas Kuhn's idea of scientific revolutions,² Lyotard detected a "shift" in the cultural paradigm.

While Connor's suggestion is not invalid at its face value, any number of dates could be assigned as benchmarks for the beginning of postmodernism. Postmodernism has been emerging for decades and has involved many different thinkers. Postmodernism is burdened with a variety of connotations especially in respect to philosophy and theoretical discourse. The meaning and significance of postmodernism can be delineated most appropriately, it is suggested, in reference to the idea of modernism in philosophy. The place to begin is with Rene Descartes.

Descartes (1596-1650) lived at a time when assurances of stability, order, and permanence were becoming increasingly challenged. The conventional knowledge of the world was under attack because of the discoveries of explorers. Revolutionary developments in religion, politics, and cosmological theory made the world appear less than secure. New ideas and discoveries were broadcast in what must have seemed an unceasing explosive outpouring of publications thanks to the invention of moveable type in the 15th century. Faced with challenges to his intellectual security, Descartes developed a philosophy that was to earn him in the appellation "Father of Modern Philosophy."

In his *Discourse on Method* Descartes grounded philosophical certainty in the operations of his own mind: I think, therefore I am. He claimed to have discovered a method that would establish certain knowledge and deliver philoso-

phers from fundamental doubt. The passion for pure, objective, and indisputably certain knowledge, an almost neurotic passion, began in earnest with Descartes. Subsequent philosophers who shared this craving for objective certainty, during and after the Enlightenment, stressed Francis Bacon's thesis anent the need for direct observation and inductive reasoning, Auguste Comte's trust in the "Scientific method," and a restrictive definition of rationality itself. It became a regnant dogma in the 19th century that certitude was available only in terms of the laws of science and under the conditions set forth by the positivist philosophy, a philosophy that based all legitimate knowledge on empirically validated data.

For scientific discourse to be possible, it was necessary that language be used precisely to convey clear and distinct ideas. Logical positivism set forth the arguments that all propositions required empirical verification and that philosophy itself is reducible to "philosophical analysis," the clarification of meaning through the use of logic and scientific method.

While there is not a small hazard in capsulating a span of intellectual history, albeit to serve brevity in a journal article, the two foregoing paragraphs establish a basis for the development of the meaning of postmodernism.

Language, Hermeneutics, and Tradition

In its response to Cartesian, Positivist, and selected Enlightenment philosophical themes, postmodern philosophical reflection highlights: 1) the study of the nature of language, 2) philosophical hermeneutics, and 3) the place of tradition in the development of human understanding. Each of these central concerns of postmodernism is considered here as preliminary to a discussion of the relevance of these concerns for educational discourse.

Language

Language comes into play not only in communications among human beings but also in the fundamental processes of thinking. In a recent insightful article, Robert Walsh observed that according to Martin Heidegger we can never stand outside of the process of language and examine it with sterile objectivity. According to Heidegger we exist as human beings in the very speaking of language. As Walsh explains Heidegger's thought he notes that any questioning of language is also a questioning of the person who asks the question. Language is radically mysterious. Those who believe that language is merely a tool used by rational beings have mistakenly estimated language as an instrument of human rationality. However, it is not "... Aristotelian rationality but *language* that distinguishes humans from other creatures.³ *Dasein*, Heidegger's word for the being of being-human, is the kind of being for whom its own being is an issue and, at the same time, language becomes an issue because of its essential connection to *Dasein*.

Language is not only mysterious, it is inherently ambiguous. Here is an experiment that illustrates this point. Take the famous sentiment penned by Blaise Pascal: *Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait pas*. The usual translation is "The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing." According to the Italian adage, of course, all translators are traitors. The complete meaning of something in one language cannot be brought over to another language. Strictly speaking "*le coeur a ses raisons*" means "*le coeur a ses raisons*," nothing more and nothing less.

Several other interpretations of Pascal's truth are legitimately available. Here are some candidates: 1) The soul has a logic transcendent to the conventional definition of rationality. 2) The spirit owns a kind of judgment that defies

Leon McKenzie is the director of human resource development for the Indiana University hospitals and is associate professor of adult education at Indiana University, Indianapolis.

logic. 3) The inner self claims a sense of reality different from what reality may seem to those who lack discernment. 4) The arguments that issue from the center of human experience put to flight the cognitive claims of those who are led by the spirit of their times. 5) Profound intuitional prompts are at times as adequate as criteria of rationality as the canons of scientific problem solving.

Each of the above interpretations is compatible, to one extent or another, with Pascal's insight. Only if one defines the process of translation as a literal substitution of words from a French to an English dictionary (whatever literal may mean!) are the above interpretations improper. No doubt a more complete interpretive translation can be made on the basis of a further study of Pascal, his work, and his times, but if we mastered all of Pascal's writings and understood as completely as humanly possible all of the influential factors in his life, we would not be able to translate his famous aphorism with complete accuracy.

The above thought experiment makes the point that it is impossible to interpret meanings perfectly when translating from one language to another. The experiment can be extended to include interpretations of meaning within the bounds of a single language. Had Pascal written in English "The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing," several meanings would continue to be available to the reader-interpreter. To read something, as noted more fully below, implies the simultaneous *taking* of the author's meaning and the *projecting* of the reader's meaning into the text.

Two comments about the ambiguity of language need to be made. Firstly, language is ambiguous, but not absolutely so. The relative ambiguity of language does not utterly mask the meanings intended by the author of the language. The radical deconstructionist interpretation, of course, is annulled by a direct appeal to our shared experience in the *Lebenswelt*: Love letters carry the meanings intended by lovers; we buy the morning paper to read the meanings intended by reporters; grocery lists carry the meanings of the individual who wrote the lists. Deconstruction as a technique for the analysis of literary and philosophical texts, however, a technique that treats texts independent of author-intended meanings, can uncover subtle textual nuances and is a legitimate analytic tool. Language carries: 1) an author's meanings, and for the interpreter, 2) the meanings that attach to any text as cultural residue together with 3) additional meanings projected into the text by the reader/listener. But deconstructive techniques can be applied in the workaday world only at the risk of massive breakdowns in communications. The coinage minted in the philosopher's shop cannot always be spent in the marketplace.

Secondly, it is not altogether problematic that language is fundamentally ambiguous. Kant, according to Hannah Arendt, thought it was not unusual for readers of a text sometimes to understand the meaning of the text better than the author. Arendt goes on to say that such understanding took place in respect to Kant's own writing. Others, who had perspectives not possessed by Kant, were able to recognize important implications of Kant's philosophy that he failed to grasp.⁴

From another point of view it may be said that because of the ambiguity of any text, the reader actively interprets the text in the very act of reading and "inserts" new insights into the text that make the author's original writing fuller and more complete. A text seldom "says" something complete, objective, and strictly denotative, especially in matters of theoretical discourse. What any text really "says" includes what is present in the intentionality of the reader as

well as what was in the intentionality of the writer. Both intentionalities, it must be added, are reflective to some extent of the cultural conditions in which the text was created by the writer and read by the interpreter.

To interpret requires the interpreter to reach into the intent of the writer, and also through the colorations each word may have as a result of the cultural milieu or intertext, in order to retrieve the writer's meaning. To interpret also supposes the reader projects personal meanings into the text in the very act of interpretation.

To read something means to engage in a process of interpretive reconstruction wherein the assumptions of the reader are written "between the lines." In reading something an understanding occurs in the juncture between the writer's intended meanings and the meanings projected into the text by reader, meanings that are projected precisely when the writer's meanings are addressed in terms of the reader's frame of reference. If reading ever became the mere-mechanical registering of purely objective fact-objects, theoretical discourse itself would become a mechanical exchange of denotations; the connotative dimension of words would cease to exist. Progress is possible only because readers enter into dialogues with writers, only because readers "fill in" the blanks that are present due to the ambiguity of language. The relative ambiguity of language, it seems, serves us better than would a system of communication in which nothing is ambiguous.

Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics is taken from the Greek *hermeneuein* which in English is usually rendered "to interpret." Etymologically the word refers to the priestess-interpreter who tended the oracle at Delphi and honored Hermes, the messenger of the gods. Hermes, the Roman Mercury, took something that was shrouded, beyond human ken, and made it intelligible. In the hermeneutic process, according to Richard Palmer "something foreign, strange, separated in time, space, or experience is made familiar, present, comprehensive; something requiring representation, explanation, or translation is somehow 'brought to understanding'—is interpreted."⁵

Hermeneutics was originally referable to the interpretation of divine messages such as those reputed to be available at Delphi or in various sacred groves. Later, hermeneutics was applied to the interpretation of Biblical texts, then to the interpretation of literature, art, and symbols. When the world in which we live is construed as a text-analogue, hermeneutics becomes philosophical hermeneutics—the interpretation of the world and what has been thought about the world. When participants in a theoretical conversation entertain the insight that what they say about the subject matter is stated precisely as interpretation and not as definitive proposition, it would seem the nature of the dialogue would change considerably.

David Tracy observes that every time "we act, deliberate, judge, understand, or even experience, we are interpreting. To understand at all is to interpret . . . Interpretation is thus a question as unavoidable, finally, as experience, understanding, deliberation, judgment, decision and action."⁶ It might be added that interpretation is as unavoidable to the human being as language.

All human understanding is interpretive understanding. To understand is to arrive at some insight that is achieved through the interpretive process. Interpretive understanding is reached through the use of language, in all of its ambiguity, thereby making understanding itself a *social* achievement since language is also a *social* achievement. Whether our inquiries concern the ultimate meaning of the

cosmos, the arguments of a colleague in a journal article, the meaning of research findings, or the nature of interpretation itself, we are involved in a striving for intelligibility that relies on hermeneutical thinking. Hermeneutical thinking endeavors to organize knowledge—justified beliefs—in such a way that the kind of insight we call understanding “comes to mind.”

Postmodernists, at least the kind of postmodernists described here, because they recognize the limitations of the language that is employed for thinking and communicating, do not offer their truth claims as purely objective, certain beyond all questioning, and proven apodictically as the result of a rigorous scientific method. On the contrary, they realize human insight is not perfectly clear, and that while indeed we are capable of seeing, we see in a glass darkly. Thinking processes are mediated and abetted by language, either spoken or written language. Language is not perfect with the result that any person's thinking will fall short of perfection. So also will communication fall short of perfection because language of some kind is implicated in communication.

Postmodernists who make use of philosophical hermeneutics approach inquiry not as something that must be carried out according to a definite “scientific” method but as a collaborative enterprise that must accommodate other individuals and the paradigms of inquiry they bring with them. Postmodernists hope to unveil the truth of things through an ongoing conversation carried on within a community of interpreters. “Hermeneutics,” writes Richard Rorty, “sees the relations between various discourses as those of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers, but where the hope of agreement is never lost so long as the conversation lasts.”⁷

Rorty seems to be saying, within the context of his celebrated book noted above, that this conversation carried on by the community of interpreters is constitutive of truth, that if the community of interpreters reaches consensus about anything, it is true. This position does not take into account that the world outside one's subjectivity is not dependent on the mind of any individual person or any community of persons for its being.

What is apposite here is the traditional distinction between ontological and logical truth. What is, is ontologically true; what is known, if it is known correctly, is logically true. Ontological truth is the truth of beings; logical truth is the truth *about* beings. Ontological truth is attributed to any existent because of its being, because it is. Logical truth is attributed to a theoretical proposition because the proposition is commensurate with what is. Something is logically true because there is a correspondence between a knower's mind and the reality outside the knower's mind (correspondence theory of truth), because all of the elements of the stated position are internally consistent (coherence theory of truth), or because the position leads to efficacious action (pragmatic theory of truth).

Reliance on the distinction between ontological and logical truth, to keep from falling into the mistake of making something dependent for its truth solely on the beliefs of those who talk about it, requires further exploration and interpretation. None of the major theories of truth, it seems, is without flaw. The distinction between ontological and logical truth, nonetheless, is appropriate and useful even when existing theories of truth are not completely satisfying. This raises the point that whenever multiple explanatory theories abound it is fair to infer that language, thinking, and understanding fall particularly short of coming to terms with that which is being explained. In those instances where

multiple theories or interpretive understandings compete strenuously, further conversation is require of the community of interpreters to find ways of finding a coherent confluence of the theories.

Tradition

The notion of tradition, long under attack by those who had fallen under the influence of the Enlightenment's romantic fixation on novelty, has been rehabilitated in the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. At this writing (1991) Gadamer, who was born in 1900, is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Heidelberg University. Widely acclaimed as a principal originator of philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer has set forth his ideas primarily in *Truth and Method*.⁸

Many sophisticated persons today share the bias that what speaks to us out of tradition is wrong. Whatever hears to the past is faulted, by some, for not meeting the criterion of modernity. When we think of tradition we tend to imagine a body of dusty rules and out-of-date norms. For some educationists tradition is largely referable to the “dead hand of the past.”

According to Gadamer, living within a tradition has nothing to do with blind adherence to something authoritatively given. To stand within a tradition means, for example, sharing a language, and having a common ground for raising issues in a conversation. While Gadamer never defines tradition exactly (perhaps in an effort not to reduce tradition to something extrinsic to human existence), a tradition not only inclines us to provide particular answers to questions but also leads us to ask some questions instead of others. That is, tradition forestructures a person's understanding. A tradition is never completed. Errors in a tradition are found out and repudiated as the tradition renews itself through the thinking and communication of those who live within the tradition.

People “argue” with elements of their respective traditions. Obscure meaning are retrieved from the tradition and clarified. The tradition acts upon us and we act upon the tradition. Every tradition is reconstructed and refreshed by the new experiences of those within the tradition who come into contact with other traditions. In conversation the perspectives sanctioned by one tradition become fused with the horizons available in other traditions. Tradition is a dynamic reality.

No one can outrun tradition. That you cannot go home again may be true. It is also true that you can never leave home. The events in each person's life are touched by the tradition that shaped the persons' life. Tradition is a kind of canonical experience in terms of which we tend to interpret the world and ourselves. The tradition each person received “prejudices” that person, not in the pejorative sense used by Enlightenment philosophers, but in the original sense of a provisional judgment or inclination. “Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous,” avers Gadamer, “so that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience.”⁹

Everyone comes to the hermeneutic conversation—everyone arrives at the point of interpreting during theoretical discourse—out of a particular philosophical tradition. No one interprets out of a values vacuum. Even when someone is unaware of being touched by a prevailing tradition or plays the hubristic modernist game of speaking “scientifically, certainly, and objectively” about disputed theoretical matters, some kind of tradition is present in the language

and thinking of this person. For tradition, although never defined by Gadamer, it not like an ideological livery worn by a person or something extrinsic to the character of the individual. The complexus of predominant thoughts, values, ideals, images, and experiences we call tradition is to the person what water is to the fish.

Theoretical Discourse in Education

What is the bearing of the foregoing reflections on educational discourse in the postmodern world? It is suggested that three directions for further reflection are appropriate. Firstly, given postmodern understandings of the mystery and ambiguity of language, the language of discourse needs to be evaluated more diligently by participants in the discourse. Secondly, the style and tone of discourse requires that participants in continuing conversations become more cognizant of the modest weight of all cognitive claims. That is, the style and tone of discourse that presents itself in books, articles, papers, speeches at conferences, and so forth, greater attention must be paid to the tradition out of which an interpreter speaks or writes; the hidden assumptions underlying theoretical expressions and asseverations need to be unveiled with more criticalness by those who participate in continuing professional discourse.

The Language of Discourse

A doctoral student once announced his intent to develop a dissertation theme around the concept of experiential learning. "What kind of learning is at all possible," the student was asked, "that is not experiential?" The question baffled the student because he had come to associate a single meaning with the notion of experiential learning: the kind of learning that takes place in "real world" contexts, the kind of learning that results from "doing" something instead of talking about it in a classroom.

To reduce the idea of experience to meet the requirements of experimentalism, of course, debases the concept of experience and, in effect, postulates that the kind of learning which occurs in classrooms is somehow inferior. Some discussions about the meaning of words, even a word as vital to educational discourse as experience (as John Dewey recognized over 50 years ago),¹⁰ may seem picky and slight, but these discussions must take place to prevent education discourse from sliding into the realm of vaporous jargon. The notion of experience as the "doing of an experiment" is valid, but so also are other senses of experience. The connotative wealth and variety of words crucial to educational discourse must be taken into account.

Two examples of the analysis of the concept of experience, taken from the writer's area of specialization—the field of adult education—illustrate the kind of analysis of key concepts that should be encouraged. Peter Jarvis, in a critique of a model of experiential learning proposed by David Kolb, observed that the progression in Kolb's cyclic model from 1) Experience to 2) Reflection and Observation to 3) Active Experimentation and finally back to 1) Experience suggests that experience is limited to what is concrete and limited to the senses. Jarvis argued that reflection, observation, and experimentation are also forms of experience. In pursuing this argument Jarvis made the notion of experience more inclusive of different kinds of experience. What is important about the Jarvis critique has less to do with the critique of Kolb's model and more to do with the enrichment of the concept of experience.¹¹

This particular strand in the discourse conducted by adult education theorists was followed by an article authored by Robin Usher. Jarvis proposed that adult experi-

ences are either meaningful or meaningless and that meaning is brought to experience by the stock of knowledge or subjectivity of the person who is experiencing something. Usher observed that Jarvis, like other writers since Dewey evaluates experience as something that is mute and needing transformation to serve as a foundation for learning. Usher offered an alternative interpretation of experience and in so doing enriched the discourse about experience. Usher claims that the attribution of meaning does not originate in the unique subjectivity of diverse individuals since such an origination does not account for shared meanings in the social milieu.

The suggestion is made that the source of meaning attribution is located in language. "As human beings, we are inscribed within language. As individuals, language both pre- and post-dates us and therefore regulates our experience through constituting the means by which we interpret and give meaning to our experience. Experience is made intelligible through language."¹²

Without taking sides in the argument (both Jarvis and Usher provide keen insights) it can be concluded that Jarvis and Usher have provided new ways of thinking about the nature of human experience because of their concern for language. It is this kind of discourse which examines the language of discourse itself closely and seriously that promotes richer understandings of what is considered in the continuing discourse of theorists.

The Weight of Cognitive Claims

Some academicians who are actively involved in theoretical discourse tend to overstate the authority of their cognitive claims. This is not surprising. One of the occupational hazards of being a professor, and having students address the academician deferentially as "professor" or "doctor," is that the professor may begin to experience an inflated sense of self. One cannot not attend many conferences of professional educators without forming the opinion that some of those who present papers pretend to a certainty, objectivity, and authority beyond the power of human interpretive understanding.

Controverted issues about national education policy, the political ramifications of educational decisions, questions of ethics and education, and the meaning of research findings are sometimes argued with such force that listeners can be forgiven for concluding some speakers must think of themselves as possessing a God's-eye view of reality.

All of us are limited beings. We have been born into a particular culture and at a particular time in history. We have been exposed to a particular value system in our family of origin. We have been influenced in our view of the world by a particular set of friends and associates, and authors who's books we have read. Each of us has a single, narrow perspective on the world and on the issues we address professionally. The vistas of some individuals may be wider than others, but all individual horizons are finite. Human beings are not solely the products of their times, cultures, and upbringing, but these particular conditions have exerted, and continue to exert, influences on their variable capacities for free choice.

Since we are beings of limited understanding, and since in most complex matters of discourse ranging from our constructions of research findings to our conclusions about education and public policy, we must realize that what we say is said by way of interpretation. Further, we must realize that our interpretations are not perfect; our interpretations are not purely objective and absolutely certain. Our interpretive understandings should be open to

change in the light of new evidences that may be presented to us.

Does this imply an easy relativism that holds all interpretations of controverted issues as possessing equal value? Not by any means. There is a truth of *what has been*, historical truth. There is a truth of *what is*, ontological truth, and logical truth, the truth of the *propositional form of what is*. But some truth issues are so large, complex, and impenetrable that only a God's eye view is able to disclose the truth in its totality. Some persons' interpretive understandings may come closer to seizing complex truths than others, but all interpretive understandings fall short of exhausting the full meaning of what is interpretively understood.

There are also truths of *what should be*. One kind of these truths is pragmatic truth. Given a number of alternative designs gauged to foster a just society, a society wherein equal opportunities are available for all citizens, which of these designs should be selected? Obviously this question is not amenable to a simple unqualified answer grounded on the interpretive understanding of an individual or narrow interest group as to what constitutes an effective educational design for the future.

While the *efficacy* of an educational design for a just society, for example, relates to pragmatic truth, another kind of truth of *what should be* is ethical truth. This kind of truth refers to the moral character of the design. To develop and implement any design without reference to ethics simply sacrifices morality for expedience. What works, it is suggested, is not always morally right. Again, when we enter the domain of ethics we are confronted by different moral standards and diverse criteria of moral judgment. Complex problems cannot be solved by reliance on the interpretive understanding of an individual or narrow interest group.

Decisions about the means to secure ends with which everyone agrees—decisions about pragmatic and ethical truth issues—are almost always based on understandings that are incomplete. This knowledge must lead us to exercise a degree of humility when we advance positions on controverted and complex issues. The style and tone of presentations, whether oral or written, need to be moderate and modest. The weight of our cognitive claims should not be exaggerated. The foregoing considerations should also move us to remain upon to the interpretive understandings of others and to attempt to accommodate within our own positions the views of others that seem to clash with our own.

Identifying an Interpreter's Tradition

Suppose someone offers an interpretation of a controverted issue. In order to interpret and understand the meaning of the other's interpretation it is fruitful, and sometimes necessary, to identify the ideological tradition that served as framework for the other's interpretation. It is likely the other's interpretive understanding of any issue becomes more intelligible to the reader/listener when it is located in terms of its development in intellectual history.

Take, for example, the current discourse in the field of adult education regarding the appropriate role of teachers as instigators of political and social change. Ideas about the transformative function of education in regard to society are not new nor limited by any means to the field of adult education. References to the literature of adult education it is again noted, are offered because of the writer's familiarity with this body of literature.

Phyllis Cunningham averred that adult educators who claim to be apolitical in the classroom make a political statement, in effect, by their neutrality (her word). To be neutral signifies that "one is quite satisfied with the present or-

ganization of societal relationships and the distribution of resources in our society." Educators have invented such ideas as scientific objectivity "to sanitize our basic desires to maintain inequality, racism, sexism and classism since we are satisfied, on balance, with our 'share of the pie'."¹³

Out of what particular philosophical tradition does the position articulated by Cunningham arise? Some might argue that it emerges not out of an intellectual tradition but simply out of the opportunism. So-called victims of an oppressive sociopolitical system stand to gain access to special entitlements once they have been officially designated as victims. At the same time these opportunists suppress dissent by stereotyping persons of a different theoretical outlooks as racist, sexist, and classist.

When special advocacy is employed by teachers, they are wont to use their classrooms as platforms for the declamation of political statements. What they cannot achieve at the ballot box they attempt to gain by invading and colonizing the minds of their students. Education becomes, for them, not a process wherein learners grow and develop, thereby transforming society through the development of individual citizens, but instead an instrument of social engineering. The social engineering, of course, is to be undertaken following the blueprint of the teacher or a special interest group.

The authentic issue, it seems is not one of neutrality on the part of the teacher but impartiality. No one can feel neutral about political, social, and economic arrangements as long as some persons are not treated fairly. On the other hand, it seems a matter of plain ethical principle that teachers remain politically impartial and do not turn the educational process into a campaign to advance particular political agendas.

While some who politicize classrooms through special advocacy may be opportunists caught up in "politically correct" rhetoric, this does not necessarily mean the substance of their discourse is unrelated to a definite philosophical antecedents. Not to understand these antecedents is to fail to understand the substance of discourse.

Once an interpreter's intellectual frame of reference has been identified (even if the interpreter does not fully understand the significance his or her discourse), once the assumptions of that frame of reference are disclosed, it becomes easier to understand the discourse and respond to it appropriately.

Noting that many American professors share the "belief in the virtue of using education for sociopolitical progress rather than for imparting mere knowledge and rational thought . . ." Dario Fernandez-Morera locates this belief in the philosophy of "late Marxism." According to Marxist philosophy politics should exercise a hegemony over all other disciplines and fields of study. "Thus instead of examining materialist political discourse from the point of view of, say, aesthetics, or religion, or psychology, or the sexual practices of Marx—as Philosophy, or Religion, or Psychology, or Sexology might want—one is supposed to examine these subjects from the point of view of materialist political discourse."¹⁴

In the present examination of Cunningham's discourse, the underlying assumptions of her position could be understood to include: 1) the principle that politics and ideology should take precedence over the manifest content of an instructional situation and 2) the axiom that political *ad hominem* rhetoric which attributes base motives to opposing views (racism, sexism, classism) is an appropriate tactic for suppressing dissent.

Since Cunningham has more recently clarified her po-

sition to a considerable extent, it would be incorrect to locate her discourse in the Marxist tradition.¹⁵ In any conversation within the community of interpreters participants are free to change their views or, as Cunningham has done, expand meanings, refine points of emphasis and clarify aims. The purpose of locating discourse within a particular tradition, it must be strongly urged, is not to find a label with which to stigmatize an "opponent" in a scholarly conversation. Within the community of interpreters the only opponents should be ignorance, error, and malevolence.

The argument that teachers should explicitly advocate political causes in the classroom can be associated with liberal philosophy, liberal in the contemporary and not classical sense of the term. No inference should be made, however, that conservative ideologists are without fault when the classroom is turned into a forum for the pleading of their special causes. In all cases education should not be trivialized as a mere tool for the attainment political leverage. Whether the teacher is liberal or conservative is irrelevant: political impartiality should be the norm that governs all teachers, especially in publicly-funded schools and universities. The full range of alternative responses to issues should be available to all students.

Conclusion

As the originator of analytic geometry Rene Descartes provided humankind with an invaluable instrument. His large mistake, however, was to attempt to reduce philosophy to a single method that would assure certainty and objectivity. Descartes' model of rationality initiated the modernist movement in intellectual history and set the stage for the positivism celebrated in the discourse of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Modernism, however, always contained the seeds of its own critique. Postmodernism has ushered in a new way of looking at theoretical discourse.

No doubt postmodernism contains within itself the seeds of its own critique. We advance from century to century taking turns to speak in the ongoing conversation of humankind. Perhaps educational discourse during the post-modern period will prove more efficacious than it has been in the past. A recognition of the centrality of language in discourse, the nature of interpretive understanding, and the formative role of tradition can serve us well as we continue sharing our understandings with one another.

References

- ¹Connor, Steven. *Postmodernist Culture*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1991 Reprint, p. 32. See all Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. (Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi). Manchester: Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.
- ²Kuhn, Thomas. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, Second Edition, pp. 77-110.
- ³Walsh, Robert D. "The Healing Word: Language, Thinking, and Being in the Earlier and Later Philosophy of Martin Heidegger," *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1991, p. 230.
- ⁴Arendt, Hannah. *The Life of the Mind*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978, A Harvest/HJB Book, p. 63.
- ⁵Palmer, Richard. *Hermeneutics*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969, p. 14.
- ⁶Tracy, David. *Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope*. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987, p. 9.
- ⁷Rorty, Richard. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 318.
- ⁸Gadamer, Hans-George. *Truth and Method*. (Trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming). New York: Crossroad, 1986. In particular see pages 235-278 where Gadamer develops some notable insights about tradition.
- ⁹Gadamer, Hans-George. "Aesthetics and Hermeneutics." In D.E. Linge (Ed. and Trans.), *Philosophical Hermeneutics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, p. 9.
- ¹⁰Dewey, John. *Experience and Education*. London: Collier Macmillan, 1938.
- ¹¹Jarvis, Peter. "Meaningful and Meaningless Experience: Towards an Analysis of Learning from Life," *Adult Education Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1987, pp. 164-172.
- ¹²Usher, Robin. "Locating Experience in Language: Towards a Poststructuralist Theory of Experience," *Adult Education Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1989, pp. 24 and 29.
- ¹³Cunningham, Phyllis. "The Adult Educator and Social Responsibility!" In Ralph Brockett (Ed.) *Ethical Issues in Adult Education*. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1988, p. 136.
- ¹⁴Fernandez-Morera, Dario. "Materialist Discourse in Academia During the Age of Late Marxism," *Academic Questions*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1991, pp. 23 and 21.
- ¹⁵Cunningham, Phyllis. "Point-Counterpoint: Should Educators Educate or Advocate? Own Your Advocacy," *Adult Learning*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1990, pp. 15-17.

In a traditional culture, all human activities are judged by the extent to which they reflect that which transcends the merely human.

The Wheel Of Traditional Education

Arthur Versluis

To speak of traditional education is to show oneself to be indisputably modern, for in any traditional culture, one would speak only of Christian education, Muslim education, Hindu education, and not in the abstract. Indeed, so much would one's own tradition suffuse this world, even to say "Christian education" would be redundant. As the Muslim scholar S.H. Nasr has written, in a traditional society, "nothing lies outside the realm of tradition."¹ Hence,

To live in the traditional world is to breathe in a universe in which man is related to a reality beyond himself, from which he receives those principles, truths, forms, attitudes, and other elements that determine the very texture of human existence.²

This is true of any traditional culture. Unfortunately, it is not true of the modern world, whose most remarkable characteristic is precisely the rejection of tradition. But it is not our purpose, in this essay, to assail modern education as anti-traditional—however much this may be true. Rather, we wish here to outline the essential elements of an education in a traditional society, and to consider whether any of these can be infused into modern education.

Yet we cannot but begin by taking account of modern education in light of what Rene Guenon called in a book by that title, "the crisis of the modern world." Modern education—by which we mean chiefly our public and private schools and universities—to an increasing extent both participates in and furthers the drift of contemporary societies away from the spiritual principles and cultures which once guided and informed them. For some time a kindly humanism, and an emphasis on "great books," still carried on in a diffused way some elements of traditional cultures in an ever more mercantilist, mechanistic, or scientific educational world—one cannot read Dante without imbibing some of what it meant to be a medieval Christian, even if one is reading in a factory—but more and more, contemporary education has become fragmented and even openly anti-traditional.

By contrast, traditional education is informed by its spiritual origin and purpose. One of the truly great scholars of the twentieth century, A.K. Coomaraswamy, a man whose erudition is unparalleled, wrote that

Our educational systems are chaotic because we are

Arthur Versluis is assistant professor of English at Washburn University of Topeka and editor of *Avaloka: A Journal of Traditional Religion and Culture*.

not agreed for what to educate, if not for self-expression. But all tradition is agreed as to what kind of models are to be imitated: 'The city can never otherwise be happy unless it is designed by those painters who follow a divine original'; 'The crafts such as building and carpentry . . . take their principles from that realm and from the thinking there'; 'Lo, make all things in accordance with the pattern that was shown thee upon the mount'; 'It is in imitation of the divine forms that any human form, (shilpa) is invented here'; 'There is this divine harp to be sure; this human harp comes into being in its likeness'; 'We must do what the Gods did first.'³

In short, what traditional human beings create on this earth, they make in imitation of and inspired by the heavenly Forms or archetypes. This is why traditional arts—in all their diversity—always present an integral harmony perfectly suited to human needs while directly reflecting their spiritual origin.

This is, then, the primary characteristic of traditional education: it is governed in all its forms by its spiritual purpose—by definition—which all the various crafts reflect, and in which all the disciplines find their origin and meaning. One may well say, using a simile that recurs in the Vedas, in Plato, and in the *Tao te ching*, that the center of the traditional culture—God—is like the unmoving center of a wheel, around which everything in the culture turns, and without which, we need scarcely add, the wheel itself would fall apart.⁴

In a traditional culture, all human activities are judged by the extent to which they reflect that which transcends the merely human; and education is really a process in which one learns how that activity proper to one's station in this life (svadharna) itself may when perfectly done transcend the merely human. Education in a traditional society (education taken in its broadest sense) is really a form of apprenticeship and initiation through which one's ordinary daily activity becomes a way of spiritual practice—and this is as true of the work of the craftsman as it is of the scholar in the university.

British artist Eric Gill wrote of the "diabolical" quality of modern industrialist society, and of its educational system which makes of people only contributors to an economic order:

The necessities of human life—the things men need and therefore love, the things upon which, during the countless centuries of human history, men and women have expended all their care and skill and pride—the arts of agriculture and the farm, the arts of the kitchen, clothes, furniture, pottery and metal, the whole business of building—from cottages to cathedrals—all these things will be made by machines, and we shall be released for 'higher things.' So they say. But for the majority of men and women—for us—there are no higher things. . . . [For] this is true art—to make well what needs making—for love of God and for the service of our fellow men and women.⁵

Whether Muslim or Christian, whether Hindu or aboriginal, all education entails maintaining a balance of means and ends, a balance between man and nature, and keeps to a human scale that does not allow for the recklessness which produces, say, nuclear weapons in the name of a "disinterested" science.⁶ Traditional education, broadly conceived, does not produce masses of anonymous workers, but rather individuals who do good work tailored to the perennial human needs.

When we turn from traditional education broadly conceived—education as including the crafts—to the edu-

cation of the traditional university, we find that the same virtues, the same expectations, hold true. Just as the crafts entail an apprenticeship to a master, and an initiatory or spiritual path manifested in and attested to by one's life work, so too the traditional scholar undergoes an apprenticeship to a master, or to masters, until he is himself deemed a master, and in turn can teach. Like the various crafts, the university disciplines are all governed by and oriented towards their common spiritual center.

This means that the scientific disciplines in particular are not conceived of as being divorced from human concerns or from religious meaning. Whereas the modern sciences have both created and resulted from a radically desecrated cosmos stripped of its spiritual significance and seen only in terms of quantity and materiality, the traditional sciences like alchemy or astrology maintained an intimate unity between man and nature, and reflected a common religious orientation. As S.H. Nasr puts it

In order for the modern sciences of nature to come into being, the substance of the cosmos had to be emptied of its sacred character and become profane. . . . In the process, the sciences of nature lost their symbolic intelligibility, a fact that is most directly responsible for the crisis which the modern scientific world view and its application have brought about.⁷

In a traditional culture, both nature and the artistic works of man are seen to bode forth the same harmonic and architectonic principles which govern all things. Nature and art—microcosm (the individual), mesocosm (the culture), and macrocosm (nature)—embody the same fundamental proportions. This means that both the sciences and the arts have common harmonic origins; that the same principles which inform the planetary spheres may in turn be found in nature, in cathedrals, in poems and music, and in each individual human being; and that the various scholarly disciplines are far more closely related by common principles than modern academia would be willing to admit.

One can see these common principles at work, for example, in medieval Christian poetry like that of Dante or William Langland, which is governed by both simple and complex number and letter symbolism.⁸ The poetry of these authors reflects the number symbolism at the heart of the Christian revelation, numbers like three, twelve, thirty-three, forty, and six hundred sixty-six, each of which has a constellation of symbolism surrounding it. These poets were intimately familiar with the esoteric implications of numbers, letters, and images, and wove these into their poetry not haphazardly, but with full knowledge of the same principles figuring in other disciplines like astrology or alchemy, not to mention the numerical or harmonic principles also governing the building of cathedrals, or the making of sacred images.

We have concentrated here on basic aspects of traditional education in Christian civilization, but one could just as well have drawn examples from Islamic, Hindu, or Buddhist civilizations, for as A.K. Coomaraswamy among others has pointed out, essentially the same principles govern these cultures as governed medieval Christendom. Indeed, is it really surprising to find that the origins of icons in Buddhism and in Eastern Christianity are virtually identical—Buddha and Christ having been said to have impressed their respective images on material for the benefit of worshippers—or that in all the major religions it is recognized that "spiritual realities have a certain definite formal equivalent, certain fixed canons of proportion"?⁹

One may well say that the whole of a traditional civilization—and of a traditional education—ultimately reflects the "science of forms," or the "science of symbol-

ism."¹⁰ For the real function of education is to render our world intelligible, to reveal to us the manifest ways in which our world reflects transcendent archetypes and principles, to reveal above all the sacred symbolism informing what we do, and the culture and natural world in which we live. Education must entail the uncovering of *meaning*. In the final analysis, then, traditional education is the progressive unveiling of spiritual significance in man, culture, and nature.

To what extent can we infuse some elements of traditional education in the modern world? Certainly much in contemporary education—its gigantism, its attempts at uniformity and "mass production," the almost complete absence of the basic principles informing traditional education—leads us to expect little in the way of restoration. Frithjof Schuon has written that modernity "limits itself to playing with evanescent things and plunging into them with criminal unconsciousness."¹¹ It follows that much of modern education consists in ignoring the spiritual foundations of traditional education, in creating a kind of "bubble-world of 'conditioning,' or, to use a current phrase, 'brainwashing,' . . . that will undo [perennial] truth if it can, and will in any case prevent coming generations even from surmising that such a truth exists, or that men have any other function but to be socially or economically useful."¹²

Nonetheless, and however dark our future might look, always there will be those of independent mind, who see through to the perennial truths that have ever guided mankind, and who recognize just how precious is our inheritance from antiquity. Restoration, then, is not a matter of artificially infusing elements of traditional education into our present systems. Rather, so long as the great works of art and literature, and the spiritual traditions which inspired them, exist—and even if, God forbid, most of them are lost—there will always be those who recognize anew the meanings inherent in nature, and what it means to be a human being. Some of these people will inevitably teach others, and will as Plato said in his "Seventh Letter," draw forth that indefinable spark of realization that always has marked authentic education, and always will.

References

¹S.R. Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred*. (New York: Continuum, 1981), p. 80.

²*ibid.*

³A.K. Coomaraswamy, *Traditional Art and Symbolism*, R. Lipsey, ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 23–24; the sources quoted are from Plato, Republic, 500E, Plotinus, Enneads, V.9.11, Exod. 25:40, Aitareya Brahmana VI.27, Shankhayana Aranyaka VIII.9, Shatapatha Brahmana VII.2.1.4. Coomaraswamy includes many other cross-references in the notes.

⁴Some will no doubt object, mistaking modern fundamentalism for a truly traditional society, that a religious culture is a kind of tyranny, that in a traditional culture one is bound by caste and stricture and is not free. But at the risk of disturbing our smug modern belief in inevitable "progress," one might well ask who is more free in reality, someone who lives in one of our crimeridden, violent, hopeless cities, caught in a consumer society that offers nothing beyond this life, or a pious craftsman in medieval Europe?

⁵Eric Gill, *A Holy Tradition of Working*. (West Stockbridge: Lindisfarne, 1983), p. 96.

⁶See Philip Sherrard, *The Rape of Man and Nature, An Enquiry into the Origins and Consequences of Modern Science*. (Ipswich: Golgonooza Press, 1987).

⁷S.H. Nasr, *Man and Nature, the Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man*. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968), p. 21.

⁸In this regard, see Arthur Versluis, "Piers Plowman, Numerical Composition, and the Prophecies," *Connotations* 1 (1991) 2, pp. 103 ff.

⁹Philip Sherrard. *The Sacred in Life and Art*. (Ipswich: Golgonooza Press, 1990) p. 80.

¹⁰See Rene Guenon. *Fundamental Symbols of Sacred Science*, Alvin Moore, trs., (Cambridge: Quinta Essentia, 1992).

¹¹Frithjof Schuon. *To Have a Center*. (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 1991), p. 37.

¹²Gai Eaton. *King In The Castle: Choice and Responsibility in the Modern World*. (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Soc., 1990), p. 19.

Dr Benjamin Rush, America's leading physician and signer of the Declaration of Independence, was probably the most articulate and comprehensive spokesman for the true meaning of the American Revolution.

Dr. Benjamin Rush (1746-1813) and the Judaean-Christian Origins of American Education

Donald J. D'Elia

Any discussion of the educational thought of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic in the late twentieth century, if it lays claim to historical accuracy and is not simply a variation on the prejudices of the day, must first come to terms with the post-medieval naturalism that is best exemplified in America by William James and John Dewey. If we are going to address the origins and historical development of the contemporary sociology of knowledge we must appreciate the chasm that divides modern thought from the eighteenth century American worldview.

This is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, which is limited to notes on what might be called needs and opportunities for further research and writing in the history of early American education. In this brief essay I use the example of Dr. Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence and a leading revolutionary patriot as representative of the American people at the time of the nation's founding.

The insightful work on education by people such as James Hillestad, Russell and Annette Kirk and some of the others represented in this issue have greater clarity for us if we keep in mind the nature of the modern world that is coming to an end before our very eyes. That world, in which all of us were born and reared, was brilliantly characterized by Romano Guardini in his *The End of the Modern World*, first

published in war-torn Germany in 1950. The post-medieval world, argued Guardini, came to rest on three presuppositions, each of devastating consequence for man.

The ancient Hebrews and early Christians knew man as the *image* and likeness of God. Modern man saw himself not as *image* but as *reality*, the new Absolute that could exist first independently of the Church and then by his own finite resources. Man became autonomous. And with Man's declaration of independence from God, his rejection of the mystical union for which he was created, nature and culture became autonomous. Man, nature, and culture lost their reference to God and became distortions of what they were supposed to be in the divine plan. Jesus, who "knew what was in the heart of man," warned mankind of the consequences of its preferring itself to the Creator and viewing itself as the ultimate ground of all things. "Without Me," the Truth Himself proclaimed, "you can do nothing." (John 15:5)

While these presuppositions about the autonomy of man, nature, and culture describe modern man's understanding of education we must not make the unfortunately common mistake of attributing such naturalism to all of the founders of the American Republic. At the time of the American Revolution, we insist against the still prevalent sociology of knowledge which exaggerates the influence of Thomas Jefferson and the Enlightenment, that the naturalism of Herbert of Cherbury and Jean Jacques Rousseau played only a minor role in thinking about education. The "dogma of the primacy and all-sufficiency of nature" was as widely accepted as now presumed by many.

These and other introductory observations about the differences between early American education and the naturalistic training of today have been summarized, in effect, by Jacques Maritain. We can do no better than to repeat his "Seven Misconceptions of Modern Education" which should be the starting-point of any history of American education.² They are:

1. A Disregard of Ends
2. False ideas Concerning the End
3. Pragmatism
4. Sociologism
5. Intellectualism
6. Voluntarism
7. Everything Can Be Learned

Allowing for some differences between Protestant and Catholic scholasticism in the Calvinistic tradition of the eighteenth century American Christian culture, the fact remains that Maritain's analysis has a particular relevancy in United States history.³ These seven misconceptions of modern education, each traceable to the radical secularization and deformation of man, nature, and culture discussed by Guardini and Maritain, were not yet held by the majority of Americans in the eighteenth century. But it is also true that Enlightenment thinkers like Thomas Jefferson and Dr. Benjamin Franklin, good men that they were, were leading agents of the modern worldview with its new autonomies of man, nature, and culture. Theirs was a radically secularized and distorted picture of the world based on understandings which in our day has caused much damage to traditional Western Civilization generally and to education in particular.⁴ These *philosophes*, though, were a distinct minority. Revealed Protestant Christianity was the norm of American society. If we forget this, as too many academic historians tend to do, the past will elude us and we shall become, in Pascal's terrifying phrase—"children of the present."

The Role of Dr. Benjamin Rush

Dr. Benjamin Rush (1745-1813), America's leading physician and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, was

Donald D'Elia is professor of history at the State University of New York at New Paltz.

probably the most articulate and comprehensive spokesman for the meaning of the American Revolution. A deeply religious man, formed in the New Light Presbyterian schools of the Great Awakening, Rush's principal concern was with the social message of the New Testament and making Jesus' teaching about God and man the basis of a new Christendom in America. I have discussed this theology and philosophy of the American Revolution elsewhere.⁵ What I propose to do here is to introduce Dr. Benjamin Rush as a representative of eighteenth century American Christian culture, especially in his detailed plan for a new, American system of education which, contrary to the modern philosophies of Jefferson, Franklin, and others, included both Christian revelation and natural reason at all levels.

Rush's plan for what he called a "Revolutionary system of education" should not be thought of as revolutionary in the modern sense of anti-traditional. In his understanding, which he shared with practically everyone at the time, "revolutionary" meant more radical and systematic approaches in the etymological sense of getting back to the roots of things. The fact that Dr. Rush is recognized as the "Father of Dickenson College," and was the charter trustee of another, Franklin and Marshall College, demonstrates that his philosophy of education was taken seriously by his fellow citizens. But this should come as no surprise to anyone who reads contemporary eighteenth century newspapers, magazines, and other representative materials and refuses to be victimized by that most cunning enemy of historical truth— anachronism!

Before I give what can only be a survey here, the point should be made that Dr. Rush's ideas on education have meaning only within his framework of thought, i.e. the larger Christian culture or pre-modern way of life that virtually everyone accepted. For Dr. Rush, the pauline theology of love was the basis of the new society of "new men" which his divine Master had called into existence by His redemptive sacrifice. This charity or love was supernatural; St. Paul called it the "bond of perfection;" (Col. 3:12-15) Rush's mentors in the "Schools of the Prophets" had taught him well that this supernatural principle was meant by its Divine Author to transform men into other Christs and to revolutionize fallen society into a community of love.

This "royal law," as St. James had called Christian brotherly love, was the first principle in Rush's educational thought. And here the contrast with Jefferson and Franklin is most acute. They could go no higher than natural reason in their plans for American education. This is seen in Jefferson's dedication to the secularization of the College of William and Mary while he was a trustee, and even more notably in his founding of the University of Virginia in 1819. Dr. Franklin's role in the establishment of the University of Pennsylvania also reflects his Enlightenment naturalism and utilitarianism. Rush's integral Christianity, his belief that man and society are meant to be sacred—because raised to a new, supernatural participation in Christ—is indeed revolutionary and only a finer articulation of what most Americans believed.

This supernatural participation in Christ, foreshadowed in the Old Testament and finally achieved in the perfect obedience of the New Adam, was the ultimate **democracy** for Rush. "The history of the creation of man, and of the relation of our species to each other by birth, which is recorded in the Old Testament," he wrote in his essay on education in the new Republic of the United States, "is the best refutation that can be given to the divine right of kings, and the strongest argument that can be used in favor of the original and natural equality of all mankind."⁶ To Dr. Charles Nisbet, the Scottish Presbyterian clergyman whom Rush

wanted to be first president of Dickenson College, the American claimed that his country seemed "destined by Heaven to exhibit to the world the perfection which the mind of man is capable of receiving from the combined operation of liberty, learning, and the Gospel upon it." There could be no true liberty and no true learning without Christian revelation. Education without religion was devoid of virtue, Rush and the majority of Americans agreed. Virtue was indispensable to liberty, which was "the object of life of all republican governments." Christianity, as Rush had learned as a student in the evangelical Presbyterian "Schools of the Prophets" at the College of New Jersey (Princeton) and elsewhere, made men virtuous and free.

Rush wrote in his essay on the defence of the Bible as a school book:

"We profess to be republicans and yet we neglect the only means of establishing and perpetuating our republican forms of government, that is, the universal education of our youth in the principles of Christianity, by means of the Bible; for the divine book, above all others, favours that equality among mankind, that respect for just laws, and all those sober and frugal virtues, which constitute the soul of republicanism."⁷

It was clear to the Philadelphian doctor that the Bible should be used as a textbook in all American schools. He went even further and suggested that the different churches should provide catechists for the tax-supported schools, making sure that young people learned the doctrines of their faith during regular hours.⁸

In his *An Enquiry into the Influence of the Physical Causes Upon the Moral Faculty* (1786), Dr. Rush broke new ground in showing how the moral faculties as well as the mental were subject to derangement and medical treatment. A pioneer in physiological psychology and the study of behavioral disorders, this devout Christian thinker was also the author of the nation's first textbook in psychiatry.¹⁰ The American Psychiatric Association's seal bears his portrait, in effect recognizing the religious origins of psychiatry in this country.

As a doctor of the soul and a social reformer, Rush saw the new moral and intellectual therapy as the ultimate physics of reform, that perfect synthesis of Christian faith and natural reason that would produce the "new man" and the fraternal community described by St. Paul and in the Acts of the Apostles. Religion and philosophy must work together to educate men and women as persons, as the images of God that they were meant to be. Once this was accomplished, Rush with his evangelical millenarian doctrine believed, true social justice must prevail. For it was the lack of brotherly love that was responsible for the exploitation of the poor, Blacks, women, native Americans, and other minorities whose interests—especially in the field of education—Rush defended in the newspapers and magazines of the time.

All that good and learned men had to do, Rush concluded in his above cited *Enquiry*, was to multiply

"... the objects of human reason, to bring the monarchs and rulers of the world under their subjection, and thereby to extirpate war, slavery, and capital punishments from the list of human evils. Let it not be suspected that I detract, by this declaration, from the honor of the Christian religion. It is true, Christianity was propagated without the aid of human learning; but this was one of those miracles which was necessary to establish it, and which, by repetition, would cease to be a miracle. They misrepresent the Christian religion who suppose it to be wholly an internal revelation and addressed only to the moral faculties of the

mind. The truths of Christianity afford the greatest scope for the human understanding, and they will become intelligible to us only in proportion as the human genius is stretched by means of philosophy to the utmost dimensions. Errors may be opposed to errors; but truths, upon all subjects, mutually support each other. And perhaps one reason why some parts of the Christian revelation are still involved in obscurity may be occasioned by our imperfect knowledge of the phenomena and laws of nature."

Rush's scholasticism, which Professor James J. Walsh has demonstrated as normative in the curricula of the colonial colleges, is here clear enough. "The truths of philosophy and Christianity dwell alike in the mind of the Deity," Rush continued as he drew from the medieval, Thomistic tradition which was otherwise foreign to him as a Protestant.

"Reason and religion are equally the offspring of his goodness. They must, therefore, stand and fall together. By reason, in the present instance, I mean the power of judging of truth, as well as the power of comprehending it. Happy era! When the divine and the philosopher shall embrace each other, and unite their labours for the reformation and happiness of mankind!"

Rush's physics of moral and social reform, his millenarian belief that the all-loving God has made available to mankind in divine revelation and natural reason the means to regain paradise on earth, was characteristically American, as any student of the history of religion knows.¹² But Jefferson's and Franklin's buoyant Enlightenment optimism, their Pelagian refusal to deal with original and personal sin, may also be dismissed by the realist as nothing more than a species of Western utopianism.¹³ In any case the kind of optimism mattered little. Men like Rush, Jefferson, and Franklin defiantly built the nation regardless of the verdict of the ages.

No American at the time did more than this evangelical Christian physician to reform his society. He was a leader of the anti-slavery movement, whose religious origins modern historians tend to forget in another example of misplaced zeal for the influence of the Enlightenment in American social history. Seeing Christ in his fellow-man, especially the poor, Dr. Rush established the first free medical dispensary in America in 1786; also in Philadelphia he was a lifelong member of the staff of the Pennsylvania Hospital, where he worked tirelessly for the humane treatment of the mentally ill. Again and again, inspired by his deep Christian faith, Rush called out for the abolition of cruel and capital punishments. In the same way, his voice was heard among those who demanded that prisons be places of reform and not centers of depravity. To this day the American temperance movement honors him as its founder.

In his crusade to extend "the kingdom of Christ" and the "empire of reason and science in our country," Rush helped establish the Young Ladies' Academy in Philadelphia, where he hoped to eliminate the "present immense disparity which subsists between the sexes, in the degrees of their education and knowledge." He was a prime mover in founding the first Black church in America, even drawing up its articles of faith and a plan of government. "It may be followed by churches upon a similar plan in other States," he wrote in his journal that same year, 1791, "and who knows but it may be the means of sending the Gospel to Africa, as the American Revolution sent liberty to Europe?"¹⁴ To his English Quaker friend, Granville Sharp, Rush explained:

"In spreading the blessings of liberty, and religion, our Divine Master forbids us, in many of His parables and precepts, to have either friends or country. The globe

is the native country, and the whole human race, the fellow-citizens of the Christian."¹⁵

To no one's surprise, the Christian reformer urged in his writings that Pennsylvania take the lead in the formal education of Blacks, while publicly acknowledging that much could be learned from Africans and native Americans about the cure of diseases.¹⁶

But of Rush's reform proposals for the new Christian nation, as he conceived it, surely the most radical was that of what he called a Peace-Office for the Federal Government of the United States which he had worked so hard to bring into existence. Just as there was a Secretary of War, he argued, there ought to be a Secretary of Peace,

"... a genuine republican and a sincere Christian, for the principles of republicanism and Christianity are no less friendly to universal and perpetual peace than they are to universal and equal liberty. Let a power be given to this secretary to establish and maintain free-schools in every city, village and township of the United States and let him be made responsible for the talents, principles, and morals of all his schoolmasters. Let the youth of our country be carefully instructed in reading, writing, arithmetic, and the doctrines of a religion of some kind: the Christian religion should be preferred to all others, for it belongs to this religion exclusively to teach us not only to cultivate peace with men, but to forgive, nay more—to love our very enemies. It belongs to it further to teach us that the Supreme Being alone possesses a power to take away human life, and that we rebel against His laws whenever we undertake to execute death in any way whatever upon any of His creatures."

Rush proposed that over the door of every state and court house in the new nation there should be engraved in gold, "The Son of Man came into the world not to destroy men's lives, but to save them." Familiarity with the "instruments of death" should be avoided; and military titles, uniforms, and parades should be abolished along with militia laws. The Secretary of Peace should provide every family in the United States with an American edition of the Bible at public expense!¹⁷

"Peace on Earth—Good will to man. Ah! Why will men forget that they are brethren?"¹⁸ These were the words that Dr. Benjamin Rush, signer of the Declaration of Independence, father of American psychiatry, and perhaps the nation's greatest reformer and teacher of social justice proposed to guide us. They were to be placed over the door of the Peace Office of the United States and, true to the Judaeo-Christian tradition in which Rush was formed, were beliefs instilled in every boy and girl born in America. As the nation's most influential professor at the Medical School at the University of Pennsylvania, and everything he wrote, Rush exhorted himself and his fellow citizens to imitate Christ in the new life which He made possible. This was the incorporation of all men and women into the supernatural life of the God-Man, the brotherhood of man in the fatherhood of God.

Dr. Benjamin Rush's ideal was—and remains for those of us who follow him—that described in the Acts of the Apostles. It is the same ideal that inspired the Christian founders of the Middle Ages, visionaries like Christopher Columbus in the Age of Discovery, and Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish colonists from New Spain to Massachusetts Bay Colony, Maryland, and beyond.

"Then, one of them (the Pharisees) which was a lawyer, asked him a question, tempting Him, and saying, master, which is the great commandment in the law? Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,

and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. and the second is like unto it, Though shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." (Matt. 22:35-40; Mark 12:28-31)

References

¹P. Marique, *The Philosophy of Christian Education* (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1939), p. 47; Cited in John D. Redden and Francis A. Ryan, *A Catholic Philosophy of Education* (Rev. ed.: Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1956), the English translation of the *End of the Modern World* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1956) has an Introduction by Frederick Wilhelmsen. Biographies of Benjamin Rush include Nathan G. Goodman, *Benjamin Rush: Physician and Citizen, 1746-1813* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934); Carl Binger, *Revolutionary Doctor: Benjamin Rush, 1746-1813* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966); and David Freeman Hawke, *Benjamin Rush: Revolutionary Gadfly* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill co., 1971) which is the most recent and politically detailed.

²*Education at the Crossroads* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), pp. 2-25.

³Essential are James J. Walsh, *The Education of the Founding Fathers of the Republic; Scholasticism in the Colonial Colleges: A Neglected Chapter in the History of American Education* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1935), passim; and Christopher Dawson, *The Historic Reality of Christian Culture: A Way to the Renewal of Human Life* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960). Cf. my "'We Hold These Truths,' and More: Further Catholic Reflections On the American Proposition" in the book by the same title, ed. by Stephen M. Krason and Donald J. D'Elia (Steubenville, Ohio: Franciscan University Press, Forthcoming).

⁴For an extended post-modern analysis of the American founding fathers, see my *The Spirits of '76: A Catholic Inquiry* (Front Royal, Va.: Christendom College Press, 1983).

⁵*Benjamin Rush: Philosopher of the American Revolution* (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1974); idem, "The Republican Theology of Benjamin Rush," *Pennsylvania History* 33, (April, 1966).

⁶"Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic," *Essays, Literary, Moral, and Philosophical* (2nd ed., Philadelphia, 1806), pp. 8-9. For a general discussion, see Harry G. Good's book *Benjamin Rush and His Services to American Education* (Berne, Ind., 1918).

⁷December 5, 1783, *Letters of Benjamin Rush* ed. Lyman H. Butterfield (2 v., Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1951), 1: 316.

⁸"Defence of the use of the Bible as a School Book," *Essays, Literary, Moral, and Philosophical*, pp. 112-113, 94-95, 98-100. Cf. Noah Webster's letter on the use of the Bible in American schools in *Universal Asylum*, and *Columbian Magazine* 7 (September, 1791): 191-192.

⁹Rush, Benjamin. "Plan of Education for Dickenson College." Unpublished manuscript, Dickenson College Library, Carlyle, Pennsylvania, p.1.; Rush, "Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic." *Essays*, op cit., p. 10.

¹⁰Benjamin rush, M.D., *Two Essays on the Mind*, with an introduction by Eric T. Carlson, M.D. (New York: Brunner/

Mazel, Publishers, 1972), pp. v-xii. On David Hartley's (1705-1757) Associationism and its influence in Rush's synthesis of physiological psychology, metaphysics, and Christianity, see D. J. D'Elia, "Benjamin Rush, David Hartley, and the Revolutionary Uses of Psychology," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 114, No. 2 (April, 1970). An anthology of some of Rush's writings, including the *Enquiry*, is Dagobert D. Runes, ed., *The Selected Writings of Benjamin Rush* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947).

¹¹Rush, *Enquiry*, in Dr. Carlson's edition, pp. 38-39

¹²For the American Revolution as a "work of reformation," a recurring theme of the times, see, e.g., Cushing Strout, *The New Heavens and New Earth: Political Religion in America* (New York, 1974). Standard are Perry Miller, "From the Covenant to the Revival," in James W. Smith and A.L. Jamison, eds., *The Shaping of American Religion*, vol. 1 of *Religion in American Life* (4 vols.: Princeton, New Jersey, 1961), 325, 339; and Edward F. Humphrey, *Nationalism and Religion in America, 1774-1789* (New York, 1965).

¹³Cf. Thomas Molnar, *Utopia: the Perennial Heresy* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967).

¹⁴On the education of women, see Rush's "Thoughts upon Female Education," *Essays, Literary, Moral, and Philosophical*. American women, human persons made in the image and likeness of God, must be provided with the best possible education in knowledge and virtue. This was not only their due as children of the Eternal Father; it was even more necessary in the new nation because of the great influence they were expected to exert in a Christian and republican society, pp. 81-89, 91-92. For the journal entry, see George W. Corner, ed., *The Autobiography of Benjamin Rush: His "Travels through Life" Together with his Common-place Book for 1789-1813* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 202.

¹⁵Runes, ed., p. 25. See D.J. D'Elia, "Benjamin Rush and the Negro," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 30, 3 (July-September, 1969), pp. 413-422.

¹⁶Idem., "Dr. Benjamin Rush and the American Medical Revolution," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, v. 110, 4 (August, 1966), p. 231.

¹⁷Rush, "A Plan of a Peace-Office for the United States," Runes, ed., pp. 19-23. On this millenarian vision of the United States as a Christian commonwealth united in brotherly love, which Rush shared with so many other Americans, see Alan Helmer's encyclopedic *Religion and the American Mind: From the Great Awakening to the Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), passim.

¹⁸Runes, ed., p. 21. That these anguished words should have had a wide audience at the time is reconfirmed by M.E. Bradford, among other scholars, who has shown that, out of the fifty-five men who signed the proposed Federal Constitution in 1787, no fewer than fifty were members of established Christian communions; almost thirty of them were leaders in the administration of their churches. *A Worthy Company: Brief lives of the Framers of the United States Constitution* (Marlborough, N.H., 1982), Introduction, pp. viii-ix. Also see the present writer's "The Real Bicentennial: the Continual Quest for a Therapy of Order," *Faith and Reason* v. 13, 4 (1986), pp. 353-362.

"The reason, however, why the philosopher may be likened to the poet is this: both are concerned with the marvelous."—Thomas Aquinas

A New Vision of Education: On the Nature of Poetic Knowledge and Form

Thomas Foster

One of the dangers of life is to go about something in the same way for so long that when there is a problem it is hard to conceive of a different way. Even when failure is all around, people often keep trying the same trick, a little to the right now or harder with a good kick, thinking that soon they will get it right. In America in general and in education in particular, science is considered the sole solution to the tremendous number of problems. In fact what else is there? Perhaps to find that alternate vision that many intuit is needed, it will be necessary to return the notion of "soul" to science.

The average public school administrator who is genuinely concerned about effecting some change is aware of a problem, but does no more than throw out another teaching/classroom model (e.g. Mastery Learning) or another system of evaluation (e.g. Outcomes Based Education). The hope is that we have at last found the Golden Key. Although outcomes and objectives could be stated poetically, there is a scientific bias against it. After all, what good is a non-measurable objective? What good indeed!

There is a popular conception, among both the common man and the common specialist, that poetry is about matters of passing or little substance. A person might say that poetry is fine, as far as it goes, that is to say not very far. Further, he will perhaps admit that there is indeed some very fine poetry that should be taught in schools as long as the thing itself is not taken too seriously. Poetry above being not useful is, well, vague. Science, on the other hand, is

precise, exact, and therefore — useful. In the popular mind poetry is entertainment, or to the intellectual, poetry is sentiment. One may admit that this seems to be true for many in the modern world and that these characterizations are even more pronounced in the industrialized democracies. If poetry expresses truths, they are truths of the heart. Modern philosophies over the last few hundred years have had a significant impact on this understanding. The major thrust of many of these philosophies tends to either deny transcendent reality or objective existence and have resulted in a growing reliance upon empirical validation and analytical perception.

Another popular idea is that poetry is primarily an expression of the poet's own internal conflict or self. While we may derive some pleasure from the poem, it is entirely relative to the writer; its extension is inward. This is the idea of art as therapy; its good comes from the relief it provides.

Both of these ideas are not wholly false but represent a suppression of real poetic knowledge. Poetry does entertain and give pleasure, and at times "surcease of sorrow". Granted there are poems that treat only the temporary and poets whose motivation is psychoanalytical, but there also abound bad scientific research and scientists with personal problems that affect their work. We cannot condemn the pursuit of knowledge because of the pursuers or because many lose their way. A distrust of the vagueness and a disdain for the method is not a strictly modern phenomena though the growing cult of the scientist has certainly brought about a fixation upon the discursive analytical approach to knowing and a rejection of the poetic intuitive mode.

Although the current worship of science has an irrationality, it is certainly true that in a very real way science and poetry stand contraposed.

Poetry . . . is always the antagonist to science. As science makes progress in any subject-matter, poetry recedes from it. The two cannot stand together; they belong respectively to two modes of viewing things, which are contradictory of each other. Reason investigates, analyzes, numbers, weighs, measures, ascertains, locates the objects of its contemplation and thus gains a scientific knowledge of them. (10, 253)

This is to use the word science in a limited sense as of method, not in the traditional sense of science which is "a certain knowledge of causes". (7, 102) In the traditional sense it would not at all be clear that these two modes of knowing were opposed. However, the point of science is to bring things into itself, to control and comprehend them. Man rises above nature as its rightful master. Poetry's thrust is quite different. John Henry Newman, himself a school administrator, explains the difference:

But as to the poetical, very different is the frame of mind which is necessary for its perception. It demands, as its primary condition, that we should not put ourselves above the objects in which it resides, but at their feet; that we should feel them to be above and beyond us, that we should look up to them, and that, instead of fancying that we can comprehend them, we should take for granted that we are surrounded and comprehended by them ourselves. (10, 254)

Poetry and science stand opposed as to method and technique and particular purpose. In a larger sense however, they stand opposed only as the two sides of an arch stand opposed, each with the same goal, each bearing a load and pushing that which is the "key" upward. The keystone is knowledge; each seek it, that is to say men using both methods seek it. Aristotle maintained that all men

Thomas Foster is an English teacher at Shawnee Heights High School in Topeka, Kansas, and a doctoral student in educational foundations at Kansas University.

seek knowledge (1, 499), yet perhaps not all can or should seek it in the same way. Like an arch that needs both supports to bare a load, a school requires both perspectives to function well. In an age when scientific inquiry reigns supreme, we seem to be no closer to grasping the ultimate reality or understanding the mystery of existence. We need that which turns the light of reason upon the unmeasurable as much as the measurable, the timeless as well as the temporal.

Part of the problem for the school administrator is one of balance. The curriculum requires not one or the other but both in a dynamic dialectic. The teachers also must understand the nature of the poetic as a way of being and not just doing. They must be part of the dialectic of reflection. (The reflective teacher concept is a major part of the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards' current paradigm.)

In order to understand poetic knowledge or poetic knowing, the contrast with science can prove useful. First, poetic does not mean only poetry itself. Although poetry will be used in this paper for examples, it is not the only means by which poetic knowledge is attained. Other possibilities include all of the arts, especially music, but also in much more common ways—those that juxtapose natural events with the mind, providing the condition of knowing by the natural light of reason, *lumen sub quo*, (7, 103) Though not scientific, this is the same manner by which science knows its objects. The goal of both modes of knowledge is the same as the goal of philosophy in general—truth, (9, 86–87) This has been affirmed since Socrates, and its denial by some philosophies is self-contradictory. (Poetic knowledge clearly shows this, and that is why they must deny its efficacy.)

While their end is the same, the means are different. Science is discursive and active. Poetry is contemplative and receptive. It is contemplative because it "recognizes" the object of its knowing. In the case of poetry, the words themselves signify their content; the content is immanent in its form. The words are at the same time the objects and signs (object-images). (8, 2) While the words are objects they are still signs which achieve a transcendent quality that is contemplated, received and recognized. This is also true of the other arts, the notes in music, the color in painting etc., which function in the same way. This is not true of science which uses words to talk about things. The words themselves are unimportant. The extreme of logical positivism disconnects the object/word from its sign/image producing what some may interpret to be non/sense.

Science is concerned with universals which are extracted from the particulars. Poetic is concerned with the mystery of the individual. Science does not analyze only one flower but the properties that are common to all flowers. Poetic contemplation centers on the uniqueness of a single blossom. Although there may be a thousand like it on the tree, the focus is on the one. Science speaks volumes on horsemanship but little of one horse, and in this lies the great strength of science. Poetry celebrates one horse and transcends horseness. In this way the poet seeks reality, the common experiences of life, by imitation. This imitation is not of the video camera or the tape recorder but by the *lumen sub quo* of the poetic:

The poet is the most uncompromising of realists, but his poem is reality transfigured . . . Poetry, then is life purified. Not purified, indeed, of sorrow or even of shame, but purified of insignificance. Some central power and purpose in the poet projects him into a region of undistracted vision, and there he sees truth

with an absolute clarity that is beyond the reach of thought. (4, 9)

The great poet (artist) re-presents a condensation, a distillation of reality to the mind from which the mind extracts truths. This representation is a sense experience that is produced by the object of consideration. The form signifies its content (object/image). Obviously bad poets cannot do this, although everyone has some potential determined by the particular limitation of their intellect which we might call the "gift" or lack thereof. This is true of philosophy in general, that few are truly great.

Poetic knowledge is extracted from the representation of particulars as a sense experience by which are known higher order universals, e.g. love, courage, virtue, for which examples exist but for which particular objects do not. Poetic knowledge, therefore, is knowing through the senses first, like science. "*Nihil in intellect nisi prius in sensu.*" The mind extracts essences from particulars, but then from these essences, like particulars, it extracts essences more universal than these primary levels (common experience) to form greater, more unified (simpler) concepts at higher and more sublime levels.

A question arises as to the nature of the existence of these universals, and a brief examination will be necessary to more fully develop the transcendent nature of the poetic. Matter according to Aristotle is potential, but it does not exist prior to union with form. Mere matter would exist only as an abstraction, not as a thing. To be at all, matter must be something, and that is to possess form. The material limits the form, since it is the material that differentiates particulars, while the form is the same for both:

Since the same concept or universal can stand indifferently for any number of individuals sharing the same likeness then it cannot share in whatever it is that makes those individuals separate and distinct. (15, 26)

The horses are individuated by their matter; they share the common form of horsemanship. It is form that possesses an existence outside of the union with matter since horsemanship remains unchanged while particular horses change and pass out of existence.

Aristotle and Plato both agree metaphysically that these forms conceived by the mind are universal and eternal, but they are in conflict over the ontological state of form. Plato holds that we know the essences that particulars share. We know triangularity even though each triangle is different. This form must then possess a separate reality. This is commonly known as the theory of Platonic Ideal Forms. Aristotle attacks this idea on two grounds. (2, 509) First, Plato is creating a second system of reality where the forms are like sensible objects, only not subject to change. In the second place, these forms are no help to knowing because if they exist outside the sensible and limited object, then the mind can never know the universal. The conclusion cannot be broader than the premise. (15, 126)

It is not clear to me that Plato held the ideal form to be separate from its object in the same way that one sensible thing is separate from another. Perhaps he is only guilty of metaphoric hyperbole. In any case he saw the necessity to establish a transcendent foundation for the universal form. The essence must transcend matter or science is not possible. Aristotle admits the universal nature of science. He rightly states that form is in the thing and not separate from matter except as a concept. (2, 509) If, however, the universal has no transcendental reality but is only a construct of the mind, a type of nominalism develops.

A particular object exists because of its relationship to the universal. The universal is a condition of existence of

the thing; therefore, the universal is an a priori condition of the knowledge of the thing. There is no knowledge of the universal separate from the particular, but we know the universal by abstraction. The relationship between the particular and the universal is the formula or basis for qualifying the individual. The individual qualities do not exist separate from that of which they are a part. These qualifications are a condition of form. Individual horses are distinguishable only because they share the same conditions of horsehood. The basis for the distinction lies with the universal. As horses are members of horsehood, horsehood is but a member of a more general class of being, e.g. mammals. In each case the basis of distinction lies within that from which the distinction is possible. There is a transcendent progression to what must necessarily be unlimited essence or God.

We come to know the universal element of things through our analysis of the particular, for in its limitation as a particular is contained its relation to the unlimited. But if the principle of limitation cannot be found in that which is limited, then it can only be found in that which in its being is unlimited. Thus it is in God existing as necessary and unlimited being that the principle or cause of limited being exists. This principle I identify as the eternal possibilities of contingent existences existing in the essence of God. (6, 36-37)

This transcendent ground for the universal quality of forms is important because it is the mode of knowing through which the poetic operates. At least it is the way the mind is able to transcend the object presented to it as an external form that is a sign of the internal or invisible essence. Scientific knowing in the more restricted sense is more concerned with the external and visible characteristics. That is why there is a contrariety in the operation of the poetic and the scientific. The scientific forces things to present their external characterization so they can be weighed and measured. Even internal qualities are externalized, and the invisible is stripped until it can be seen. The poetic internalizes the external and often makes vague and mysterious that which is otherwise obvious. To the extent that "science progresses as poetry retreats," this becomes a logical understanding of the position. (10, 253)

The scientific is argumentative in that it searches for causes. The poetic is representative and searches for the unity of essences. Because of this, the poetic is a knowledge of the moment, the now, but science is of the duration of time. Science moves, poetry is still and contemplative. Science is somewhat like an Easter egg hunt, to use a homey example. The children run about from one egg (idea) to another collecting the real things, stopping to look only long enough to spy the next object. Sometimes our parents would inform us that there were still more eggs to be found and back we would go, looking this way and that, trying different methods, analyzing likely places. A shout of discovery would draw our attention, and we would run to that spot. Sometimes an egg would not be found for months only to be discovered later by accident. The poet considers the hunt and the children and the simple joy. The scientist collects; The poet recollects.

It should be remembered that both seek the truth. The scientific seeks the universal that is in the particular while the poetic seeks the particular that is universal. By a representation of reality, the poet reproduces the relationship between the knowing intellect and the event. The mind transcends the particular resulting in an apprehension of the universal. This process is controllable only in part. In fact, Maritain shows that the experience of the artist is substantially different than the effect upon the audience. (8, 71-75)

These visions or images that the poet (from the Greek for "maker") produces are apprehended differently by the audience. That is why science translates into another language easily and poetry does not.

The poetic deals with the effect of the transformed and purified reality upon the mind. When the mind extends through, that is transcends, essences of the object/image, the result is a "quantum jump" (to use a scientific term), a vertical ascent to a higher plane of understanding. (1, 5) This is a great part of the essence of poetic knowledge, that it facilitates the leap of understanding. With most kinds of education, but especially with the Liberal Arts, this ascent is critical, as Senior explains:

... these liberal arts differ from one another vertically; ... you rise from one to the other, not by a horizontal extension, but a vertical ascent to a different level of understanding which includes the lower ones, analogous to the relation of part to whole. (1, 6)

The sciences, on the other hand, represent the great ability of man to progress horizontally along a continuum. The amazing development of scientific knowledge is a witness to this tendency. In fact the scientific has some advantage over the poetic in that it is more certain in some ways, more repeatable with the same results, more measurable. The greater the extent of our reliance upon the scientific, the more likely we are to reject the poetic possibilities. The great virtue of individual administrators or teachers is that they interact with individual students. The chief problem of scientific models is that they react only to that part of the individual that conforms to the group (or those defined characteristics that constitute the group). Even in the application of scientific methodology we often destroy what we seek. Wordsworth said, "Our meddling intellect/Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:/We murder to dissect". (11, 589)

What poetry can do is bring together common experiences in a way that contrasts or connects significant qualities. The mind is inspired by this and sees an essential link between different levels of being. Here is an example of how Shakespeare uses several common objects to produce meaning that goes beyond the objects of their own essences. "I can suck/melancholy out of song as a well as a weasel sucks eggs/More, I prithee more." (14, 69) If a person were given these items, melancholy, eggs, weasel, song and suck, and asked to extract a more universal concept, the task would be difficult. The object, in this case three lines from a play, is itself an element of the process. Without this structure the effect is destroyed. This is an extremely simple example. An anonymous lyric provides a deeper reflection:

Western wind when will thou blow,
Small rain down came rain.
Christ that my love were in my arms,
And I in my bed again.

Trying to explain the poetic insight of this poem reminds me of the character in a college biology lab who was shown a microscope. When he peered into the eye piece, he could see nothing. Although the instructor adjusted the instrument, it was to no avail; the student was only able to see white light. No one knew just what to do. It is just something that must be seen. If the object is taken apart, it is no longer the same. The microscope will not work the same way in pieces. The onlooker's vision can only be guided. In the example above the "Western wind" refers to spring. Knowing this may help see the point or not. Explaining the tremendous use of alliteration may be interesting, but none of this can make a person see. The object can only be presented with hope.

Part of the problem is that the poetic with its jumps and starts is somewhat unpredictable. Science is much more steady. Science is like the tortoise in the old fable. The poetic hare is faster but gets distracted. Slow and steady wins the race. In reality though the hare must move so quickly that to the tortoise he seems invisible. The fable makes an assumption that winning the race is more worthwhile than enjoying the flowers.

The tortoise with his nose to the ground does not look up at the unique or the mysterious. If he does, he does not stop but keeps moving. Poetic knowledge is about stopping and being still.

A still greater problem is that when a poet transforms reality, he fashions an extremely sharp knife. Like the sophists of old or the unscrupulous researcher of today, the goal of the agent must be truth, or the end will be a lie.

Aristotle and Plato both saw the danger of poetry. They knew it must be controlled. They did not, however, live in our age, after a time when poetry has developed and come to know itself:

We have just spoken of a second aspect or moment in the coming to consciousness of poetry as poetry, and which concerns above all the poetic state. I think that one could, at least by abstraction, discern a third, deeper still than the other two, and which would be related rather to poetic knowledge, I mean to the knowledge of reality, and of the interior of things, or their reverse side, proper to poetry or to the spirit of poetry. The more deeply poetry becomes conscious of itself, the more deeply it becomes conscious of its power of know, and of the mysterious movement by which, as Jules Supervielle put it one day, it approaches the sources of being. (8, 46-47)

Also Aristotle and Plato may not have considered poetry too deeply because they were, after all, scientists and prone to dismiss that which is nebulous in favor of that which is concrete.

St. Thomas Aquinas thought that truth was neither impossible nor easy to attain but (only) difficult. (7, 183) Since truth is neither equally nor easily given, it seems reasonable to consider some of the advantages that poetic knowledge offers not only to an administrator but any professional or intellectual. First of all, it is one of the ways that the mind can know truth. This, of course, is crucial, but further, the poetic can inspire love. Many men received their first glimpse of the transcendent reality of truth through poetry or art and continued to pursue wisdom out of love which is the meaning of philosophy. The poetic can also validate truth that is achieved through a scientific method. A writer often analyzes some point in a very logical and discursive manner but ends with a very poetic turn to add emphasis to their words and memorable quality to their argument.

With an already understood truth, poetry can be most remarkable. It can deepen and expand understanding by a vertical leap. On the other hand, poetry can also reveal error when we have strayed too far from the path. We must be suspicious of a position that obviously contradicts our poetic experience. This is one of the great common proofs against both the subjective realists and the skeptics. "The madman is not the man who has lost his reason. The madman is the man who has lost everything except his reason" (3, 19)

Finally, the poetic accomplishes two important tasks. It can lead to a higher order experience of pleasure. This pleasure is not of the glands but an ascent of the mind. If man by nature desires to know, then the highest order of knowing is the greatest fulfillment. This would be Aristotle's actualization of potential. The poetic also leads us to an understanding of the human condition. The more we un-

derstand our own essence, the more we become human. The more we become, the closer we get to the mystery of existence. Both of these elements of poetic knowledge deserve more treatment than is possible to give them here.

Although truth is difficult to attain, it is not equally difficult. The great poets and great thinkers seem to have had a "gift". A common misconception is that "either you have it or you don't". To some extent this is true in that a person has more or less potential. Unrealized potential is of little value. If Aristotle had been born and died a common slave, he would not have been a great philosopher. The person who does not understand the language of the poetic cannot experience it. This language is culture, and the school must inculcate this vocabulary as much as a scientific one. In our case the language is the sum total of myths, stories, ideas, great works and accomplishments of Western Civilization. This alone would be reason to teach the subject. Many students are unable to experience a great work because they know so little of the language of culture. It seems meaningless or trivial or "dumb". For those, reading a great poem is like taking a blind man to an art gallery.

Poetic knowledge, like scientific knowledge, can be taught either as a subject or as a technique. A teacher/administrator could present, to either young children or educated adults, experience in a poetic way. Our educational system, on the whole, is not doing it, and we are losing the very language of our poetic existence. Where do the blind lead the blind?

As a short summary, I will restate the main points of my discussion. There is an idea that poetry is either trivial or subjective. This tendency is increased by our absorption with scientific method. This absorption inhibits the ability of school officials to conceive of change in a poetic model. The poetic and scientific can be understood in part by their opposition. Poetic knowledge is contemplative, receptive, still, imitative, now, representative, mysterious, particular, invisible, internal, individual and vertical. Scientific knowledge is discursive, active, in motion, argumentative, certain, universal, visible external, general and horizontal. The poetic takes on forms where the object signifies their content. Through these forms the poetic transcends to higher levels by means of the universality of essences that are limited by their particulars until the mind reaches (possibly) the ultimate essence. The transcendent ground for the universality of essence was established in discussion of the conflict between Aristotle and Plato over the ontological nature of forms. The epistemological nature of poetic knowledge was explained in relation to its transcendent ability. The poetic is rather more a vertical ascent to a higher plane of understanding than a horizontal extension of knowledge. An examination of the virtue and defects of the poetic and the scientific proceeded a series of advantages of the poetic as follows:

1. Leads the mind to the truth.
2. Inspires love of knowing.
3. Validates scientifically attained truth.
4. Deepens knowledge already held.
5. Reveals error.
6. Results in pleasure (knowing) of a higher experience.
7. Leads to greater understanding of the human condition.

Finally there was a short axiological digression on the need for poetic education.

Poetic knowledge does not contradict common sense and experience but validates the pre-philosophic ability of the mythic to come to truth. It elevates the mind until it stops in wonder at that which is beyond all understanding.

This wonder is not the end but a beginning:

That shows that Theodorus was not wrong in his estimate of your nature. This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin. (13, 806)

References

- ¹Adler, Mortimer, et. al. *The Integration of Knowledge*. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Printing Service, 1979.
- ²Aristotle. "The Works of Aristotle": *Great Books of the Western World*. Vol. 8. Robert Hutchins. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952.
- ³Chesterton, G. K. *Orthodoxy*. New York: Doubleday, 1959.
- ⁴Drinkwater, John. *English Poetry: An Unfinished History*. London: Methuen, 1938.
- ⁵Gutek, Gerald. *Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives on Education*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1988.
- ⁶Hicks, Alan. *Pleasure and the Good of Man in the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*. Thesis, University of Kansas, 1982.
- ⁷Maritain, Jacques. *An Introduction to Philosophy*. Trans. E.I Watkin. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955.
- ⁸Maritain, Jacques, and Raissa. *The Situation of Poetry*. Trans. Marshall Suther. New York: 1955.
- ⁹Newman, John Henry. *A Grammar of Assent*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979.
- ¹⁰Newman, John Henry. *Essays and Sketches*. New Ed. New York: Longman, Green, 1948.
- ¹¹Lowry, H.F., et. al. eds. *An Oxford Anthology of English Poetry*. 2nd Ed. New York: oxford University Press, 1956.
- ¹²Pieper, Joseph. *Leisure the Basis of Culture*. Trans. Alexander Dru. New York: Random House, 1963.
- ¹³Plato. *The Collected Dialogues*. eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- ¹⁴Shaakespear, William. *As You Like It*. Ed. Albert Gilman. New York: New American Library, 1963.
- ¹⁵Sullivan, Daniel. *Fundamentals of logic*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.

What You Must Know to be a Teacher: (Variations on a theme by Gary Snyder)

Steven Lewis

The way
to the human heart; the amplified sound
blood rushing across the placenta;
the pain of menstruation behind
closed eyes; first aid
for a spurting artery; the bloodless
face of betrayal.

The voice
we use when everything we value
has been taken away; the noise of
freedom; the shattering
silence of an accusing finger;
the endless boring hours of hearing
others talk; the pain of healing.

The urgency
of sex; the rage of injustice; the goodness
in Grendl; the evil in Mother Theresa;
Solomon's ignorance; the bravery of
Chicken Little; the heart of darkness.

The way
back.

The Way Back to Educational Foundations

James T. Hillestad

This essay is contrary to the prevailing contemporary sophists respected by the power brokers of the government monopoly in education. Madeline Hunter, Albert Shanker, the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, and the Iowa State University School Improvement model, are but a sample of those power brokers. In the footsteps of Descartes and John Dewey their power prevails. Having built this pillar of Baal they now wish to maintain that power. It is a power that rivals both Baal and Nebuchadnezzar. This pillar of government in both public and private education has come to serve death more than life.

This pillar will fall. Perhaps it already has:
"And they demolished the pillar
of Baal and demolished the house
of Baal and made it a latrine to this day."

II Kings 10:28

James Hillestad is professor of education at the State University of New York at New Paltz.

I am in no need of a latrine. This essay does not urinate on the rubble of our past attempts at survival through schooling. The rubble is world wide. It is found both in Manhattan, Kansas, as well as New York. It is in Oslo, St. Petersburg, Tokyo, Buenos Aires, and Houston, Minnesota, as well as Houston, Texas.

I am an old man. I am a grandfather. I believe this best describes our present predicament:

"Even youths shall faint and be weary,
and young men shall fall exhausted;
but they who wait for the Lord shall
renew their strength
they shall mount up with wings
like eagles,
they shall run and not be weary,
they shall walk and not faint."

Isaiah 40:31

The eagle wings I have found for the historical, philosophical, and sociological foundations in education course that I teach are:

Collins, Marva, *Marva Collins Way*, Tarcher, 1990;
de Nicholas, Antonio, *Habits of Mind*, Paragon House, 1989;

Hicks, David V., *Norms and Nobility*, Rowman and Littlefield, 1991;

Postman, Neil, *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, Viking Penguin, 1986.

The Voice

By utilizing Lewis' poetry, it is Marva Collins who provides the voice to which my students can and will attend. Her courage and commitment are unmistakably authentic. She forthrightly explains the benefit she has of not being a product of a teacher education program. She also avoided the simulacrum of what now passes as a liberal arts education. She resurrects her pupils from the curses of the Enlightenment as funneled through the behavioral sciences. She knows these kids have something important—a soul. They come alive. They transcend the banalities of the Pharaohs of television, the Democratic Party, and the National Education Association. They transcend the descriptive labels of economics, race, and learning disabilities.

My students and I begin to have a hope that defies the descriptive and analytical mainstream. We are anointed by Marva. A dialectic that includes the prescriptive ideal begins to emerge.

The Urgency

Neil Postman so aptly describes the Babylonian captivity that has attempted to make products out of me and of my students. We are using *Amusing Ourselves to Death* because it magnificently develops the idea that "Public consciousness has not yet assimilated that technology is ideology." (p. 157) Our current habit of mind is permeated present darkness of information. My students are habituated (perhaps inhabited is more accurate) by this informative Pharaoh of ideology. The simulacrum is overwhelming. It is as though our image in the mirror could view itself.

Mr. Postman has exposed this current habit of mind in all its daily Huxleyan dimensions. The urgency of his *Disappearance of Childhood* and *Conscientious Objections* lead my students and me to see ourselves reflected in this mirror. It is perhaps the deepest culture shock to see oneself. Sometimes the reaction is one of denial, but most seeds germinate and many sprout at their appointed hour. As educators we can no longer be satisfied and comfortable with being merely well informed. The show business of the school and all its mass professionalism has been exposed.

The Way Back

In one of the most impossible and difficult books I have encountered, Mr. de Nicholas does indeed show us the way back to something that was left behind: the classical habit of mind. He dismisses the claim that "our culture dates all the way back to the Greeks." (p. 36) He asserts that the greatest difficulty to overcome is our current habit of mind which is limited to the formation of theories. "One need only visit any classroom to see firsthand what this habit of theory making is doing and how it is being used against the students." (p. 6) The social scientists share with the Protestant founders of American education "the belief that the scientific method is sufficient to organize the whole of life." (p. 6) Educators have become pseudo-scientists and daily fabricate "abstractions and impose them on the human and social fabric with such quickness that the students are left reeling, wondering about their human whereabouts."

But *Habits of Mind* addresses this predicament. It is, among other things, a generously and virtuously edited anthology in which de Nicholas utilizes Plato to identify and develop the classical dialectic which is to give us "the capacity and knowledge to distinguish the good and the bad life, and so everywhere and always choose the better from among those that are possible . . ."

Students can follow the way back by reading his inclusions of John Dewey's *Experience and Education*; Jude P. Dougherty's "Marx, Dewey, and Maritain—The Role of Religion in Society"; Voltaire's *Candide*; the Marquis de Sade's "Dialogue Between a Priest and a Dying Man" and ultimately Plato's *Republic* (Books I, V, VI, and VII). When he does not write his own introduction de Nicholas includes dazzling essays such as "Some Reflections on Rhetoric" by John Bremer.

Because of the demands of this book it took one of my more courageous acts to use it in a beginning teacher education course. Could my students from Poughkeepsie, the lower east side, the South Bronx, and Scarsdale possibly succeed? The experiences of Jaime Escalante and Marva Collins brought out my most affirmative Hubert Humphrey Minnesotan language: "You betcha!"

And these students did. After great struggles on each weekly essay/quiz, their final examinations literally took my breath away as they savored their triumph.

The Way

In a 1988 seminar one of my graduate students made use of an author who was unknown to me, David Hicks. The book was *Norms and Nobility*. Her references were to sentiments and ideas I had longed to formulate since 1951 when I received my first morally earned "F" grade at St. Olaf College. The conclusions I was expected to develop in a final examination in the History of Philosophy course were so repugnant that I could not participate.

I hastened to my Sojourner Truth Library to examine this book. The excitement of this encounter prevented me from wasting even the ten minutes it would require to approach the checkout desk. At midnight the library closed. Eight hours later I closed the book. The peak experience I had twenty years earlier, upon discovering Lewis Mumford, had been surpassed.

The prologue of *Norms and Nobility* best explains its purpose in this excerpt:

"My purpose in writing this book is to offer a personal interpretation of classical education—its ends, as well as some of its means—and to respond to the objections of those who might approve of the goals of such an education, but who believe that it cannot meet the needs of an industrial democracy or that it is

not feasible as a model for mass education. I have some hard words for those social scientists whose analytical methods and unexamined assumptions have worked a profound mischief in our schools. My wish is not, however, to banish science from the modern curriculum, but to save it. For I fear that the modern educator's inchoate understanding of science, his naive belief in its all-sufficiency, and his unwillingness to acknowledge its methodological limitations are leading to a reaction and revulsion against it. If descriptive science is to aid our schools and flourish in them, it must remain in the service of a prescriptive ideal." (p.3)

Here was the vital work that my thirty-five years of serving students could not produce or find. It was in my hands at last!

But it was out of print. Even though the former publisher informed me the second printing had sold out in six months, there was no intention to reprint. After a frantic AT&T SEARCH I located Mr. Hicks at St. Mark's School of Texas, in Dallas. Though his commitments now were to those students and he chose not to expend further energies on the book, he did not object to my pestering publishers, and to their eternal credit Rowman and Littlefield did the job!

My students have discovered after reading Dewey that most of his disciples, including their professors, have not. It is not surprising therefore that none have even heard of David Hicks. Here is a sample that may recall the vision of some former "Normal Schools" that Progressive Education destroyed and replaced:

"The ancient student of the Ideal Type, therefore, started out with the dogma of a moral ideal called kalakagathia—a man both beautiful and good. When he asked—what is excellence in man?—he did not so much seek his answer in poetry and philosophy as he sought illustration and confirmation of his answer there. The answer, as it were, preceded the question and the questioner, but both were needed to elicit it. Each new generation of students began at the beginning with Homer and Hesoid, refining, perhaps reinterpreting, the primal stamp, but never presuming to set up a rival ideal and never daring to give in entirely to pragmatic doubts. Any rival ideal would have met with sheer incomprehension, as Saint Paul discovered on Mars Hill, and a worse fate awaited the doubter, as the Athenians learned when their Syracusan debacle (according to Thucydides) followed hard on their ruthless realpolitik at Melos. Because it was rooted in the dogma of a prescriptive view of man, the ideal withstood the ravages of time and change. Like the life of virtue at its heart, it remained immediately recognizable in all ages and to all men, whether it wore the mail armor of a Christian Richard or the flowing robes of a Moslem Saladin." (p. 45)

Epilogue

The essay you have completed was partially built upon the assumption that the reader appreciates the Cartesian nature and history of our modern university. Charles J. Sykes has confirmed my three decades of experience in education as well as giving such a history in *Politics and Corruption in Higher Education: The Hollow Men* (1990). It is this modern pillar of the university, not Baal, that upholds our fragile American and worldwide edifice. The university prepares all the powerful professionals in government, religion, medicine, technology, law, teaching, industry, and the military; the power brokers of our collective destiny.

Page Smith in his conclusion to *Killing The Spirit* (1989) quotes Robert Hutchins: "Civilization can be saved only by a moral, intellectual and spiritual revolution to match the scientific, technological and economic revolution in which we are now living." The four authors presented here with the poet, Steven Lewis, are most often excluded from the journals of education which limit themselves to the technological, or "findings" from the social sciences, constituting the

so-called "educational mainstream." In Orwellian language this describes a stagnant pond.

Only by including the moral, intellectual, and spiritual contributions represented by these authors can there be a stream. Then may we become educators rather than teachers and researchers limited to behavior modification, publishing, and promotion.

How can the kinds of knowledge needed for administrative practice be most clearly and usefully articulated?

Knowing Why: The Integration of Theory and Practice

David E. Engle

Overview

The central concern of this paper is to examine ways of knowing which might relate to and clarify the knowledge base of educational administration. The report of the National Commission on Excellence in Educational Administration the problem of the field:

school administrators need more than mastery of a body of knowledge. Their performance depends on the ability to determine the needs of those they serve and to meet those needs with practical skills rooted in an appropriate knowledge base. (pp. 18-19)

The distinction made by Gilbert Ryle in *The Concept of Mind* between knowing-that (or factual knowledge) and knowing-how (or performative knowledge/skill) is revisited and applied to educational administration praxis. Clearly administrators need both types in developing the epistemological foundations for doing administration. Factual knowledge (knowing-that) can be gained in such typical ways as classes, readings, papers, formal and informal discussions. Performative knowledge (knowing-how) can be gained through clinically supervised field experiences, simulations, observations. Knowing-that is an appropriate way to view knowledge acquisition in educational administration. Knowing-how is an appropriate way to view skill acquisition in educational administration.

But what about the practical application of such knowledge and skill acquisition? In this regard, it is suggested the third epistemological category be considered: knowing-why (synthetic knowledge or the ability to develop rationales for action). This category grows out of the philosophical analyses of Jane Roland Martin and Harry Broudy. It seems plausible to reason that if knowledge and skill are to be successfully combined, then we will be able to explain why and how they were successful in some practical situation and even under what circumstances such action should be repeated.

Further, this line of reasoning highlights the importance of clinically analyzed field experience. That is where fact (knowing-that) and skill (knowing-how) are analyzed to

determine reasons for their application (knowing-why). As such, this explication of epistemological foundations of educational administration rejects the notion that there is a theory-practice dilemma in the field. Instead, it suggests that theory and practice, especially in the preparation program, need to be viewed as reciprocal. In epistemological terms that means that knowing-that (fact) and knowing-how (skill) and related in terms of knowing why (developing/providing a rationale for action).

Preface

Many of us engaged in the philosophy of education have been merged (thrown?) into departments of educational administration and policy studies. After the initial politicking has diminished and some degree of rapport has been established we ponder what role our field has in relation to such a practical one as educational administration. My experience has been that philosophy of education can play a vital role in explicating and expanding the rather thin knowledge base of such administrative studies. This paper applies Ryle's fact-skill distinction to educational administration and develops the (sometimes flirted-with) category of knowing-why as an epistemological basis for relating theory to practice for a field which has typically dichotomized to two.

Introduction

Another way to put the issue is in terms of the need for the administrator in training to acquire knowledge about the practice in the profession, to acquire skills that relate to day-to-day demands in administrative practice and the ability to bring together such knowledge and skills in practical application. The problem relates to the three components of administrative preparation: knowledge acquisition, skill acquisition and practical application.

To formulate the problem in epistemological terms is to ask: *what* do administrators need to know, *how* should they know it and *why*. In order to get at such epistemological issues, this analysis will focus on three elements of knowledge relevant to the field of educational administration: knowing-that (factual knowledge), knowing-how (performative knowledge or skill), and knowing-why (synthetic knowledge or the ability to develop rationales for action).

It is not intended that this analysis will specify a curriculum, although some curricular implications may be implicit. Instead, what is intended is a display of the kind of epistemological competencies needed in the field in terms of knowledge acquisition, skill acquisition and practical application through clinical experience.

Additionally, and by way of introduction, it can be noted that most educational administration training programs in one way or another already treat such matters. But it is doubtful that they do so with a clear epistemological basis. Many, driven by state certification standards, provide instruction in such specific areas as facilities, finance, staff development, organizational theory and behavior without a clear knowledge base to unify what is learned. In effect, administrators acquire knowledge and learn a set of skills in separated areas without an integrated vision of how knowledge and skills can and should be integrated to achieve effective practical application.

This analysis will revisit the epistemological distinction made by Gilbert Ryle in his *Concept of the Mind* (1949) between knowing-that (factual knowledge) and knowing-how (performative knowledge or skill). Ryle's theory of knowledge has the advantage of expanding traditional epistemology to include skill or what might be called performative knowledge. As such, it may explicate important dimen-

David E. Engle is professor of education at the University of Pittsburg in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

sions of a knowledge base for such practical fields as educational administration.

Background to Gilbert Ryle's Distinction

Discussions and arguments over the nature of knowledge have dominated the Western philosophic tradition. Broadly viewed, philosophers have looked at knowledge from two perspectives: the speculative temper and the analytic temper. Plato viewed the acquisition of knowledge or learning as an act of remembering what the mind innately held. That is the central argument in the dialogue of the *Meno*. But the grounds of that position is most clearly set forth in the *Republic* where Plato told the Myth of Er. Er, a soldier, seemed to have been slain in battle and his soul transcended to a realm of everlasting truth. But Er did not die and so when he recovered he was able to recount what he experienced. Souls in the realm of everlasting reality before they were reborn camped beside the banks of the Forgetful River. Those who drank a great deal would remember nothing of the truth they experienced. Those who drank less may recall, with help on earth, something of the truth (Soltis & Phillips, 1985). Thus Plato's notion of innate ideas as the basis of knowledge was born. But the Myth has a quality of fantasy and thus one can readily see its essentially speculative character.

In a less speculative manner, Aristotle provided an analysis which focused on one area of the ancient Trivium, rhetoric. From Aristotle we can derive an axiom: if you can say it, then you know it. As John Herman Randall (1960) has noted:

Knowledge is, like language, systematic and logical . . . We can be said to "know" a thing only when we can state in precise language what that thing is, and why it is as it is. (p. 7)

Later the British empiricists, especially Locke and Hume, emphasized sensory impression or sense data as the basis for what is known. Reinforced by the logical positivists in this century, the empirical movement came to view knowledge as justified true belief. One of the most articulate statements of this view is that of A.J. Ayer (1956) who argued:

The necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that something is the case are first that what one said is known to be true, secondly that one be sure of it, and thirdly that one have the right to be sure. (p. 35)

Ayer (1956) expanded the commentary on his three criteria: When we claim the right to be sure of any given statement, the basis of the claim may be either that the statement is self-evident, or that its truth is directly warranted by our experience, or that it is validly derivable from some other statement, or set of statements, of which we have the right to be sure. (p. 40)

At bottom, Ayer's theory is radically empiricistic. But the significant factor to highlight here is that knowledge is construed as propositional. To put Ayer's position in axiomatic terms, knowledge is that which can be demonstrated or justified in logical, empirical terms. John Wisdom (1957) has stated it very neatly: "The meaning of a statement is the method of its verification" (p. 51). In other words, meaning can be established when a proposition can be translated into other statements or sentences which refer to an experience which is logically possible and, typically, empirically verified. Once the translation is made no other explanation is necessary.

Note the movement of thought from speculation to analysis. For Plato knowledge was the remembrance of innate ideas which he supported by speculative reasoning, not empirical grounding. Recall what Aristotle was claim-

ing: if you can say it, then you know it. That is, knowledge is essentially propositional. Or consider again the British empiricists. If knowledge is based on sensory data, then it can be stated in propositional form as empirically grounded data, so Locke and Hume and Ayer believed.

A great deal of learning in educational administration proceeds in this manner of propositionally represented knowledge. Appropriately so. But the learning of administrative praxis, I would argue, goes beyond learning propositional knowledge. It includes the skill of putting together a wide range of propositional learnings and internalizing operational behaviors that can be called upon at a moment's notice and deployed in real situations. Philosophy's insistence on epistemological accuracy through empirical tests is not incorrect, but it will be argued here that it is incomplete.

Ryle on Knowing-that and Knowing-how

Gilbert Ryle saw the incompleteness of traditional epistemologies when he made his seminal distinction about knowledge types, contrasting knowing-that or factual knowledge and knowing-how or performative knowledge/skill.

Knowing-that and knowing-how in Ryle's view are distinctive forms of knowledge. Knowing-how to swim is not dependant on any articulate verbal abilities. And the articulate verbalization of requisites for swimming are not necessarily related to the act of swimming. As Jonas Soltis (1978) comments:

if one knows how to swim . . . this does not imply or, indeed, necessitate that one have any verbal knowledge about swimming. And, alternately, acquiring verbal knowledge about swimming does not imply that one will then be able to swim. (p. 40)

In sum, Ryle clearly argued that these were two different and distinguishable ways of knowing. In terms of educational administration, one would argue that a superintendent's skill in relating to various political constituencies may be enhanced by academic preparation in the areas of organizational theory and organizational behavior (knowing-that). At the same time, exposure to actual circumstances involving such matters as school community relations and board-superintendent interaction provides a contrasting kind of knowledge (knowing-how). This, in turn, raises the question for the preparation program of how these distinctive knowledge types are, or can be, integrated.

But Ryle's distinction was not unchallenged. John Hartland-Swann (1956) argued that Ryle's analysis distinguishing knowing-that from knowing-how could be collapsed. He posited that knowing-that could be reduced to knowing-how. For example, if one knew that parrots are birds or that George Washington was the first President of the United States, such propositions were the product of knowing-how to answer such questions (pp. 111-115).

Jane Roland Martin granted Hartland-Swann's conclusion on logical grounds (i.e. all knowing is in some sense performative), but still held to Ryle's distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how. She reasoned that some performances require more practice than others. For example, swimming required practice far in excess of the utterance of a simple proposition, such as, "George Washington was the first president of the United States." Accordingly, Martin argued that Ryle's distinction was useful because according to her practice criterion the two performances were epistemologically distinguishable.

But, in the course of Martin's (1961) analysis, as well as affirming the distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how, she suggested that other forms of knowledge

were possible: knowing why, knowing-what, knowing about, etc. (pp. 69-70). Such extensions are open to question. For example, it seems dubious that one could maintain, either logically or substantively, a distinction between knowing-that and knowing-what. But knowing-why might be construed as the capacity to develop the relationship or interaction between knowing-that propositions and knowing-how performances.

In still another related analysis, Harry Broudy (1961) refers to knowing-why as "theoretical or explanatory knowledge" (p. 77). More development of this will follow in a later section of the paper.

Ryle's Distinction and Training in Educational Administration

Despite the challenge of Hartland-Swann's attempt to reduce knowing-that to knowing-how and Martin's elaboration of Ryle's epistemological distinction, his original analysis seems to hold. Further, in concert with Martin's and Broudy's elaborations, the contrast between knowing-that and knowing-how can provide a useful epistemological grounding for training programs in educational administration.

It is not uncommon to view such academic training programs in terms of knowledge acquisition and skill acquisition. Knowledge acquisition is typically provided through a series of courses of study, many of which also meet state certification requirements. Skill acquisition, also meeting certification standards, is typically provided in clinical field experiences and on-campus simulations.

It is not argued here that the acquisition of such knowledge and skill is either unnecessary or unimportant. Indeed, they are the heart of preparation in educational administration. But in the light of the epistemological analysis of Ryle and others like Martin and Broudy, we are enabled to see how propositional knowledge is logically distinguishable from skill and how, in turn, although they are not necessarily related, the relationship between them may need to be developed if "performance" is to be informed by "knowledge" and vice versa.

Tempting as it might be to assume that if administrative trainees know something, then they will do it, that doesn't necessarily prove to be the case. Knowing-that and knowing-how are different epistemological types. Knowing-that organizational theory suggests certain organizational behaviors is no guarantee that such behaviors will then follow in practice. Knowing that situation X suggests behavior A and situation Y suggest behavior B is epistemologically different from actual performance in the two situations. That is why educational administration programs combine the acquisition of theory and skill in classrooms and field experiences.

While classrooms are adequate for the learning of theory and the initial learning of skill, there is no substitute for the field site for the application of the theory and skill previously learned in isolation from actual practice. So viewed, the field site becomes an important element in the training program for developing the interrelation between theory and skill. Here, in this estimate, an important question is raised. Is there adequate time and opportunity for reflection about the relationship between theory and skill? Are there adequate instruments (e.g. seminars, field practica, mentorships) to develop these relationships and provide explanations of how theory and skill inform one another? I think that Alfred North Whitehead (1974) captured the importance of this interrelationship in the following remark:

What the faculty have to cultivate is activity in the

presence of knowledge. What the students have to learn is activity in the presence of knowledge.

This discussion rejects the doctrine that students should first learn passively, and then, having learned, should apply knowledge. It is a psychological error. In the process of learning there should be present, in some sense or other, a subordinate activity of application. In fact the applications are part of the knowledge. For the very meaning of the things known is wrapped up in their relationships beyond themselves. This unapplied knowledge is knowledge shorn of its meaning. (pp. 218-219)

Knowing-why

The contention here is that the interrelationships between knowing-that (e.g. knowing how to use budgeting systems or knowing how to relate to a variety of publics) is a complex epistemological activity. It requires not only a knowledge of facts and a knowledge of skills, but also a rationale for explaining why some pieces of knowledge and some particular skills apply to the situation at hand. It will be referred to as knowing-why and should be the objective of preparation programs in educational administration.

Martin and Broudy both have suggested that a category of knowing-why appears to be possible. But neither worked it out or analyzed it thoroughly. Martin saw it as one among many distinctive types beyond knowing-that and knowing-how. Broudy (1961) felt that "in most subject matters there is some kind of reasoning by which it is argued that one way of looking at experience is more sensible or more logical or more trustworthy than another" (p.77). In this view this kind of reasoning to provide explanations may be termed knowing-why. And he comments on the relationship among three knowledge types.

Actually, all three are involved with each other, because the terms used in stating facts and theories are concepts and these, in turn, affect what we perceive the facts to be. (p. 77)

For educational administration, the three epistemological categories suggest how the relationship between theory and practice is best construed as one of reciprocity instead of a dilemma. Theory can inform practice (knowing-that). Practice (knowing-how) can inform theory. The relationship between them can be determined by the sufficiency of reasoning each brings to the other (knowing-why).

Broudy's suggestion that knowing-why is explanatory knowledge is useful in this analysis. Knowing-that is an appropriate way to view knowledge acquisition in educational administration. Knowing-how is an appropriate way to view skill acquisition in the field. What is entailed epistemologically in the application of such knowledge and skill? It seems reasonable to argue that if knowledge and skill are successfully combined in some activity, then one will be able to explain why and how they were successful and even under what conditions they should be repeated.

Further, this line of reasoning suggests why practical experience at a field site needs to be clinically analyzed. In this regard, state certification requirements for field experience are typically not sufficient when they are stated in quantitative terms (e.g. 150 hours of on-site experience). What is learned will be dependant on the quality of knowledge and skill derived from experience not just the quantity of time spent in the activity. The point of a clinically oriented seminar related to field experience is to promote reflection on the relationships between knowing-that and knowing-how by diagnosing problems encountered in practice, evaluating the success of action taken and then developing alternative strategies for like and unlike circumstances. Such

reflection promotes the development of knowing why, and will hopefully promote a tendency for administrators to engage in "relationship seeking behavior" throughout their careers.

A Postscript

It seems to me that, although he used different terms, much of John Dewey's (1916) educational philosophy points in the same direction. For Dewey there was clear intent that one develop what he called "executive skills" or the ability to take what one knew (knowing-that) and apply it to the problem at hand (knowing-how) and be able to analyze how successfully what one intended had been accomplished (knowing-why). Intentions for Dewey, if they were to be anything more than dreams, required that one develop clear "ends-in-view." The educational administrator as educational leader thus needs to have a vision of what a good education is and what steps are required to approach it. Most importantly, educational administrators need to have a rationale for their vision.

References

Ayers, A.J. (1956). *The problem of knowledge*. Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books.

Broudy, H.S. (1961). *Mastery in language and concepts in education*. (Ed.) Smith and Ennis. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and education*. New York: The Macmillan Co.

Hartland-Swann, J. (1956). "The logical status of knowing that." *Analysis*.

Randall, J.H. Jr. (1960). *Aristotle*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Martin, J.R. (1961). "On the reduction of knowing that to knowing how." In Smith and Ennis (Eds.) *Language and concepts in education*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Soltis, J.F., and Phillips (1985). *Perspectives on learning*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Soltis, J.F. (1978). *An introduction to the analysis of educational concepts* (2nd ed.). Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.

The Report of the National Commission on Excellence in Educational Administration (1987). *Leaders for America's Schools*. The University Council for Educational Administration.

Whitehead, A.N. (1974). *Essays in science and philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc.

Wisdom, J. (1957). *Philosophy and psychoanalysis*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

The issue of competition and athletics must be analyzed more closely by looking at ends and new models of sport

Distinguishing Conflict and Competition: A Model for Understanding Some Teaching Interactions in Athletics

Richard J. Nastasi

The receiving of athletic instruction, by its interaction processes, runs the gamut of positive and negative experience. How teachers, coaches, and administrators convey concepts to their constituencies will strongly effect the process and the product of athletic participation.

We are all competitive by nature. This statement invokes joy in some and fear in others. The basis for these beliefs are centered in the popular meaning that we give to the word "competition". Does this popular meaning coincide with the word's etymological derivation? In this paper the author would like to restate the derivative base of competition, offer an alternative group of words to perhaps replace the popular meaning of competition, and finally to offer a model to attempt a separation of two sporting concepts: competition and conflict. First, however, the author would like to describe several views of the term "competition".

Opinions of competition in sport have various definitions that satisfy a multitude of constituencies. Simon (1985) agrees with Delattre's (1975) assessment of competition as "a mutual quest for excellence through challenge." Martens (1978) views competition as a "social process whereby individuals or groups compare themselves with others using the same agreed upon criteria for evaluation." Therefore, Martens concludes, "competition is neither good or bad." Philosopher Nicholas Spykman (1966) relates Georg Simmel's view distinguishing competition from

Richard Nastasi is director of the Center for Ethics in Sports at Ballarat University College in Victoria, Australia.

other forms of conflict. Simmel said that as "one gets rid of an adversary or damages him directly, one does not compete with them." In other words, to destroy your opponent is to eliminate the parallel paths that must be taken in order for competition to exist. Taking this tack a step further, Dewitt Parker (1931), in his essay on the value of play, affirms Shiller's contention that in play (meaning sport) "I should regard my opponents as my friends, as I do during the game, knowing there would be no zest to the game of life without them."

Even in the business world, there is a movement called the "new competition" (Best, 1990) in which corporations pool their resources in one or two areas so they might achieve victory (i.e. higher profits). As a result of this enterprise there are degrees of winning (and losing) but aspects of cooperation have been interwoven into the competitive process.

It is with the concept of competitor as friend that the author cites the writings of Kretchmar (1975) and Hyland (1978) who see competition in its original Latin derivation *competre* as the coming together of two constituencies to respectively, "bear witness together" and "question together." Both Kretchmar and Hyland's excellent discussions of the derivative meanings of competition yield an important question. If competition creates a positive synthesis between parties, why do some competitors still engage in anti-social behaviors before, during and after the contest on a regular basis?

It is the author's contention that competition is, by definition, inherently good. The true concern should be centered on the term "conflict". For the purpose of this paper the working term for conflict shall be "conflict based athletic interaction." The term conflict as applied in this paper should not be confused with the concept and application of "conflict theory" to sport. (Eitzen, 1987)

For many years most athletic coaches, players, parents, fans, as well as the general public accepted the term "competition" to mean a conflict involving two sides resulting in a winner and a loser. As Hyland and Kretchmar point out, the word "competition" has no derivative association to the word "conflict". The word "conflict" derives from the Latin term *confligere*, which means to strike together. It might seem that the negative onslaught associated with the term "competition" is really a cry against conflict based athletic interaction. Alfie Kohn (1988) suggests that

"... we sometimes assume that the working toward a goal and setting standards for oneself can take place only if we compete against each other. This is simply false. One can both accomplish a task and measure one's progress in the absence of competition."

While the author would agree with Kohn's assessment of the popular interpretation of competition, I would prefer to replace "competition" in his statement with the term "conflict based athletic interaction". Competition has its roots in the act of working with others to achieve ones goals. According to Kohn, cooperation is based on collective performance. Is it not true that the most aesthetically pleasing competitions are the ones where great synthesis occurs and the product that is born is "high sport." A 59-0 drubbing as well as one student forgetting their part in a school play reflect a failure of synthesis. The result is a lack of competitive satisfaction and the contest (or production) is not totally complete. Participants in sport who revel in the rout are displaying conflict based athletic interaction. This is the mind set that the author believes to be "inherently undesirable" and that healthy conflict based athletic interaction is actually a contradiction in terms.

To illustrate the contentions presented in this paper,

the author will put forth a model that will attempt to reveal the dichotomous relationship between coaching and teaching in the competitive mode and the conflict based athletic interactive mode (see figure 1). In the following sections, the author will attempt to explain the progression of the model as well as its cyclical nature.

Competition Based Athletic Interaction

The competition component of the model forms its pattern in the belief that a benevolent feeling toward all participants in an athletic contest can be achieved even when the objective is one side's higher athletic achievement for that particular contest.

To begin with, teachers/coaches must introduce three basic concepts to the long and short range strategies of the participants (including the team, parents and supporters) involved in the contest. First, it should be emphasized that the sporting event is taking place because both constituencies have something (namely their athletic prowess) to share. If the opposition had chosen not to show up for the contest, the result would be less satisfying.

The second issue that the competitive component addresses is the realization that everyone is responsible for the good conduct of the event. In order for a sporting event to be in the competitive mode all of the athletic constituencies must be aware of the synthesis of the event. Thus, the fans as well as the parents, coaches, and players need to be sensitive to the concept of an honorable contest. The reader can look to Lowe's (1977) writing on symbolic communication to see how the concept of athletic honor permeates ancient Greek sport.

"Hercules cannot win glory through his strength without deference to a code of honor. . . (Honorable acts) are not merely unbridled expressions of force . . . (this type of force) in Homer's time was differentiated as violence and denigrated as an asocial or immoral act."

Finally, the competitive contest must be athletically intrinsic to all concerned. Participants must derive pleasure via the decency of the event. There cannot be satisfaction in a concept such as revenge since the participants would be sacrificing their locus of control and putting in place a hatred of the opposition that can never be truly satisfied. This overt and covert hatred might be the true villain of athletics as they are used (and abused) today.

What will this orientation to the concept of compete yield in the actual contest situation? It is hoped that two things will emerge. One, a unification in the competitive act will take place. Pepitone (1980) states that "By virtue of their required interaction, competitors have . . . control over each other, [and] are also more dependent on each other." A resultant synthesis will then take place. This does not mean that there will be a "love-in" after every basket, but it does suggest that respect will be at a high level and incidents that tend to compromise respect (such as, but not limited to, gratuitous violence, cheating and fan disorder) will diminish.

The second result would be to put the contestant into a positive mode for Festinger's (1954) concept of social comparison. The contestant might be better able to determine the relative progress of the opponent without some of the extrinsic baggage that is attached. Baron and Byrne (1981), in discussing social comparison, corroborate Festinger by pointing out that ". . . competition might stem from a source we might not first expect: our desire to gain fuller and more valid knowledge of ourselves."


When the athletic contest is over, what benefit will the competition based athletic interaction yield? First and foremost, it will provide a mind set for all participants to feel respect for the opposition. This feeling should be pervasive in defeat as well as victory. Secondly, by focusing on the game

itself and not on extraneous variables (such as hating your opponent), contestants can concentrate on improving their athletic skills for subsequent encounters. These realizations will improve post game evaluations and make a natural and positive cyclical transition to the top of the model. Players, coaches, parents, and fans will have little need or concern for non-related attributes such as fan degradation and player taunting.

Model for Conflict / Competition in Coaching and Teaching Athletics and Physical Education (Applicable to Teachers, Coaches, and Parents)

(Third Draft)

(Nastasi, 1991)



Conflict Based Athletic Interaction

Many coaches look at the preparation, participation, and evaluation of a game as a battle situation, with the opposition being an entity that must be destroyed. Slogans such as "when they are drowning, throw them an anchor" demonstrate the breaking away of true competitive ideals.

A major sign of Conflict Based Athletic Interaction is a war mentality. With this type of orientation several issues will arise. Firstly, the combatants are fighting for something that the opposition possesses. This can be a material item like an annual trophy or a concept such as "bragging rights." Many coaches ascribe to this concept, motivating athletes (as well as parents and fans) to strive for these external rewards promising the glory of extrinsic acquisition rather than the satisfaction of simply a job well done.

Conflict Based Athletic Interaction also promotes "subject pugnacity" (Simmel, 1950). When coaches tell their charges to go out and kill the opposition, and players remind themselves to "win by as many points as possible" (Snyder, 1972) we can see a hatred and callousness that is disturbing. The constituencies of the game are taught that sport is ruled by *homo homini lupus*, that man is wolf to man.

The fourth process that could be manifested in the Conflict Based Athletic Interaction is that victory might be taken away from a contending team because of outside in-

fluences. The bad calls of a referee, cheating by the opponent, or the unsuitable conditions of the playing field, might be the consistent ways for a conflict based coach, fan, or player to explain defeat. If there is no respect for the opposition, how can a team justify losing based on athletic merits? When you see a message on a locker room wall proclaiming, "If you did your best, you won" (Snyder, 1972) there is not much room for the opponent's input into the equation.

What differences will the conflict side of the model yield during the game situation? There will be turmoil and confusion among the constituencies. The author believes, in contrast to Simmel, that people would lean to the competitive rather than the conflict side of the model. As a result of this persuasion, competitors might react aggressively not solely because they were told to, but because they are manifesting their own frustrations by having to play the part of the wolf.

No matter what orientation one ascribes to, the element of hatred perpetuated by the conflict based model and propagated against the opposition will produce negative social comparison. Win or lose, this is not a healthy result for any of the constituencies of the contest.

After the game, the people in the conflict based side of the model would seek athletic revenge and might engage in taunting and name calling. The mistrust that participants would feel would render the shaking of hands after the match relatively meaningless. In this mode, the natural next step will be to return to the beginning of the conflict cycle and prepare for the "enemy" again. It must be emphasized again that this interaction is not only a player/coach model. Athletic conflict is also prevalent among parents, fans and spectators.

Discussion

The conflict mode of athletic interaction can be seen in the sport world on a consistent basis.

Some violence in sporting crowds can be traced to the frustration that conflict based athletic interaction yields. Research involving critical incidents as determinants in crowd violence have been well documented. (Cheffers, 1988; Cheffers, Hawkins, Rhodes, and Prosser, 1990; and Goodman, 1989) Verbal and non-verbal violence are heightened when the sport is relegated to conflict interaction.

When the Cincinnati Reds defeated the Boston Red Sox in game six of the 1975 world series the Boston police had little trouble after the game. As one Red Sox fan said "We were in a state of shock, but it was more than that. Nobody lost the game. The Reds just won it more." This was not the case when the Detroit Pistons won their first National Basketball Association championship in 1989. The "celebration" after the game had turned into violent assault on the city of Detroit. Eight people were killed, 26 were treated for gun shop wounds and 99 were treated for maladies ranging from knife wounds to baseball bat bruises. William Oscar Johnson (1991) of Sports Illustrated called the proceedings "sports-associated mayhem" and "utterly pointless." The chief investigator for the Wayne County Medical Examiner's Office tried to play down the effect of the game on the violence by saying "Death is an ambiguous thing. Who can say those people wouldn't have died anyway? When your time is up, your time is up." This is a difficult assessment to accept. It is the author's belief that the adversarial hype that surrounded the Pistons (being heralded as "the nasty boys") had something to do with the reaction of the several hundred people in Detroit and its suburbs that night. Detroit mayor Coleman Young cited the media as being partially responsible for the hype involving the Pistons' reputation and therefore contributing to the atmosphere of the post-game events.

During the 1990 World Cup in Italy, the London Daily Star employed the self proclaimed "greatest hooligan in the world" as a soccer correspondent. This person had to sneak into Italy since his passport had been revoked "because of his 40 convictions for soccer fan violence." (Telander, 1990). One of his reports told of his plans to meet the Dutch team and supporters and "give them a right good kicking." Thankfully, he was arrested and deported soon after his literary career had started.

These examples of fan related conflict based athletic interaction show the war mentality and the subject pugnacity that are inherent with this type of orientation. The Red Sox fan who spoke of Cincinnati winning the game "more" touched upon one of the aspects of the competition side of the model. There was unification in the competitive act.

There were examples of conflict and competition interaction involving players and coaches which clearly illustrate the dynamics of both sides of the model. Magic Johnson and Isaiah Thomas embracing before the start of the National Basketball Championships in 1989 was a testament to the respect the two players shared for each other. There was no sacrifice in their desire to win the title, yet there was a synthesis which produced a competitive honor between them. When Jack Parker, head coach of Boston University's hockey team told his team that he was proud of their effort and desire in their heartbreaking 8-7 overtime loss to Northern Michigan in the 1991 collegiate finals, he was a competitive coach. He left the door open for improvement, but saluted the valiant effort. According to the model presented in this paper, these players probably will have a greater chance of putting their season in proper perspective and move on to the next challenge relatively unscathed.

In conclusion, the role of true competition in society is to maintain the moral initiative for athletic constituencies to strive for excellence. The critics of "competition" have given compelling testimony to the evils of an association which can best be described as "conflicted based athletic interaction."

Competition as a moral ideal has emanated from our Greek and Roman predecessors. It should be recognized as an important component of a person's life. What a pity it would be to compare the competitor Hercules with the hooligan who mocks sport and its rich traditions.

References

- Baron, Robert A. and Byrne, Donn (1981), *Social Psychology* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon) p. 377.
- Best, Michael H. (1990). *The New Competition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press)
- Cheffers, John T.F. (1988) "A Patriotic Sunday: A Study of the Spectators at Foxboro Stadium." Unpublished paper presented at Boston University.
- Cheffers, John T.F., Kenneth Hawkins, Brad Rhodes and Laurie Prosser (1990) "Change Without Threat or Compulsion." Unpublished paper presented at AIESEP World Convention, Atlanta, Georgia.
- Delattre, Edwin (1975) "Some Reflections of success and Failure in Competitive Athletics." *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, v. 2, pp. 133-139.
- Festinger, Leon (1954) "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes." *Human Relations* v. 7, pp. 117-140.
- Goodman, Sylvia (1989) "An Analysis of Behavior and Emotional Involvement of Spectators During Professional Hockey Games." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Boston University.
- Hyland, Drew (1978) "Competition and Friendship." *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, v. 5, pp. 27-37.
- Johnson, William Oscar (1991) "Nothing to Celebrate." *Sports Illustrated*, June 25, p. 35.

Kohn, Alfie (1986) *No Contest: The Case Against Competition*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Kretchmar, R. Scott (1975) "From Test to Contest: An Analysis of Two Kinds of Counterpoint in Sport." *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, v. 2, pp. 23-30.

Leonard, William M. (1988) *Social Perspectives of Sport*. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company. pp. 61-65.

Lowe, Benjamin (1977) *The Beauty of Sport: A Cross Disciplinary Inquiry*. Englewood Cliffs: Printice Hall. p. 201.

Martens, Rainer (1978) *Joy and Sadness in Children's Sport*. Champaign, Ill.: Human Kinetics Publishers.

Parker, Dewitt (1931) *Human Values: an Interpretation of Ethics Bases on the Study of Values*. New York: Harper and Brother. pp. 315-316.

Pepitone, Emily A. (1980) *Children in Cooperation and Competition*. Lexington, Ma.: Lexington Books. pp. 74-75.

Simmel, Georg (1950) *Conflict*. (Translated by K.H. Wolff) New York: The Free Press.

Simmel, Georg (1950) *The Web of Group Affiliations*. (Translated by R. Bendix) New York: The Free Press.

Snyder, Eldon (1972) "Athletic Dressing Room Slogans as Folklore: A Means of Socialization." *International Review of Sport Sociology*. v. 7, pp. 89-102.

Spykman, Nicholas (1966) *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*. New York: Atherton Press.

Telander, Rick (1991) "A Nightmare in Florence." *Sports Illustrated*. June 18, p. 40.

The interplay of school district culture, decision making procedures, leadership behaviors, and staff development are key to effective school districts and effective schools.

Effective School Districts: Some Key Components

Charles F. Webber and Kathy G. Skau

Introduction

Educators seeking to better understand schools have noted that the quality of what happens in schools is determined to a large extent by the effectiveness of the school district (Leithwood, 1989; Rosenholz, 1989). In fact, there appear to be strong similarities between the characteristics of effective schools and the features of effective school districts (Murphy and Hallinger, 1990). They include attention being given to curriculum and instruction, strong instructional leadership, high levels of student achievement, and strong ties between policy and practice at all levels of the organization. The latter is referred to as "coherence" by Leithwood (1990, p. 74) and "tight linkages" by Coleman and LaRoque (1990, p. 26).

The Culture

The blueprint for instructional improvement, leadership attention, and policy making lies in the stated mission of the school district. That mission should focus on teaching and student learning, be the standard by which virtually all educational decisions are judged, lead to a feeling of unity, and be agreed upon by staff, parents, and the general community (Coleman and LaRoque, 1990; Isherwood and McConaghy, 1991; Taylor and Levin, 1991).

Despite assertions that the role of school board members in creating schools is vague and unclear (Danzberger, Carol, Cunningham, Kirst, McCloud and Usdan, 1987), it is more generally accepted that school board members do clearly influence school district culture. That role can be destructive if, as has happened, teachers are perceived by school board members as primarily concerned with getting more pay for less work (R.G. Townsend, 1990). Certainly trustees are advised to show trust and respect for their teaching staff if they expect a positive staff morale to develop and sincere application of district policy to occur (D. Townsend, 1987). Exactly how school board members are able to exhibit that trust and respect will vary somewhat from one community to another, but it is vital that school boards attempt to agree upon the importance of that task if

Charles F. Webber and Kathy G. Skau are on the faculty of the department of teacher education and supervision, at the University of Calgary in Calgary, Alberta.

they wish to promote positive schooling (McGonagill, 1987). School board members should also maintain public support by being responsive to community concerns and attempting to represent all segments of their society (Danzberger, et. al., 1987).

School boards are themselves significantly influenced by their districts' chief executive officers. Isherwood and McConaghy (1991) found that school superintendents generally see themselves as being responsible for facilitating the development of a district vision of education and for leading the system from where it is to where it wants to go. Earl and West (1991) go further to say that system administrators have a responsibility to strive to be truly inspirational in their district's journey from what is to what can be. On another level, it has been suggested that school superintendents be held responsible for achieving stakeholder agreement on a long-range strategy for attaining system-wide improvement goals. In this way they can minimize recent public perceptions that "district offices are out of control (Seashore Louis, 1989, p. 146) and not doing enough to cut district wide administrative costs despite declining enrollments in some districts and rising educational expenditures in most districts.

A positive school district culture is of great importance to teachers. It is a critical factor in how well they implement innovations and how effective they are (Fullan, 1982). In fact, unless there are good relationships among the teaching staff, optimal student achievement is unlikely to occur (Rosenholz, 1985). Those staff relationships should be free from threat and should include the perception that opportunities for career advancement are equitable for all, including women and minorities (Wyatt, 1991).

Therefore, it can be said that effective school districts are characterized by shared values and purpose, support, trust, collegiality, open communication, high morale, innovation, and flexibility. When this environment exists, it is possible for innovation and enthusiasm to exist among teachers of all types (Fullan, 1982; Hopfengardner and Leahy, 1988; Thompson and Cooley, 1986), contrary to the suggestion that teachers tend to "peak out" (McLaughlin and Marsh, 1979, p. 84) after five to seven years of classroom teaching.

Deciding Together

Collaborative decision making is a main feature of effective school districts. Its benefits include increased ownership for change, "safer" participation by teachers, and increased efficiency (Brown, 1990; Burkett and Bowers, 1991; Coleman and LaRoque, 1990; Fullan, 1982).

These benefits are best realized when key participants in a school district understand the direct impact of their actions on what happens in individual schools (Danzberger, et. al., 1987; D. Townsend, 1987). For example, school board members and district administrators are well advised to develop a working understanding of how the making of policy and administration are both separate and, in some ways, overlapping (McGonagill, 1987).

The role of district administrators is also critical in effective decision making. It involves achieving the delicate balance between tightly linking district policy with action in schools (Coleman and LaRoque, 1990) and allowing school-based staff the freedom to modify district policy to fit the local school community (Isherwood and McConaghy, 1991; Loucks-Horsley, 1990; Seashore Louis, 1989). It includes knowing how to delegate authority, what expectations to have for staff members, how to trust, when to provide appropriate pressure and support (Earl and West, 1991), and when to involve others in goal setting (Rosenholz, 1989).

Another key decision making role is filled by classroom teachers, who should be involved in school district planning and goal-setting processes (Musella, 1989). If they are ignored "they have the potential to subvert the best intentions of any new policy" (D. Townsend, 1987, p. 4).

There are additional characteristics of decision making in effective school districts. School administrators have the option of participating in inservice sessions that help them develop long-range planning skills (Seashore Louis, 1989). Decisions are based on appropriate information, improvement plans are designed so that important implementation details are not excluded, time-lines are neither too short or too long, and teachers are not overloaded (Fullan, 1982; Levine, 1991).

Leadership

Conspicuously absent in the literature on the superintendency in effective school districts is a great deal of attention to the mechanical tasks inherent in the role: budgeting, scheduling, developing agendas, and report writing. Instead, the powerful leadership function of superintendents in promoting district effectiveness is highlighted. Outstanding superintendents are described as inspirational, able to inspire "belief, faith, and idealism" (Murphy, 1991, p. 509). Their jobs are seen as multifaceted (Danzberger, et. al., 1987) and they are viewed as exhibiting the high quality leadership they expected of principals (Rosenholz, 1989).

Effective superintendents champion the people with whom they work. They hold high expectations for their staffs, support them appropriately, promote the school leadership roles of school principals, expand the district leadership team, are persistent in striving for their vision of excellence, clearly articulate the relationships between new initiatives and the mission of the district, and ensure coherence between organizational goals and individual teacher goals (Earl and West, 1991; Leithwood, 1989; Taylor and Levine, 1991). They are consistently visible in schools, listen well, seek to create a district environment free from threat, and regularly communicate with stakeholder groups (Coleman and LaRoque, 1990). Effective district administrators also foster collaboration and shared responsibility for growth among teachers and school-based administrators (Isherwood and McConaghy, 1991).

Finally, superintendent support for people in excellent school districts is accompanied by the judicious use of power. They monitor district activities and are ready to intercede when things are not going well (Isherwood and McConaghy, 1991; Murphy, 1991). Levine (1991, p. 392) has termed this careful balance of collaboration and control as "directed autonomy."

Staff Development

A salient feature of effective school districts is a continuous staff development program teachers, administrators, and support staff (Fullan, 1982). Staff development initiatives are planned collaboratively, focus on school-based improvement goals, and are long-term (Coleman and LaRoque, 1990; D. Townsend, 1987). Moreover, staff development is promoted more than formal staff supervision and evaluation (Isherwood and McConaghy, 1991). Successful staff development in school districts that make a difference for students focus on instructional improvement issues, but are careful to avoid getting mired in overly elaborate training efforts before smaller-scale successes have been achieved (Levine, 1991).

Staff development in effective school districts is supported in several ways. First, school staffs are provided with substantial time during the school day for participation in

staff development activities (Levine, 1991). District administrators support staff development by allowing for maximum teacher control at the school level (Rosenholz, 1989). Improvement efforts are supported when materials, methods, and strategies that have worked elsewhere are sought, considered, and creatively modified by planners (Levine, 1991). District and school administrators signal strong support for staff development programs by participating in them, planning for time at administrators' meetings and staff meetings for discussion of improvement thrusts, and using district monies to pay for materials and resource personnel (Coleman and LaRoque, 1990; Fullan, 1982; D. Townsend, 1987). In addition, school support should be considered equitable in the eyes of most district personnel (Isherwood and McConaghy, 1991).

Efforts to improve the system-wide quality of instruction are most fruitful when priorities are set and only a few new programs are introduced at once (Seashore Louis, 1989). That way efforts can be focused and overload avoided. Further, effective districts give teachers and principals sufficient time to develop new skills and acquire appropriate knowledge (Coleman and LaRoque, 1990).

Administrators and teachers in effective school districts are aware that staff development endeavors aimed at improving instruction need to include observation, practice, and feedback, plus significant coaching support once teachers return to their home classrooms and incorporating new skills into their regular teaching repertoire (Joyce and Showers, 1980, 1981, 1982). Similarly, school improvement drives that focus on improved school-level decision making, staff relations, or curriculum planning will likely require significant technical assistance from outside change agents (Levine, 1991), particularly in their early stages.

Finally, the leadership role of the school principal in staff development is recognized and supported in effective school districts. Principals clearly understand district-wide expectations and they are supported by their district as they try to reach them (Coleman and LaRoque, 1990). They have access to appropriate inservice activities that will help them better understand the change processes that their staffs undergo as they consistently try to improve instruction.

Conclusion

Clearly, there are important guidelines for school board members, administrators, and teachers in the literature on effective school districts. Close attention should be paid to the interplay of school district culture, decision making procedures, leadership behaviors, and staff development activities. This will increase the probability that curriculum and instruction will become a district priority, that formal and informal instructional leadership will be exhibited at all levels of the organization, that classroom practice will be closer to the intent of policy, and, significantly, that student learning will increase.

The challenge for educational leaders is to make it happen in their organization. To quote Warren Bennis (1989, p. 146): You can't learn it by (only) reading up on it, you've got to do it. the only real laboratory is the laboratory of leadership itself."

References

- Bennis, W. (1989). *On becoming a leader*. Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.
- Brown, D.J. (1990). Does decentralization enhance both efficiency and equality? *The Canadian School Executive*, 10(1), pp. 22-23.

Burkett, C.W. and Bowers, J.H. (1991, April). *The principal's role in changing the school*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of The Organization of Professors of Elementary School Administration, Anaheim, CA.

Coleman, P. and LaRoque, L. (1990). Generating commitment: Administrative practices, district ethos, and district quality. *The Canadian School Executive*, 10(6), pp. 25-27.

Danzberger, J.P., Carol, L.N., Cunningham, L.L., Kirst, M.W., McCloud, B.A. and Usdan, M.D. (1987) School boards: The forgotten players on the education team. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 69, pp. 3-8.

Earl L. and West, J. (1991). School improvement: A system partners approach. *The Canadian School Executive*, 10(7) pp. 3-8.

Fullan, Michael. (1982) *The meaning of educational change*. Toronto: OISE Press.

Hopfgardner, J.D. and Leahy, P.E. (1988). Providing collegial support for experienced teachers. *Journal of Staff Development*, 9(2), pp. 48-51.

Isherwood, G.B. and McConaghy, G. (1991). The CEO's role in educational development. *The Canadian School Executive*, 10(10) pp. 30-31.

Joyce B. and Showers B. (1980). Improving inservice training: The messages of research. *Educational Leadership* 37(5), pp. 379-385.

Joyce, B. and Showers, B. (1981). Transfer of training: The contribution of 'coaching'. *Journal of Education*, 63(2) pp. 163-172.

Lam, J.Y.L. (Ed.). (1990). *Canadian public education system: Issues and prospects*. Calgary: Detselig Enterprises Limited.

Leithwood, K.A. (1989). School system policies for effective school administration. In M. Holmes, K.A. Leithwood and D.F. Musella (Eds.), *Educational policy for effective schools* (pp. 73-92). Toronto: OISE Press.

Levine, D.U. (1991). Creating effective schools: findings and implications from research and practice. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 72, pp. 389-393.

Loucks-Horsley, S. (1990, September). What we know

about change in schools: an interview with Susan Loucks-Horsley. *The Developer*, pp. 3-6.

McGonagill, G. (1987). Board/staff partnership: The key to the effectiveness of state and local boards. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 69, pp. 65-68.

McLaughlin, M.W. and Marsh, D.D. (1979). Staff development and school change. In A. Lieberman and L. Miller (Eds.), *Staff development: New demands, new realities, perspectives* (pp. 69-94). Teachers' College, New York: Columbia University.

Murphy, J.T. (1991). Superintendents as saviors: From the terminator to pogo. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 72, pp. 507-513.

Murphy, J. and Hallinger, P. (1990, winter). Characteristics of instructionally effective school districts. *The Quarterly Journal of the Network for Outcome-Based Schools*.

Musella, D.F. (1989). Problems in public implementation. In M. Holmes, K.A. Leithwood and D.F. Musella (Eds.), *Educational policy for effective schools* (pp. 93-111).

Rosenholz, S. (1985). Effective schools: Interpreting the evidence. *American Journal of Education*, 93, pp. 352-388.

Rosenholz, S. (1989). *Teacher's workplace*. New York: Longman.

Seashore Louis, K. (1989) The role of the school district in school improvement. In M. Holmes, K.A. Leithwood, and D.F. Musella (Eds.), *Educational policy for effective schools* (pp. 145-167.). Toronto: OISE Press.

Taylor, B.O. and Levine, C.U. (1991). Effective schools projects and school-based management. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 72, pp. 394-397.

Thompson, J.C. Jr. and Cooley, V.E. (1986, Winter). A national study of outstanding staff development programs. *Educational Horizons*, pp. 94-98.

Townsend, D. (1987). *Teacher supervision and evaluation policies in selected Alberta school jurisdictions 1983-1987*. Edmonton: Alberta Education.

Wyatt, J. (1990). Women in management: Opportunities, constraints and recent initiatives. *Challenge in Educational Administration*, 27(2), pp. 16-19.

Goodlad, John I. *Teachers for Our Nation's Schools*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990).

John Goodlad's most recent book, *Teachers for our Nation's Schools* has received extensive pre-publication and post-publication coverage. Therefore, rather than provide another general review of the book, this review examines aspects of Goodlad's book that are related specifically to the preparation of elementary school teachers.

Teachers for Our Nation's Schools: Implications for Elementary Education

David W. VanCleaf

In this book, Goodlad critically examines the quality and effectiveness of our nation's teacher education programs. After briefly describing the historical and social context of teacher education programs, he describes 19 postulates necessary for the preparation of effective teachers. Much of the remaining portion of the text contains anecdotal information and conclusions emerging from his study of 29 of our nation's teacher preparation programs.

The 19 postulates, subdivided into four groups, are essential presuppositions "providing direction without confining the options" (p. 303). The first group focuses on the need for teacher education programs that enjoy a secure, semiautonomous existence within its higher education institution. The second set, which consists of a single postulate, asserts that teacher preparation programs should be "centers of pedagogy" with their own authority, budget, faculty, curriculum, and means for student recruitment and selection. The third set of postulates describe essential program standards and outcome statements for teacher preparation programs. The fourth group of postulates outline the role of the states in governing teacher preparation programs.

David VanCleaf is professor of education at Washburn University of Topeka.

Book Review

Goodlad's primary conclusion is that we are not preparing the type of teachers that are capable of making needed improvements in our nation's elementary and secondary schools. Goodlad uses two analogies to illustrate this conclusion. First, our educational system is compared to a train that is derailed. Before improving the performance of the train, workers must get the train on the correct track. Similarly, he suggests that our educational system is derailed, but adds that our teacher education programs are not preparing individuals with the abilities needed to improve the quality of the educational system.

The second analogy compares the preparation of teachers today with the process of preparing physicians early in the 20th century. The typical practice of preparing physicians was proprietary apprenticeship processes in which prospective physicians, who were often near-illiterate, attended proprietary schools and worked with mentor physicians who had been trained in a similar manner. Apprentice physicians seldom had access to cadavers, learned primarily through didactic instruction, and had limited induction into the full care and treatment of patients (Flexner, 1910). To improve teacher preparation, preservice teachers must be literate, they must be engaged in a well articulated program of general education courses, they must be trained by professionals who model expected behaviors and methods, and they must be provided numerous opportunities to interact with students and professional educators within the full context of the school setting.

Goodlad identified several key problems that have a direct impact on the preparation of effective elementary teachers. An understanding of these problems is a necessary prerequisite to improving our nation's elementary schools.

Many of the current problems emerge from the structure and level of support institutions of higher education provide for their teacher preparation programs. For example, the quality of teacher preparation programs is affected by the prevailing reward structure in most institutions of higher education. Although faculty are supposed to be evaluated in the areas of teaching, research, and service, the primary emphasis has shifted to research. Faculty members working for tenure and faculty members striving for merit pay increases often spend more time and effort pursuing research activities than improving their teaching. Since teaching is not rewarded as readily as research, prospective teachers often do not receive the quality of teaching necessary for their preparation.

The university pecking order places faculty dealing with academic ideas and preparing high paid professionals on a higher level than faculty members preparing teachers. As a result, teacher education faculty members and their departments receive relatively low status within the higher education setting. This usually contributes to lower levels of monetary support for teacher education programs.

Goodlad also criticized the curriculum requirements for preservice teachers. The preservice preparation programs have poorly conceived curricula that fail to provide their students with the academic background necessary to understand the role of education in a democratic society. As a result, they are sending newly certified teachers into schools who will conform to existing practices. The poorly designed curriculum also fails to prepare the preservice teacher to function as a change agent. The new teacher can teach well in a traditional sense, but is not prepared to assist in the improvement process.

Goodlad identified the need to attract more members from minority groups. He stated that preservice teacher preparation programs are competing with other professions

for individuals who are well prepared for the academic challenges of higher education. However, he indicated that we could expand the field of qualified applicants by offering tutorial and remedial programs that would help intelligent yet academically underprepared members of minority groups develop prerequisite abilities.

While we commit relatively few dollars to the education of preservice teachers, Goodlad pointed out that we train too many people who are not committed to becoming practicing teachers. These individuals either do not seek jobs as teachers, or they quickly leave the profession. If one considers how much is spent to educate the proportionately small number of individuals who are committed to teaching, the cost of preparing teachers is excessive. Goodlad suggested recruiting committed individuals, even if they need remedial help, and closing the doors to those who cannot demonstrate a commitment.

Teacher education units on campuses are also contributing to the preparation of less than adequately prepared teachers. Goodlad found that many teacher preparation programs did not provide sufficient experiences for the students in school settings. Students typically learned about teaching in the college classrooms and did not have opportunities to apply the newly learned ideas in elementary classrooms. Student teaching was often the first significant contact preservice teachers had with children.

Perhaps the most troubling problem is the practice of placing student teachers with unqualified cooperating teachers. Cooperating teachers are seldom selected because they have philosophies and practices that support the teacher preparation program. As a result, student teachers are placed with cooperating teachers who have little understanding of their roles nor the direction needed to ensure optimal student teacher development. Teacher education units must work with local schools and their teachers to develop a cadre of model cooperating teachers.

The student teaching experience and the first year of teaching have been described as period in which the preservice and beginning teachers learn to conform to traditional practice. While the lack of criteria used to select cooperating teachers contributes to this, two other factors also contribute. First, most institutions provide little follow-up support for their graduates. Graduates, once hired, are expected to utilize ideas taught in the college classroom with no support from the teacher preparation program.

Second, preservice teachers need to observe and practice newly learned skills in exemplary school settings, however there is a lack of exemplary programs. One can reasonably ask, How can we train people to become effective teachers if model programs are not available? Again, teacher education units must provide support throughout the induction process.

The negative impact of state regulatory agencies and state legislative bodies also contributes to the poor quality of elementary teacher preparation programs. States have approved emergency and alternative certification programs as a means of circumventing the teacher preparation process. Short-cut programs provide opportunities for individuals to enter the profession who lack knowledge of how to teach, who have little understanding of the challenges of teaching in a democratic society, and who do not know how to work with other professionals to improve schools. Alternative certification options demean the role of the teacher

and minimize the challenges inherent in being an effective teacher.

As you begin reading Goodlad's book, you might consider the characteristics of effective teachers described by Lee Shulman (1987). Shulman stated that effective teachers must have an understanding of the content they teach and they must be able to transform their knowledge of this content in ways that are appropriate for their students. Further, to be effective in the dynamic, complex classroom environment, teachers must make reasoned decisions as they plan, teach, and reflect on the effectiveness of their efforts.

Elementary teachers are unique because they are essentially teachers of the arts and sciences. As such they need an extensive background in the humanities, social sciences, fine arts, and the natural sciences. Effective elementary teachers also need an extensive repertoire of teaching methods that will enable them to communicate their knowledge in ways that are appropriate for their students. And, elementary teachers must continuously reflect on their instructional effectiveness. Goodlad's anecdotal observations indicate that preservice preparation programs do not require students to take a well articulated set of general education courses in the arts and sciences. Further, students are not provided opportunities to communicate their knowledge and apply newly learned practices in elementary classroom settings.

Before elementary teachers can get elementary education on the correct track, they must receive a better preparation. They must have an understanding of the subject matter and they must possess an extensive repertoire of methods for sharing their knowledge to their students. Further, they must understand the nature of the challenges they encounter and critically examine current practices as well as possible solutions.

Goodlad's book presents few new ideas; the problems have been identified by others. However, Goodlad's book has made two important contributions to the current rhetoric about school reform, particularly for the preparation of effective elementary teachers. He reinforces the need for improvements in the teacher education programs and he provides insights missing from other reform-minded publications. It is now up to institutions of higher education to provide the resources necessary to support their teacher education programs. It is the responsibility of preservice teacher education units to examine their programs and improve the quality of the curriculum, the models they provide through their teacher faculty, and the types of professional field experiences necessary for preservice teachers. While Goodlad recommends leaving the specific means of addressing most of these problems to well-qualified faculty and administrators, institutions of higher education are unable to single-handedly improve the quality of teachers. Public schools, state governing bodies, and the public must share in efforts to improve the preparation of teachers.

References

- Flexner, A. (1910). *Medical education in the United States and Canada*. New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Shulman, L. (1987). Knowledge and teaching: Foundations of the new reform. *Harvard Educational Review*, 57, 1-22.

Farber, Barry A. *Crisis in Education: Stress and Burnout in the American Teacher*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991).

What are the reasons that teacher burnout is such a hot topic? Is there anything that can be done about it by administrators and others who are concerned about maintaining a quality teaching force?

Are We In a Burnout Crisis

Donovan Cook

Crisis and education are two terms frequently found together in recent book titles, journal articles, and newsprint. Barry Farber has provided us with a well-researched, comprehensive and very readable book which examines a crisis in an essential element of our educational system: the American teacher. The Japanese do not have a precise word for crisis in their vocabulary, the nearest translation being "perilous opportunity." the Japanese definition seems more fitting in describing this book, as Farber relates an educational system struggling to adjust to more and greater demands. Perhaps the opportunity to meet those demands exists in our current attempts at the restructuring of education, while the peril may lie in our failure to recognize and understand the needs of teachers. It is within this context that Farber apprises us of one of the most insidious afflictions affecting our nation's teachers: burnout.

Although the term has been used often by educators to explain the lack of effectiveness in certain teachers, Farber reveals burnout as a complex, often misunderstood phenomenon, with widespread implications. "Teacher burnout is not an excuse that poor teachers invoke," he says. "It is a work-related disorder to which even the best educators sometimes succumb when faced with the nature and circumstances of teaching . . ." In the book he analyzes the

problem of teacher burnout systematically and holistically, in both a social and historical context over the past three decades. We hear the perspectives of educators, sociologists, and psychologists; we're taken through the periods of teacher strikes, the civil rights movement, the women's movement, in an attempt to understand the problem more fully.

He also describes burnout as it affects the individual, providing numerous vignettes of teachers in their classrooms. We hear of teachers in a variety of situations, meeting their daily challenges and reflecting on them. Through this technique, the causes of burnout becomes apparent; too many students, too much paperwork, too little payback, not enough control of one's circumstances, and increasingly, the threat of violence. Although it is disquieting to read of unfulfilled, disenchanting teachers, this unfortunate trend within the profession is real and becomes tragically apparent through the personal, individual dialogues. It is necessary to understand how teachers feel about their work in order to find solutions to problems and eventually improve the state of education.

Farber recognizes that there are no panaceas in dealing with teacher burnout (" . . . as long as half the students in this country are in the lower half of their class, teachers will continue to be criticized and continue to be vulnerable to stress and burnout"), but he does provide potential solutions in the form of change strategies designed to relieve stress and burnout at both the individual (time management, use of support groups) and school levels (restructuring schools to provide teachers with more autonomy within the system, and opportunities for intrinsic rewards by working with students in more personal ways).

Crisis in Education is an informative book regarding not only the etiology of a disturbing pattern of blame and media distortion leading to disillusionment and low morale of the American teacher, but as a manual which will provide educational leaders with needed tools to understand and deal with the problem. The book is based on empirical data, much of it collected over the last five years in the New York City schools by Farber, Leonard Weschler, and others. The author is director of the Clinical Psychology Program and associate professor of psychology and education at Teachers College, Columbia University. This book updates an earlier work *Stress and Burnout in the Human Service Professions* (1983) by the author, and is intended for teacher education courses, professional educators, and members of the general public who are interested in education. According to Farber, the book is a " . . . rarity in the literature of either education or psychology—it is supportive of teachers."

Donovan Cook is assistant professor and director of field experiences in the Department of Education at Washburn University of Topeka.

Book Review

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION OUTSTANDING DISSERTATION AWARD

PURPOSE: To recognize exemplary dissertations by doctoral students in the field of school law. In addition to the traditional legal research type of dissertations, studies that utilize empirical research on specific problems will be considered. Topics selected should reflect a direct relationship between educational statutory and case law and its impact on school/university operations.

AWARD:

- * One year complimentary membership in NOLPE.
- * Presentation of a plaque during the annual convention.
- * Free convention registration for one year plus \$500 in convention travel expenses.

ELIGIBILITY: Dissertations defended or degrees awarded
between August 1, 1991 and July 31, 1992.

CRITERIA:

- * Theoretical base, i.e., legal theory.
- * Conceptually clear and important problem or hypothesis.
- * Comprehensive and relevant review of applicable literature.
- * Utilization of methodologically sound approach.
- * Cogent analysis of data.
- * Significant results and discussion.
- * Scholarly writing style and appropriate documentation.

PROCEDURE: By *August 1, 1992*, mail five (5) copies of the dissertation, which will not be returned to:

R. Craig Wood
Professor and Chair
Department of Educational Leadership
2403 Norman Hall
College of Education
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL 32611

In addition to the actual submission, the faculty member who makes, or supports, the nomination should submit a letter of endorsement attesting to the nominee's eligibility and specifying the meritorious nature of the dissertation.

A blind review process, with multiple readers, will be utilized in considering the submitted dissertations.

Although the NOLPE Outstanding Dissertation Committee makes every attempt to recommend a meritorious dissertation each year, the award will only be given if the Committee finds an exemplary dissertation.